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1 INTRODUCT ION
During a meeting with one of my supervisors, he asked me a
question which basically had the following meaning: “Why do
you want to defend economics that much?” The innuendo was
that a lot of my research appeared to be about finding loopholes
that would salvage the epistemic credibility of highly idealized
models. He was of course right. One implication of my work
is that we often mix up genuine understanding or knowledge
with epistemic frivolousness. Another implication is that I am
lending a hand to the social science that is already at the top of
the disciplinary hierarchy (Fourcade et al. 2015). For someone
whose initial impetus to study philosophy of economics was a
(very) critical attitude towards ‘the dismal science’ and who cited
Kropotkin in the students’ association journal, it may look as if I
took a bad turn somewhere along the way.1
Indeed, an important motivation of mine when beginning these
studies was to understand better on what grounds economists
were justifying their claims. I just had a hard time fathoming
why economists gave credence to their unrealistic models and
followed them for policy-making. It seemed to me that not only
their models were methodologically questionable, but that they
were also morally perverse.
My undergraduate professor of Aristotelian logic used to say
that ideas are like punching bags: you need to hit them hard to
test their robustness. If it was in a sense the ethics of economics
that prompted me to study the discipline, it is with the tools
of philosophy of science that I wanted to analyze and peel its
theoretical carapace. Understanding how economists rationally
justify the foundations they give to their science and assessing
whether or not we should grant our credibility to these justi-
1 For those who might be interested: “ ‘Struggle so that all may live this rich,
overflowing life. And be sure that in this struggle you will find a joy greater
than anything else can give.’ This is all that the science of morality can tell you.
Yours is the choice” (Kropotkin [1897] 2002, p. 113).
1
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fications is a task that, I believe, partly lies within the realm
of philosophy. What brought me to philosophy of economics
was by and large politically motivated, yet understanding—and,
why not, criticizing—economics nevertheless requires an honest
epistemological appraisal.
My honest epistemological appraisal quickly led me—after
long hours trying to make sense of F.A. Hayek’s at times inconsis-
tent epistemological prescriptions (Verreault-Julien 2010)—to eco-
nomic models. If you want to examine the work of blacksmiths,
you better look at how they handle hammers. The economist’s
toolbox is full of models of all shapes and sizes.
Today, if you ask a mainstream economist a question
about almost any aspect of economic life, the response
will be: suppose we model that situation and see what
happens. It is important, then, to understand what a
model is and what it is not (Solow 1997, p. 43).
If I wanted to understand economics, I had to understand
models. I quickly realized—after long hours scratching my head
over articles on scientific representation—that this was easier
said than done. As I had developed interests in issues concerning
scientific explanation and about the instrumentalism/realism
debate, I was immediately drawn to Reiss’s (2012b) “explanation
paradox” when I had to read it for a class. I viewed it as a very
fruitful way of approaching the problem of the epistemic import
of models in economics, but also more generally. ‘We have good
reasons to think that models explain, yet this is a conclusion that
we also have good reasons to resist. What should we do?’ Since I
did not believe that our theories of explanation were the problem
and since it seemed to me that the model-world relationship was
often very tenuous, then the only alternative was to conclude
that economic models did not explain. Despite my prima facie
preference for this verdict, Reiss yet again phrased one colourful
objection it was facing.
Why do economists build complex, mathematically
sophisticated models rather than, say, resort to creativ-
ity and intuition, crystal balls, hypothesis-generating
algorithms or consciousness-enhancing drugs? All of
introduction 3
these sources of inspiration would be a lot easier to
come by, and some of these would be more fun, than
doing the hard work of constructing and solving a
model (Reiss 2013c, p. 282).
There are probably a number of reasons why economists like
so much their models. Proficiency in mathematics has for some
time been considered very important for success in the discipline
(Colander and Klamer 1987; cf. Colander 2007). Mathematical
modelling is also often considered to be a mark of scientific rigour
(Backhouse 2010, 99ff.). And perhaps there is some truth to Paul
Krugman’s (2009) post-crisis pronouncement that “economists,
as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathe-
matics, for truth”. Regardless of the plausibility of each of these
explanations, it seemed to me it did not capture everything that
was going on and that I needed to give economic models, like
peace, a chance.
Thus, another explanation may just be that “simple models
of the type that economists construct are absolutely essential
to understanding the workings of society” (Rodrik 2015, p. 11).
Understanding, that was it. At the time when I started to work
on that topic, there had been a renewed interest in the notion
of understanding and in its relationship with its sibling/parent,
explanation. Since Hempel (1948; 1965a), the epistemology of
understanding had been for all practical purposes reduced to the
epistemology of explanation. Theories of scientific explanation
all claim explanations provide understanding (Achinstein 1983;
Michael Friedman 1974; Hempel 1965a; Kitcher 1981; Salmon
1984; Strevens 2008; Woodward 2003), but they view it solely as a
by-product of explanation and not as an object of study in its own
right. However, the year 2000s saw an important rehabilitation
of understanding as a notion worthy of inquiry (de Regt 2004,
2009; de Regt and Dieks 2005; de Regt, Leonelli, et al. 2009;
Grimm 2006, 2008, 2010; Khalifa 2011).2 It seemed to me that
2 Of course, ‘understanding’ has a long history in the philosophy of the social
sciences where the Weberian ‘Verstehen’ (interpretative understanding) was
distinguished with ‘Erklären’ (explanation). The current debate on understand-
ing has rather its roots in the more general debate on the nature of scientific
explanation. One underlying premise is that the sciences, natural and social,
all aim at producing understanding of empirical phenomena.
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understanding could be the key to offer a novel solution to the
explanation paradox.
The guiding idea behind my research has been that perhaps mod-
els do not explain, yet afford understanding. This solution, I thought
and still think, has maximum benefits for limited costs. What I
purported to do with this thesis is to lay the ground for an epis-
temological framework that reconciles plausible philosophical ac-
counts of representation, idealization, and explanation while also
taking seriously the economists’—and other scientists’—claim
that we understand the world better because of the models they
build. Not only do I think it is reasonable to believe that the
epistemic judgments of whole disciplines are not wholly mis-
guided, but I also think that it is what an ‘honest epistemological
appraisal’ calls for. Let us make the strongest case for models
and let us see where it leads us.
1.1 unrealistic assumptions and the ex-planation paradox
Do businesspeople act in a way to maximize profits? Do indi-
viduals have a perfect knowledge of the economy? Are there no
transaction costs? Are markets efficient? Are people only self-
interested? Is competition perfect? The short answer to all these
questions is a simple “No”. We know these statements, taken as
universal generalizations, to be false descriptions of the world we
live in. Yet, various economic models contain idealizations of this
sort. The long answer, as the vast literature devoted to discuss
the methodological implications of unrealistic assumptions, is
more complicated.
Indeed, the use and status of unrealistic assumptions has a long
history in economics. One of the first methodological treatise on
economic methodology was Mill’s (1844) Essays on Some Unsettled
Questions of Political Economy. Mill argued that the claims of
economics were true “in the abstract” (Mill 1844, 144-45, emphasis
in original). To know what would actually happen also requires
to know all the disturbing factors and other countervailing forces
as well as how they combine together.
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The problematic status of unrealistic assumptions came under
light during what has been called the ‘marginalist controversy’
(Backhouse 2009; Mongin 1997). Basically, the controversy stems
from a series of studies which showed that, contrary to what the
marginalist theory of the firm implied, firms were not actually
behaving in profit-maximizing fashion. Most famously, Hall and
Hitch (1939) used survey data to conclude that businesspeople
were not fixing prices using information about marginal cost and
revenue, but were rather following simple rules of thumb like the
‘full cost principle’. This principle involves calculating ex ante
the costs of producing a unit of output and then fixing its price
by adding a margin of profit to the costs.
The marginalist controversy sparked a debate on the status
of unrealistic assumptions. There are many ways to respond to
what appears to be deviating price-setting behaviour. One can
conclude that the profit-maximization theory shall be rejected,
one can simply reject the validity of the evidence, or one can
amend the theory so that full cost price-setting can be reconciled
with the data. At any rate, facing data that prima facie contradict
key theoretical assumptions, economists felt the need to provide
a methodological response.
The single most famous response to the controversy is Fried-
man’s (1953) The Methodology of Positive Economics.3 In this essay,
Friedman advocates what has often been interpreted as an instru-
mentalist position (Blaug 1992; Boland 1979; Caldwell 1994; Reiss
2012a).4 According to him, “the only relevant test of the validity
of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience”
(1953, 8-9, emphasis in original). In short, he claimed that the
realisticness of the assumptions was irrelevant to a theory’s ap-
praisal and that only its predictive power mattered. Friedman’s
text came to be “one of the most influential texts in the method-
ological literature of twentieth-century economics” (Blaug 2009,
p. 351; see also Boland 1989; Mayer 2009).
Despite efforts to legitimize the role of unrealistic assumptions,
the underlying concern raised by the marginalist controversy
was not completely dispelled. Indeed, issues concerning the sim-
3 Although similar to Friedman’s, but arguably philosophically sounder,
Machlup’s (1955) defence was not as influential.
4 For a dissenting interpretation, see Mäki (2009b).
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plifications, abstractions, and other idealizations are “the central
questions in economic methodology” (Hausman 2018, emphasis
in original). To what extent the idealizations of economics are
harmful or helpful is still to a large extent an open question.
A reason why a position à la Friedman can become question-
able is when we consider the goals of economics. Menger (1985),
for instance, recognized three aims to economics: explanation,
prediction, and control. If one only cares about the narrow pre-
dictive success of economics, perhaps there is no reason to “look
under the hood” (cf. Hausman 1992a, pp. 70-73) of theories. Per-
haps one can only judge a theory by its predictive capacity. This
is why Hausman (1998) argues that what is really at stake in
the instrumentalism/realism debate in economics is a question
concerning its goals: should they be purely practical (instru-
mentalism), or should they also be cognitive? If they are also
cognitive, like explanation, then determining the status of the
assumptions becomes a more pressing issue. For if the cognitive
goal of explanation requires truth, then false assumptions are
at first sight an obstacle to the achievement of this goal. One
key challenge unrealistic assumptions pose thus concerns the
explanatoriness of economic models.
But, one may ask, do economists actually aim to explain eco-
nomic phenomena? It appears they do. Economists regularly
ask explanation-seeking questions like ‘Why are there business
cycles?’, ‘Why did the 2007-08 financial crisis occurred?’, ‘Why
is there unemployment?’, or ‘Why did the 1970s suffered from
an episode of so-called ’stagflation’?’ All these questions call for
an explanation: we want to know why the events occur. We can
also find the language of explanation in textbooks or seminal
academic papers.
To understand how the economy works, we must
find some way to simplify our thinking about all
these activities. In other words, we need a model
that explains, in general terms, how the economy
is organized and how participants in the economy
interact with one another (Mankiw 2015, p. 22).
A competitive equilibrium model was developed and
used to explain the autocovariances of real output
1.1 unrealistic assumptions and the explanation paradox 7
and the covariances of cyclical output with other ag-
gregate economic time series for the post-war U.S.
economy (Kydland and Prescott 1982, p. 1368).
The proposed explanation correspondingly focuses
on generalized external economies rather than those
specific to a particular industry (Krugman 1991, p. 485).
[O]ur point is that many aspects of herd behavior
can be explained quite plausibly without invoking
these kinds of gains from association (Banerjee 1992,
p. 801).
But despite economists’ self-avowed goal of providing expla-
nations, whether they actually achieve it is a point of contention.
Can they explain the world if they rely on assumptions that we
know are descriptively false of the world we live in? Do shocks in
technology or productivity explain business cycles if there are no
such shocks? Would the greed of bankers explain why the Great
Recession occurred if bankers had not actually been greedy? Is
unemployment a voluntary decision if in fact people preferred to
work? In a nutshell, can unrealistic assumptions explain?
1.1.1 The explanation paradox
A contemporary characterization of this long-established problem
has been called the “explanation paradox” (Reiss 2012b). The
explanation paradox can be formulated this way:
1. Models are highly idealized; they misrepresent reality.
2. Our best philosophical theories of explanation require faith-
ful representation.
3. Yet, models appear to explain phenomena.
Reiss claims that there are good reasons for independently
holding these three propositions. However, since they are mutu-
ally inconsistent, this leads to a paradox; something has to give.
What I have always found interesting with the ‘paradox’ is that
it neatly showcases how various strands of the literature deal
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with the overarching issue of accounting for the explanatoriness
of economic models. Indeed, what Reiss’s explanation paradox
highlights is that there are already accounts that attempt to tackle
this issue and that these accounts are perhaps not as successful
as it seems.
There are basically three sets of solutions. The first attempts to
show that despite models using idealizations and misrepresent-
ing reality, they still capture true parts of the world we live in.
They simplify reality in order to ‘isolate’ the relevant explanatory
factors. If some parts of a model faithfully represent, the argu-
ment goes, then these may explain and thus the paradox vanishes.
Proponents of this solution are, for example, Cartwright (1989)
and Mäki (1992, 2009a). However, whether this is an appropriate
characterization of what models do is disputed. For instance,
Grüne-Yanoff (2011) argues that modellers do not aim to isolate
causal factors and that even causal factors of interest tend to
be idealized. Cartwright (2009) argues that since there are few
robust economic principles, then models must cope with a host
of structural assumptions which then also drive the results. Thus,
it becomes unclear what models are isolating in the first place.
The second set of commentators maintains that it is the require-
ment of faithful representation which is inadequate. According to
proponents of these solutions, philosophical theories are wrong
and models that misrepresent can still explain phenomena. If
misrepresentation and explanation are in fact compatible, this
may solve the paradox. While there were various theories of
explanation in the general philosophy of science literature which
relaxed this requirement (e.g. van Fraassen 1980; Kitcher 1981),
they have not been as influential as the causal account (Reutlinger
2017b). In the context of modelling, Sugden (2009, 2013), for one,
submits that models are akin to fictions and that judgments of
similarity between model and target underscore their explana-
toriness. According to him, these judgments are to some extent
subjective. But if a model needs to be similar to its target in order
to explain, then one may ask whether the model really fails to
faithfully represent. Unless one adopts a pragmatic concept of
similarity, it seems it does not solve the paradox. And if one does
adopt such a concept, there is still the problem that theories of
1.1 unrealistic assumptions and the explanation paradox 9
scientific explanation typically require (approximate) truth or
faithful representation.
The final set simply denies that models actually explain phe-
nomena. If we trust that our best philosophical theories are
correct and that models indeed misrepresent reality, then the
logical conclusion is to deny that they explain phenomena. Per-
haps models serve other purposes, e.g., heuristic ones, but do not
directly explain. When economists say that their models explain,
it should therefore be taken with a grain of salt. They do not
explain in the philosophical sense of the term. They may serve
other purposes, but explanation is not one of them. This solves
the paradox by showing that, in fact, practitioners’ judgments
are mistaken and that therefore the third proposition is false.
Advocates of this position are, for instance, Hausman (1992b),
Alexandrova (2008), Alexandrova and Northcott (2013), or Grüne-
Yanoff (2009, 2013a). For one, Alexandrova (2008) denies that
models per se explain. Instead, she claims, it is their material
concretization in the form of, for example, experiments that carry
the explanatory work. Grüne-Yanoff pursues a different strategy.
He denies that model actually explain, but claim they provide
so-called ‘how-possibly’ explanations. These how-possibly ex-
planations, he argues, can help us learn about the world under
certain circumstances. One problem Reiss (2012b) sees with this
line of defence is that it does not account for economists’ judg-
ments of explanatoriness. Denying that models actually explain
may solve the paradox, but it also comes at a hefty cost, viz.
attributing systematic error to practitioners.
1.1.2 A novel solution
From the time of my research master onwards, it seemed to me
there was another way of solving the paradox. Without claiming
that other answers are in all cases incorrect or fatally flawed,
I thought that a different—and in my mind better—solution
was available. In a sense, the following thesis can be viewed as
an attempt to ‘solve’ the explanation paradox. It builds on two
trends in contemporary philosophy of science and epistemology.
Firstly, whether causal explanation is the one and only type
of legitimate explanation is more and more put into question
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(Lange 2017; Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018a). If explanations do not
have to be causal, this is germane to the discussion insofar as
a lot of theoretical economics appears to be preoccupied with
achieving mathematical results more than establishing causal
knowledge. This suggests that “blackboard economics” (Coase
1992) and the widespread use of formal methods that is so often
decried (e.g. Blaug 2002; Chick 1998; Lawson 2009; Rosenberg
1992) may not be epistemically futile, after all.
Secondly, as I said above, there has been in the past fifteen
years or so a revival of taking the notion of ‘understanding’ as a
legitimate object of philosophical study. This was inaugurated in
work by, e.g., Trout (2002), de Regt (2004), and de Regt and Dieks
(2005). Historically, even though the close connection between un-
derstanding and explanation has long been recognized (Michael
Friedman 1974), ‘understanding’ has seldom received indepen-
dent attention, to the benefit of its parent term ‘explanation’.
Recent research studies if and to what extent the epistemology
of understanding can be reduced to the epistemology of explana-
tion.
Within this literature, one can find two distinct projects: 1)
providing an account of understanding that tells us under what
conditions explanations provide us with understanding, and 2)
providing an account of understanding such that understanding
can be achieved without an explanation.5 The second project is
of particular interest because traditionally having an explanation
was considered to be a sufficient and necessary condition for
understanding (Khalifa 2012). However, if understanding can be
had without having an explanation, that may the key to eating
our proverbial cake and eat it too; models may fail to explain, yet
afford understanding.
All that being said, what is more precisely this solution and
how does it fit in terms of the explanation paradox? Basically,
the overarching project of this thesis is to show that models
may provide epistemic benefits in the form of understanding
even when they do not actually explain or when they do not
provide causal knowledge. This solution challenges the third
proposition of the paradox, viz. that models explain. In this
respect, I therefore side with those who claim that economic
5 I owe this distinction to Nounou and Muller (2015).
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models do not typically explain phenomena by identifying its
true causes. However, the novelty of my approach is that it does
not come at the costs usually associated with this set of solutions.
These costs are of two kinds.
First, an undesirable implication of denying that models ex-
plain is that it seems to entail that economists are under a sys-
tematic and deep delusion about their own work. Economists
may think that they explain and provide understanding of the
world, but they are wrong and achieve neither. I consider that
this blanket claim does not readily fit with a broadly construed
naturalistic philosophy of science. Practitioners can of course
be wrong. But it is also undesirable for a philosophical account
to conflict with sentiments that are widespread in the practice
of a science. As Hausman argues, methodologists “should be
suspicious of accounts that attribute to economists egregious and
persistent errors” (2009, p. 40). That is not to say that philosophy
can’t criticize economics, but rather that we should be careful be-
fore dismissing a scientific practice that appears to afford genuine
understanding for economists.
An important motivation of mine is to take seriously what
practitioners think of their work and how they reveal their epis-
temic preferences by choosing to engage in theoretical modelling.
Despite all the valid criticisms one can raise against economics
and the practice of theoretical modelling, I believe that there is
a philosophical mistake in not taking scientists judgments more
at face value. Science is hard. Mistakes are unavoidable. And if
the past is any indication of the future, theories that we have
currently all the reasons to believe are true will turn out to be
mistaken, if not flat out wrong. Yet, we sent probes with golden
records outside the solar system. We eradicated smallpox. I can
call family and friends in Québec for free over the Internet while
walking in the streets of Rotterdam.6 We designed algorithms
that help people receive the kidney transplant they so direly need.
The burden of proof shall be on those who dismiss the epistemic
success of science.
The second cost is that denying the explanatoriness of mod-
els seems to imply denying they afford epistemic benefits tout
court. If models do not explain, then what are they doing for us?
6 I should probably do that one more often.
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Hausman (1992b) and Alexandrova (2008), for instance, argue
that models suggest causal hypotheses and thus have a heuristic
function. But even though this may be an important role of mod-
els, models also appear to afford us genuine insight into why the
world is the way it is. Reiss expresses a similar point:
To warrant their existence, models must do more
than to provide hypotheses. They must have some
genuine epistemic benefit. EP (Reiss 2012b) asks but
does not assume that this benefit is explanation. If
not explanation, however, there must be something
else [. . . ] (Reiss 2013c, p. 282).
This ‘something else’, I contend, is understanding. According
to the proposal I develop, it is possible to deny that models
explain while also granting that they afford understanding. It
hence responds to Reiss’s (2013c) demand that a philosophical
account of models grant them a genuine epistemic benefit. This
is a promising strategy insofar as economics seldom seem to
provide fully-fledged explanations of phenomena, yet appear to
offer some insight about the world. Hence, perhaps economists
do not explain the world, but this may not come at the cost of not
improving our understanding of it. We may have understanding
without an explanation.
But, one may object, am I not committing the same mistake,
i.e., going against practitioners’ judgments of explanatoriness?
I do not think I am, for two reasons. First, as Alexandrova and
Northcott (2013) acknowledge, denying that economic models
explain implies the need for an error theory: what may explain
that economists are mistaken? They suggest three possibilities:
1. ‘Explanation’ is an ambiguous term and economists may
not use it properly.7
2. People are prone to all sorts of cognitive biases, most no-
tably hindsight and overconfidence (see Trout 2002).
3) Explanatory intuitions are not conducive to reliable judg-
ments.8
7 Grüne-Yanoff (2013b, p. 258) proposes an explanation along these lines.
8 See Grimm (2009) for a more positive outlook on the reliability of these intu-
itions.
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Reiss (2013c) finds these three hypotheses lacking. While I
basically side with Reiss concerning 2) and 3), I think that 1)
deserves more consideration.9 Following a distinction due to
Salmon (1984) between ontic and epistemic explanations, Alexan-
drova and Northcott (2013) view the former type as explaining by
virtue of identifying the objective features of reality responsible
for the phenomenon, typically causes. By contrast, according
to Alexandrova and Northcott, epistemic explanations explain
by making the phenomenon expected, or less surprising. Since
they believe epistemic explanations to be inherently subjective,
they reject their validity and thus economists’ judgments. Reiss
argues—rightly—that this presumes that there is only one correct
type of explanation (ontic).
But, it seems to me, the relevant confusion that would explain
mistaken explanatory judgments is not so much between epis-
temic and ontic explanations, but rather, as Grüne-Yanoff (2013b,
p. 258) points out, between ‘how-possibly’ and ‘how-actually’ ex-
planations. Whereas a how-actually explanation (HAE)—or expla-
nation simpliciter—provides an account of how a phenomenon
actually occurred by citing its (approximately) true explanans
and explanandum, a how-possibly explanation (HPE) does not
provide such an account. As Reiss argues, “[a] ‘how-possible
“explanation” ’ is not an explanation. It is possibly an explanation”
(2013a, 111, emphasis in original).
Even though there is now a substantial literature (e.g. Craver
2006; Forber 2010; Reydon 2012; Grüne-Yanoff 2013a; Bokulich
2014; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014; Rice 2016) likening theoretical
models to HPEs, there is no established account that provides
clear criteria on how to demarcate them from HAEs. Philosophers
do not even agree on whether HPEs are a genuine species of
explanation (see Dray 1968; Forber 2010). If this is the case, then
it should hardly come as a surprise that scientists, economists in-
9 Without entering in the details, I consider that whereas 2) and 3) may be
plausible at the individual level, they are not at the level of whole epistemic
communities like economics. Science is organized such as to provide checks
and balances on the possible hubris of individual researchers. There may
be sociological reasons for why scientists adopt inadequate epistemic values
or methodologies, but I doubt these come from cognitive biases or the phe-
nomenology of explanation. Perhaps individual economists can be misled
about the explanatoriness of its models, but can a whole discipline be?
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cluded, mix up HAEs with HPEs. I thus agree with Grüne-Yanoff
(2013b, p. 258) who says that “[. . . ] committing this conceptual
confusion is hardly a crime, as no generally accepted account of
this distinction is extant”. In this sense, it is not so much that
economists are mistaken, simply that they use the same concept
of ‘explanation’ to describe two different exercises. And since we
do not have a clear account we can’t blame them for doing so.
In other words, I do not think that economists typically mistake
HPEs for HAEs (even though they might do so in specific cases),
but simply that they use the same words to describe the two.
The second reason I do not think I am going against practi-
tioners’ judgments is, in fact, quite similar to the first. When
economists tell us their models explain, I take the main contribu-
tion of the models to be that they afford understanding. The crucial
point is that even if I deny that models provide explanations—in
the HAEs sense—I do not deny the sort of epistemic contribution
they are making, i.e., understanding. Hence, if I am going against
the judgments of practitioners—and perhaps I am not at all con-
sidering the ambiguity between HAEs and HPEs—, it is only in
a very limited way. Furthermore, it is also a potentially far less
important mistake to attribute because the cognitive benefits are
categorically similar; economists are right to hold their models
afford understanding. Once more, if philosophers themselves do
not distinguish explanation from understanding, why should
we expect scientists to do so? As I do not think the failure is
with our account of explanation, I also do not think the failure
is with economists. Instead, the failure is with our account of
understanding.
In light of these two reasons, my solution does not imply
that economists are under a collective blameworthy delusion. It
offers a simple error theory—the lack of a suitable conceptual
framework—that does not depend on attributing biases, cogni-
tive or institutional, to practitioners. We can’t blame economists
for lacking in conceptual precision when philosophers commit
the same sin. If anything, philosophers should take responsibility
for not having cleared-up the muddy conceptual waters of expla-
nation and understanding. This thesis endeavours to participate
in the cleaning effort.
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It also remains within the realm of a naturalistic philosophy of
science, but one that still has some bite. If philosophy of science
should be careful before systematically condemning scientific
practices, it should also not condone them at all costs (Hausman
2009). The solution I propose strikes a reasonable balance be-
tween taking what economists do seriously, while also calling
attention to conceptual inaccuracies.
My project is therefore both philosophy and science-directed
(Currie 2015). It is philosophy-directed in that it looks at science
in order to claim and support philosophical theses. Examining
science may raise various challenges to traditional accounts of ex-
planation and understanding. For instance, theoretical modelling
suggests, among other things, that many significant epistemic
benefits models provide fall short of being (actual) causal expla-
nations. Looking at how science is conducted can pinpoint where
philosophy fails in reconstructing and appraising the results of
science.10 It is also science-directed in that philosophy can also
inform our appraisal of what science actually achieves and thus
change our perspective on the world.
This is why I believe a revised epistemology of understand-
ing, which my thesis contributes to, not only sheds light on
scientific practice, but can also provide new evaluative tools to
practitioners and methodologists alike. Notably, this allows to
take seriously the economists’ claim that their models improve
our understanding of the world. But it also allows to downplay,
when justified, their actual achievement.
1.2 foretaste
The main goal of this thesis is to examine and provide novel
ideas on how to map out the epistemic contribution of theoret-
ical models. The case of economics is interesting because of its
peculiarity as a highly mathematized social science and because
its empirical success is, to put it mildly, contested. Physics can
always point to, among other things, the Voyager probes drift-
10 Note that I wrote ‘reconstruction’, not ‘constructing’. The purpose of philosophy
is not foundational, science provides the foundations of science. Rather, it is to
judge to what extent we should give credence to its results.
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ing in space more than 15 billion kilometres away from earth to
vouch for the helpfulness of their idealized models. Biologists
can forecast the dynamics of populations of organisms and help
save endangered species.
Economics does not have such clear-cut achievements. If any-
thing, it might contribute to endangering said species. The recent—
and looming—international financial crisis was a dreadful re-
minder that the models need some adjustments. Famously, even
the Queen of England did not understand how possibly could
the whole discipline miss the mark by that much (Stewart 2009).
Economists were also divided in their solutions to the crisis.
While some countries went for stimulus packages—and thus
espousing a Keynesian perspective—, others went down the aus-
terity route and cut down on public spending.11 At any rate,
economics should be less divided about some of the solutions
it offers to the public. Here, I do want to say that there is no
empirical success, simply that it is clearly less obvious than in
other natural sciences.
Furthermore, the fact that economic models typically depict
worlds populated with agents no sane person would like to have
as friends casts doubt on their epistemic import. How possibly
could one understand actual economic phenomena using these
highly idealized models that so badly misrepresent the world we
live in?
Although I have talked a lot about economics so far, I have
to warn the reader that this thesis is not uniquely or particu-
larly about economics. At least, not how one might expect. There
are two reasons for this. First, many difficulties we have with
appraising the epistemic contribution of models are not spe-
cific to economics. Models are pervasive across the sciences and
whether or to what extent highly idealized models may explain
is a general problem (Batterman 2009; Batterman and Rice 2014;
Bokulich 2011; Graham Kennedy 2012; McCoy and Massimi 2018;
Morrison 2015; Potochnik 2017; Rice 2015; Wayne 2011; Weisberg
2013). As I said above, some lines of defence are not readily avail-
able to economics, for instance empirical adequacy. However,
economic modelling nevertheless shares common philosophical
11 It appears austerity was a mistake (Guajardo et al. 2014; Jordà and Taylor 2016;
Ostry et al. 2016).
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issues with other disciplines. Therefore, I developed my episte-
mological framework with generality in mind. Economics is the
motivation, not the final destination.
Second and relatedly, some problems we face when assess-
ing the contribution of specific models require taking a step
back. This means questioning and examining the underlying
epistemology. This is a strategy I pursue during much of the
thesis. As a matter of fact, the most detailed case study—from
economics—will only come at the end in chapter six. In a sense,
the previous chapters lay the logically prior conceptual ground
work. In practice, however, these previous chapters are heavily
indebted to my study of the Arrow and Debreu (1954) model
of general equilibrium. I partly lacked the language that would
have helped me articulate better my analysis, so I took on myself
to solve this. While looking at economics was instrumental in
reaching some of my views, it was ultimately the more general
epistemological framework that was in need of revision.
The five main chapters of this thesis were written as self-
standing articles. A modified version of chapter 4 is forthcoming
in the European Journal for Philosophy of Science. A slightly altered
version of chapter 5 is forthcoming in Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science Part A and a modified version of chapter
6 was published in the Journal of Economic Methodology. Even
though they are therefore in principle independent of each other,
they are united in their aim to contribute to the varied aspects of
the same larger project. In the following I introduce the chapters
as well as the issues they address and, hopefully, solve.
1.2.1 Chapter 2
Chapter 2 analyses what I call the inferentialist-behavioural ac-
count of understanding (InfBUn). Proponents of InfBUn suggest
that understanding is constituted by having knowledge of rela-
tions of dependence and being able to use that knowledge to
answer ‘what-if-thing-had-been-different’ questions (w-questions).
InfBUn is behavioural because it considers that actual inferential
performance is the key criterion for attributing understanding.
InfBUn, which is developed in a series of studies (see Ylikoski
2009; Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009; Ylikoski and Kuorikoski
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2010; Kuorikoski 2011; Ylikoski 2013; Ylikoski and Aydinonat
2014; Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015), offers an insightful and ex-
tensive defence of the epistemic import of theoretical modelling.
One reason why I devoted a whole chapter to it is because I
think it is to a large extent on the right track. I do believe that
knowledge of relations of counterfactual dependence and the
ability to put that knowledge to use are closely related to under-
standing phenomena. And I also believe that models improve
our understanding precisely by allowing to make more and bet-
ter counterfactual inferences. What motivated me to pursue this
analysis was not that I thought the account was wrong-headed.
To the contrary, it was that I felt compelled to identify what were
the potential weaknesses of the account and then look at ways it
could be improved.
I consider that InfBUn identifies many correct aspects pertain-
ing to understanding, namely that understanding can only be
achieved when certain facts of the matter obtain.12 I also agree
that understanding demands a sort of cognitive grip, or grasp,
that are not necessarily implied by common doxastic attitudes
like knowledge. It is not because Bob knows that the windmill
caused the polder to drain that he really understands what hap-
pened. He also needs to have some sort of grasp of why this is
the case.
That said, drawing on literature in epistemology and philoso-
phy of science, in this chapter I argue that InfBUn is inadequate.
First, I show that the behavioural concept of understanding can’t
properly distinguish illusory from genuine cases of understand-
ing. This is because it places excessive emphasis on actual infer-
ential performance as a criterion for understanding rather than
the ability proper. The ability to understand is best understood in
dispositional terms and that is precisely what their behavioural
notion inclines to reject. Second, I contend that it is not necessary
to have a behavioural concept of understanding in order to retain
compatibility with viewing models as extended cognition. Since
this is one motivation for adopting a behavioural notion, I thus
effectively defuse the two main reasons—distinguishing genuine
12 Whether understanding requires knowledge or simply true belief is a matter of
contention (see Hills 2016). However, no one argues that mere belief is sufficient
for understanding.
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understanding from the sense of understanding and compatibil-
ity with extended cognition—to adopt a behavioural notion of
understanding.
I the last section of this chapter I propose that InfBUn should
be better viewed as an evaluative account of understanding and
not as a substantive one. In short, I argue that while InfBUn
may be lacking as a substantive epistemological account, it may
nevertheless identify a relevant dimension according to which
we should attribute understanding (see Wilkenfeld 2017).
1.2.2 Chapter 3
While the previous chapter looked at the inferentialist-behavioural
account of understanding, this chapter examines what I call the
factive inferentialist account of representation (FInfR). FInfR claims
it is immune to the difficulties the traditional inferentialist ac-
count of representation (e.g. Suárez 2004) has with accounting
for the explanatoriness of models. In particular, FInfR aims at
showing how highly idealized models can provide explanations
given that explanations are supposed to be factive. In a nutshell,
FInfR holds that the correct ‘what-if’ inferential affordances of
a model are a sufficient condition on establishing explanatory
representation.
In the third section of the chapter, I argue that FInfR does not,
in fact, allow to demarcate merely phenomenological models
from explanatory ones. This is because of a crucial indeterminacy
within FInfR. What are correct ‘what-if’ inferences (w-inferences) is
either too ambiguous or too liberal. Basically, even if we grant
that correct counterfactual inferential affordances are sufficient
for (faithful) representation, not all counterfactual inferences are
explanatory. For instance, predictively successful models will in
a sense offer w-inferences. However, these models will not be
explanatory.
I then expound a programmatic dilemma FInfR faces. The
first option is to double down on deflationism, viz. dismiss-
ing any substantive criteria about successful representation. The
second one is instead to substantiate under which conditions
w-inferences are explanatory. I argue that the first horn is unde-
sirable because it implies abandoning FInfR’s main motivation,
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namely its commitment to the factivity of explanation and to re-
alism. I then show how the second horn is preferable and discuss
two possibilities. The first is to make a list of the sort of correct
w-inferences they consider to be explanatory. For instance, FInfR
could tie the notion of correct w-inferences along interventionist
lines (Woodward 2003). The second possibility is to sever the
link between explanation and understanding that FInfR assumes.
While it is plausible that all w-inferences may afford understand-
ing, as I argue they are not all explanatory. The benefit of this
last line of defence is that it provides an adequate solution to the
puzzle of model-based understanding, but at the cost of progress
on the puzzle of model-based explanation.
1.2.3 Chapter 4
The fourth chapter examines two sets of views one can commonly
find in the literature about the relationship between understand-
ing and explanation:
1. Causal knowledge is necessary for understanding.
2. Only explanations can provide that knowledge.
Following a terminology I borrow from Pritchard (2014), I call
the conjunction of these views, or tenets, the narrow knowledge
account of understanding (KnUn). This chapter has three aims.
The first is to show that narrow KnUn faces descriptive and
normative issues because it can’t account for scientific practices
that do not actually explain (e.g., theoretical models that offer
how-possibly explanations) and for those that do not explain
causally (e.g., mathematical explanations). Narrow KnUn does
not have the resources to describe these practices and has the
undesirable normative conclusion of ruling out these practices as
being able to afford understanding.
The second aim is to debunk the tenets of narrow KnUn. The
strategy I employ is to show that significant parts of the ex-
isting literature already and implicitly imply that the tenets of
narrow KnUn are false. In one section I observe that current
and numerous accounts of mathematical explanations constitute
counter-examples to the necessity of having causal knowledge
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for understanding. I consider objections, but ultimately reject
them and come to the conclusion that this tenet of narrow KnUn
is unwarranted.
In another section, I address a perhaps less evident issue,
namely that actual explanations of phenomena are not necessary
for understanding. To support my claim, I bring to the fore the
literature on how-possibly explanations, ‘explanations’13 that
that they do not explain actually, in the sense that they do not
cite, for instance, what actually caused a given phenomenon. If
how-possibly explanations may afford understanding, as we have
good reasons to think they do, then we should also reject the
second tenet of narrow KnUn.
The third aim is to propose an alternative to narrow KnUn,
one that I coin ‘broad’ KnUn. Broad KnUn, contrary to its narrow
sibling, makes the following two propositions:
1. Causal knowledge is not necessary for understanding.
2. Having an (actual) explanation is not necessary for under-
standing.
In particular, in the last section of this chapter I propose an
account of broad KnUn that builds on Reutlinger’s (2016) coun-
terfactual theory of explanation. I show that by amending the
veridicality condition of his theory in favour of what I call the
possibility condition, we are left with an account of understanding.
This account can accommodate, for instance, both mathematical
and how-possibly explanations. My proposal for broad KnUn
does not have the same descriptive and normative issues that
narrow KnUn has.
Notwithstanding its contribution to our comprehension of the
relationship between explanation and understanding and the
specific proposal of broad KnUn that I make, this chapter plays
a special role within the thesis. Indeed, the two propositions of
broad KnUn lay the foundation for the rest of the dissertation. It
serves as a bridge from the current state of the literature towards
more specific proposals on HPEs and economic models.
13 As I explain in the chapter, whether HPEs are a species of explanation is an
open question. The important point is simply to note that they do not explain
actually.
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1.2.4 Chapter 5
In chapter 5, I propose and develop a new account of HPEs.
HPEs are usually contrasted to HAEs. HAEs provide explana-
tory accounts of why or how phenomena actually occurred. The
concept of HPEs has a long history in the literature on scientific
explanation. Yet, as I show, it is subject to various interpretations
and other not always fortunate relabelling.
Using a distinction Strevens (2013) makes between the internal
and the external conditions for explanatory correctness, I classify
accounts of HPEs into two broad types: the Dray-type and the
Hempel-type. Roughly, the Dray-type regards HPEs as a different
species of the same genus ‘explanation’. According to this type,
HPEs are genuine and complete explanations in their own regard.
HPEs differ from HAEs in that they do not have the same internal
conditions; HAEs basically answer a different sort of questions
than HPEs. The Hempel-type instead holds that HPEs diverge
from HAEs not by their internal conditions, but by the external
ones.14 Hempel-type HPEs and HAEs have the same structure,
but the former lack sufficient empirical confirmation. Were they
(approximately) true, HPEs would be HAEs.
Considering the significant differences between the two types, I
then show that accounting for the epistemic import of theoretical
models by viewing them as HPEs can be misleading. For if we
do not have a proper account of what HPEs are and can do, then
the notion loses most of its philosophical usefulness. On top of
that, I also show that neither the Dray nor the Hempel-type are
adequate characterizations of models that offer HPEs. There is
therefore both a philosophical and practical need for a novel
account of HPEs.
This is precisely what the remainder of the chapter purports
to do. Basing my proposal on what various commentators take
HPEs to do—but without developing the idea—I suggest that the
fundamental feature of HPEs is that they provide knowledge of
possibility. In terms of internal conditions, I propose that HPEs
have different ones than HAEs, the latter being best character-
ized as propositions of the form ‘p because q’ whereas the former
14 Hempel-type HPEs technically are, as I explain in more details in the chapter,
‘potential explanations’ (Hempel 1965a).
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include a possibility operator and thus have the form ‘♦(p be-
cause q)’. This is different from the Dray-type in that it does not
characterize HPEs as answering a different type of questions
or as identifying necessary conditions for a phenomenon. It is
also different from the Hempel-type in that it acknowledges that
HPEs indeed have a different form and are not only false/not
known to be true HAEs.
As for the external conditions, propositions of the form ‘♦(p
because q)’ can have a truth value; they can be true or false.
Evaluating their truth requires at least a minimal amount of
relevant background knowledge. One has to assess the possibility
of the explanans, of the explanandum, and of the explanatory
relationship. Contrary to the Hempel-type, this implies that only
satisfying the internal conditions is not sufficient to qualify as
a HPE. A proposition is not a HPE only in virtue of its form.
Contrary to variants of the Dray-type, my characterization does
not require to identify any actual element, nor can it be satisfied
without at least minimal empirical support.
In the last section I come back to the initial motivation of
this chapter, namely to provide a characterization of HPEs that
clarifies issues pertaining to the epistemic import of theoretical
modelling. I argue that models should not be viewed stricto sensu
as HPEs; rather, models provide reasons to believe propositions of
the form ‘♦(p because q)’. Models are therefore not explanations,
but they enable or justify the beliefs we have in certain real-world
propositions like HPEs and HAEs. Acknowledging this evidential
role of models elucidates what is their relation with respect to
explanatory propositions and how they could, in a sense, provide
HPEs. However, what this does not settle is whether HPEs should
be regarded as a genuine species of explanations. That said, this
issue can be partly set aside since regardless of whether HPEs
are explanations, there is strong evidence that they may grant
similar epistemic benefits.
1.2.5 Chapter 6
This chapter is in a sense a culmination of what I discussed
so far. It draws on many insights (account of understanding,
broad KnUn, HPEs as possibility claims, etc.) and applies them
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to a specific case in economics, the Arrow and Debreu (1954)
model of general equilibrium. It is interesting to look at the
Arrow-Debreu model because it has been both very influential—
it laid the foundations for much of economics going forward and
earned each of its authors a Nobel prize—, but also very much
criticized. From the economists’ widely held judgment that the
model improved our understanding of economic phenomena to
some methodological appraisals (e.g. Blaug 2002) to the effect
that the model may have decreased understanding, there is, to say
the least, a slight discrepancy.
A potential solution to this problem is to draw on the literature
on HPEs. Perhaps the Arrow-Debreu model is similar to other
models (e.g., Schelling’s checkerboard model (1978) or Banerjee’s
(1992) model of herd behaviour) and provides a HPE of general
equilibrium. However, one difficulty with this interpretation is
that the contribution of the Arrow-Debreu model is first and
foremost a mathematical result. Whereas our current accounts
of HPEs in economics regard models as providing some sort
of causal knowledge, this can hardly be the case with Arrow-
Debreu. The main claims of this chapter is that their model of
general equilibrium provides a mathematical HPE and that this
HPE affords understanding not only of the model, but also of
the world.
To support these claims, I first present the historical back-
ground of the general equilibrium problem. I show that the
Arrow-Debreu model provided a solution to a problem whose
origin can be traced back to Smith’s ([1776] 1904) famous in-
visible hand. The modern interpretation of the invisible hand
hypothesis—the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics—
indicate that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. How-
ever, whether such an equilibrium could actually exist was a
separate but related question. While economists trusted the equi-
librium could exist, there was no conclusive evidence, not even
Walras’s (1954) model.
I then argue for the main claim of this chapter, viz. that the
Arrow-Debreu model is a mathematical HPE that affords under-
standing of the world. I first present some defining features of
mathematical explanations and show what sort of dependence
is involved in these cases. I then submit that the Arrow-Debreu
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model is not an actual mathematical explanation, but that it in-
stead provides a mathematical HPE. In particular, I argue that
even though the model can in principle receive a causal inter-
pretation, the how-possible problem economists were trying to
tackle was properly mathematical.
In the final section, I address the crucial issue of whether
the Arrow-Debreu model affords understanding not only of the
model, but also of the world. To do so, I draw an analogy with
causal HPEs as discussed by Ylikoski and Aydinonat (2014). Af-
ter presenting the distinction between understanding the world
and the model, I show that proving the existence of the gen-
eral equilibrium was motivated by the fact that it could inform
economists, albeit minimally, about its actual existence. This is
because mathematical claims can serve an evidential role with
respect to causal claims. For if the equilibrium would be math-
ematically impossible, then this would be evidence that it is
causally impossible. Therefore, there is an important sense in
which the Arrow-Debreu model is also an inquiry about the
world.
Since this is an important aspect of the account of model-based
understanding that I use, I finish this section by showing what
sort of w-questions the Arrow-Debreu model allows to answer.
By establishing relations of mathematical dependence between
certain assumptions and the theorems of existence, the model
constrains the economic space of possibility. We can infer that
if some conditions were not satisfied, then there would be no
general equilibrium. This is even truer if we consider the cluster
(see Rodrik 2015; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014) of models that
use similar assumptions and that test their robustness.
I end by defusing two objections: 1) that since the model fail
to identify robust conditions, then it can’t afford understanding
and 2) that any mathematical model could afford understand-
ing, which is an undesirable conclusion. I respectively argue
that failure of robustness may be a significant achievement in
that it shows what conditions should be satisfied for the gen-
eral equilibrium to actually exist and that not all mathematical
HPEs are born equal, some fail to establish relevant relations of
dependence.
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1.3 final prolegomena
One general implication of my research is that understanding is
an epistemic benefit that can be had in the absence of an actual
explanation and that, as a consequence, it has less demanding
requirements than explanation. Have I made economists’ and
other scientists’ life too easy by providing them with a framework
within which most of what that they do could be viewed as
affording understanding? I do not think so for three reasons.
The first is that while I believe there are good arguments to
the effect that we need to be more liberal in our attributions of
understanding, of course not anything goes. We need criteria
to distinguish genuine from illusory understanding, spurious
science from fruitful one. I have explicitly discussed a form or
another of this objection in all the chapters. As I see it, research
on the boundaries of understanding has just begun. Perhaps I
have been too generous, but one conclusion I am sure of is that
understanding is more prevalent than some of our philosophical
accounts would have us believe.
The second reason is that nothing that I said implies that what
Northcott and Alexandrova (2014) call an ‘efficiency analysis’
can’t or should not be done. This analysis consists in asking
whether particular exercises of theoretical modelling pay off in
terms of solving actual and important problems. That is indeed
a very important question and one about which my research is
agnostic. As far as economics is concerned, figure 1.1 shows that
there is already an important trend towards more empirical work.
The majority of resources appear to be put on approaches that
deal directly with the collection and analysis of data.15
That said, whether there is still too much theoretical modelling
in economics or other sciences is of course an open question.
It may indeed be the case that, for instance, too much energy,
time, and money was invested in proving the existence of an
equilibrium. Perhaps the benefits in terms of understanding were
not worth the costs. As in everything, it is likely there are bad
investments in understanding. Having said that, this question
is orthogonal to the problem of formulating an epistemological
15 This is even more the case if we assume that empirical research is more
expensive than theoretical work.
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Figure 1.1: Changing methodology of economics
Source: Hamermesh (2013)
framework that allows to conceptualize in a fruitful manner the
epistemic benefits models may give. The task I undertook was to
work on such a framework, but it is of course important that we
carry further research on the efficiency of theoretical modelling.
I do not consider that my work overestimates the benefits and
conceals the costs of modelling. Rather, it simply allows for a
more fine-grained assessment.
The third reason is that I believe that a new account of the
relationship between understanding and explanation allows us
to assess better the epistemic contribution of various epistemic
practices. Traditionally, the problem of the epistemic contribution
of models was like a switch, on or off. Either models explain and
thus afford understanding, or they do not. But since “understand-
ing admits of degrees” (Elgin 2007, p. 36), we need to be able
to distinguish cases where models afford us limited understand-
ing to those where it is more deeper or broader. In particular,
this raises the question about where, on the spectrum of under-
standing, explanation begins. For instance, economists appear
to mix-up providing actual explanations with providing HPEs
(Grüne-Yanoff 2013b). So they may be right that their models
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afford understanding, but they may be too hasty in claiming
they explain. And if explanations are the ideal of understand-
ing (Khalifa 2013b), it may show that economics often fall short
of that ideal. Economic models may afford understanding, but
ultimately what we expect from them is that they provide expla-
nations.
Opening the door of understanding does not imply we can’t
judge its quantity or quality. It just means we need to roll up our
philosophical sleeves and figure out what is understanding with
models.
4 UNDERSTAND ING DOES NOTDEPEND ON (CAUSAL )EXPLANAT ION
4.1 introduction
The epistemology of understanding has traditionally been related,
if not reduced, to the epistemology of causal explanation. A
prominent view on the epistemology of scientific understanding
(understanding hereafter) and explanation submits that one has
understanding of a phenomenon only if one has an explanation of
it. Furthermore, explanations are usually taken to be of a specific
sort, namely causal. Causal explanations provide understanding
in virtue of the causal knowledge they provide. I characterize
the combination of these two views as the narrow knowledge
account of understanding (narrow KnUn). Narrow KnUn has
two tenets: 1) causal knowledge is necessary for understanding
and 2) only explanations can provide that knowledge.
I show that these tenets are descriptively and normatively
inadequate because they can’t account for scientific practices
that do not actually explain (e.g., theoretical models that offer
HPEs) and they can’t account for non-causal explanations (e.g.,
mathematical explanations). I argue for a broadening of narrow
KnUn, the broad knowledge account of understanding (broad
KnUn), which does not face these problems.
In section 4.2 I give a brief overview of narrow KnUn. Section
4.3 spells out the descriptive and normative issues narrow KnUn
gives rise to. I then argue in section 4.4 that causal knowledge is
not necessary for understanding and in section 4.5 that having
an explanation is also not necessary. In section 4.6 I present an
alternative, broad KnUn.
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4.2 the two tenets of narrow knun
One can find two sets of views concerning the relationship be-
tween understanding and explanation in the literature, viz. that:
1. Causal knowledge is necessary for understanding.
2. Only explanations can provide that knowledge.
Proponents of the latter set consider that explanations are the
only legitimate source of understanding, for instance:
The resulting objectivist, ontic, account, in generic
form, states that scientific understanding is the state
produced, and only produced, by grasping a true
explanation (Trout 2007, pp. 584-585).
[U]nderstanding amounts to (a) knowing that the ex-
planans is true, (b) knowing that the explanandum
is true, and (c) for some l, knowing that l is the cor-
rect explanatory link between the explanans and the
explanandum (Khalifa 2012, p. 26).
An individual has scientific understanding of a phe-
nomenon just in case they grasp a correct scientific ex-
planation of that phenomenon (Strevens 2013, p. 510).1
In a nutshell, what these accounts say is that one can’t under-
stand without an explanation. According to Trout, it is important
to separate the sense of understanding, which can be a mislead-
ing phenomenology, from the genuine understanding one obtains
when being in possession of a true explanation. Khalifa maintains
that a distinct concept of understanding adds nothing to what
he calls the “Explanatory Model of Understanding” (EMU). For
Khalifa, having scientific understanding is a matter of having
explanatory knowledge. Similarly, Strevens argues that what he
calls the “simple view” adequately depicts the connection be-
tween explanation and understanding. For him, the epistemology
of explanation precedes and guides the epistemology of under-
standing. One understands why something is the case, according
1 See also Strevens (2008, p. 3).
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to Strevens, when one not only grasps a state of affairs, but also
its correct explanation.
It is important to bear in mind that Strevens and Trout do
not claim that knowing an explanation is sufficient for under-
standing.2 Indeed, the ‘grasping’ condition may require a state or
ability on top of knowledge. This is why Strevens (2013, p. 510)
does not reduce understanding to explanation. However, grasp-
ing can be related to knowing. Indeed, as Strevens (2013, fn. 6)
indicates, his account is compatible with the view that knowl-
edge is necessary for grasping. Trout is not as explicit as Strevens,
but nevertheless suggests that one might “treat grasping as a
kind of knowing” (2007, p. 585). In short, perhaps knowing an
explanation is not sufficient—one may need to grasp it—, but
to grasp a true explanation one may need to know it.3 That
said, the important point is that one needs to stand in the ap-
propriate epistemic relation—e.g., knowing, grasping, believing,
etc.—with an explanation to understand. Explanations are the
bearer of the information that affords understanding and without
an explanation there is no understanding.
Trout’s, Khalifa’s, and Strevens’s accounts thus all assert that
an explanation is necessary for understanding. If this is true,
one may then ask what sort of explanation may provide un-
derstanding. In point of fact, one characteristic that competing
theories of explanation share is their lack of agreement over what
affords understanding. For this reason, discussions about the
nature of scientific explanation have largely focused on what
information affords understanding: e.g., for Hempel (1965a) it is
nomic expectability (given by laws of nature), for Salmon (1984)
it is information about the causal history of a phenomenon, for
Michael Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1981) it is unification, and
for Woodward (2003) it is patterns of causal counterfactual depen-
dence. These accounts started, in a sense, with the basic notion
2 Khalifa (2013c) argues that the crucial cognitive ability involved in understand-
ing, which we may call grasping, is the ability to conduct a reliable explanatory
evaluation. See also Khalifa and Gadomski (2013).
3 There is also a debate over whether understanding, unlike knowledge, can be
‘lucky’ (see, e.g, Hills 2016; Khalifa 2013c; Morris 2012; van Riel 2016; Rohwer
2014). More minimally, we could say that what is required is to have true beliefs
about the explanation. Nothing here hinges on how this question is settled.
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of understanding and then used it to explicate their notion of
explanation.
Despite the existence of alternative theories of explanation
(e.g. Achinstein 1983; Batterman 2002; van Fraassen 1980; Kitcher
1981; Ruben 1990), the causal account of explanation has emerged
as the currently dominant view (Lange 2017; Potochnik 2015).
As Reutlinger and Saatsi (2018b, p. 2) observe, “[t]he state of
the field after six long decades suggests that something close
to a consensus was reached: scientific explanation is a matter
of providing suitable information about causes of the explanan-
dum phenomenon”. As such, accounts of causal explanation
received tremendous philosophical attention and analyses of cau-
sation have been a major topic of philosophical research. On the
contrary, “non-causal scientific explanations have been largely
neglected by philosophy of science” (Lange 2017, p. xii). One can
find many proponents of the causal account of explanation in the
literature, for instance:
Here is my main thesis: to explain an event is to provide
some information about its causal history (Lewis 1986,
217, emphasis in original).
Scientific explanations, from which such understand-
ing derives, are often, if not always, causal (Salmon
1998, 2, emphasis in original).
Understanding is not some sort of super-knowledge,
but simply more knowledge: knowledge of causes
(Lipton 2004, p. 30).
As maintained by the causal account of explanation, the na-
ture of the information that affords understanding is causal. Put
differently, a causal explanation is one that provides information
about the causes, processes, or mechanisms that bring about
the phenomenon to be explained. Pritchard (2014), from whom I
borrow the terminology, calls this underlying epistemology of un-
derstanding the ‘knowledge account of understanding’ (KnUn).
In short, “the idea is that understanding is essentially a type of
knowledge–viz., knowledge of causes” (Pritchard 2014, p. 315).
A consequence of the dominance of the causal account of expla-
nation is that having causal knowledge is de facto viewed as
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necessary for understanding. Since causal explanations provide
this knowledge, knowing a causal explanation thus becomes the
pathway to understanding.
According to the first set of views discussed, having an expla-
nation is necessary for understanding. According to the second
set of views, causal knowledge is necessary for understanding.
These are the two tenets of what I call narrow KnUn. According
to narrow KnUn, one has understanding only if:
1. One has knowledge of causes;
2. That knowledge is provided by an explanation.
As shown, narrow KnUn incorporates two common views
about the relationship between understanding and explanation.
The qualifier ‘narrow’ emphasizes that within narrow KnUn only
knowledge of causes is a source of understanding and that only
explanations can provide that knowledge. In other words, it is
narrow because it states that knowing a causal explanation is a
necessary condition for understanding. Of course, each of these
tenets can in principle be held independently. For instance, one
can consider that having an explanation is necessary and be a
pluralist about the sorts of explanations there are (e.g. Khalifa
2012). In fact, as we will see, they are also not equally contro-
versial. Hence, narrow KnUn is not so much an actual thesis
than a useful characterization of widespread—at least taken
individually—positions in the literature on explanation and un-
derstanding. Using it as a foil allows to assess better the costs
and benefits of holding these tenets, conjointly or individually.
Furthermore, it also allows to see in which direction we need
to amend our current accounts to relax the unduly restrictive
nature of narrow KnUn.
4.3 narrow knun: its limits and diagno-sis
Holding narrow KnUn does not come without costs. A significant
one is that it has difficulty making sense of the epistemic value
of actual scientific practices. Debates on scientific representation,
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idealizations, and the explanatoriness of models are striking
evidence that our epistemology of understanding suffers from
important lacunae. For if it could straightforwardly accommodate
how science is conducted, then these debates could be settled
much more easily. As a matter of fact, an important motivation to
revise the relationship between explanation and understanding
is precisely this difficulty of reconciling our epistemology of
understanding with actual science. Narrow KnUn is descriptively
and normatively inadequate. Descriptively, narrow KnUn can’t
account for scientific practices that:
1. Do not provide explanations, yet provide causal knowledge.
2. Provide explanations, but not causal ones.
Normatively, it has the undesirable implication of ruling out
large parts of science as improving our understanding.
Firstly, there are cases in which scientists cite causes that are
not known to actually obtain, but where they nevertheless con-
sider citing them to provide understanding. Following common
usage, these ‘causes’ do not explain because they are not the
actual causes of a given phenomenon. Yet, as we will see in sec-
tion 5, scientists think that they afford understanding. Not citing
actual causes therefore does not appear to be necessary for under-
standing. Scientists are regularly engaged in activities, theoretical
modelling being a prime example, that they consider to afford
understanding, but do not explain. Thus, from the perspective of
narrow KnUn, it is rather unclear—if not outright inconceivable—
how highly idealized models could improve our understanding
of the world. For if knowledge of (actual) causes is necessary to
explain a phenomenon, and if models do not always identify ac-
tual causes, then how could they afford understanding? Narrow
KnUn has no room for practices whose goal is not to provide
causal knowledge of that sort.
Secondly, narrow KnUn can’t account for explanations of the
non-causal sort. Analyses of scientific understanding have put
emphasis on knowledge of causes since providing this knowl-
edge is a hallmark of what science does. However, as section
4.4 will show, there are cases of non-causal explanations, for
example mathematical explanations. Since they do not provide
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causal knowledge, narrow KnUn would therefore commit us to
conclude that mathematical explanations are not, in fact, explana-
tions and for this reason can’t afford understanding of empirical
phenomena. However, the point of contention in debates over
mathematical explanations is not so much whether they actually
explain empirical phenomena—commentators and practitioners
alike reckon they do—but rather, how we could account for them?
Narrow KnUn is of no help here.
In consequence, if we give due credit to the cases I will present
in the following sections, then narrow KnUn can’t provide a nor-
mative account of science. Due to a lack of conceptual resources, it
appraises actual scientific practices—e.g., mathematical explana-
tions and theoretical modelling—as not affording understanding.
One important desideratum of an account of understanding is
that it provides evaluative criteria for assessing when understand-
ing has been achieved. The sense of understanding (see Trout
2002; Ylikoski 2009) can be a misleading cue for genuine un-
derstanding, the state of actually understanding. We want to be
able to demarcate cases of genuine understanding from illusory
ones. As such, it must be recognized that misunderstanding is a
possibility.
However, another important desideratum is that the account
does not rule out entire areas of science as not being conducive
to understanding. A naturalistic outlook on science should com-
pel philosophers to not attribute systematic and persistent error
across different fields of science. While narrow KnUn scores
very well on the first desideratum, it does poorly on the sec-
ond. It provides clear and explicit criteria for judging whether
understanding is genuine, but at the cost of making illusory
understanding dubiously prevalent. Indeed, one implication of
narrow KnUn is that we have to conclude that a very important
part of what scientists do does not afford understanding because
it either does not provide causal knowledge or does not provide
an explanation.
An account of understanding with such implication is suspect.
The problem is that causal knowledge and explanations are sim-
ply very hard to obtain. Restricting understanding only to cases
where one has a causal explanation appears to place unduly
constraints on what counts as genuine understanding. Perhaps
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having knowledge of causes can be seen as an ideal (Khalifa
2013b), but surely there must be some epistemic benefits in the
form of understanding for results that fall short of that achieve-
ment. In other words, achieving something other than knowledge
of causes or of an explanation should not necessarily entail a
complete lack of understanding. We may sometimes have good
reasons to doubt that scientists are overly optimistic concerning
some of their results. However, the fact that our epistemology of
understanding would rule out a large part of what scientists do as
not promoting understanding is still an unwelcome conclusion.
Having identified two problems with narrow KnUn, a question
remains: what features of narrow KnUn generate these problems?
As we have seen, narrow KnUn states that only causal knowledge
provided by an explanation can afford understanding. Narrow
KnUn has these problems precisely because it:
1. Restricts the type of knowledge to knowledge of causes.
2. Restricts the source of (causal) knowledge to explanations.
In other words, narrow KnUn considers that having a causal
explanation is necessary for understanding. We need an episte-
mology that is both stringent, but also in line with how science
is actually conducted.
Now that we have the diagnosis, what is the treatment? I
claim that narrow KnUn needs to be broader. Consequently, I
will present a version of what I call ‘broad KnUn’. Broad KnUn
contradicts narrow KnUn in two ways. It asserts that, for under-
standing:
1. Causal knowledge is not necessary;
2. Having an (actual) explanation is not necessary.
In other words, broad KnUn broadens the knowledge—i.e.,
not only knowledge of causes—that affords understanding and
broadens the ways this knowledge can be acquired.4
4 Whether narrow KnUn states sufficient conditions for understanding is a
different question. While it appears prima facie plausible, here I remain agnostic
over this issue.
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What I think a better fleshed out notion of understanding can
do is precisely to help us solving these problems in two different
ways. Firstly, it allows for the possibility of such a middle ground
between non-explanatoriness and understanding. Secondly, it
helps to address the assessment problems above by spelling out
more clearly what is the nature of the benefits provided. It also
gives space for non-causal approaches to understanding.
One can already find philosophical positions that, as we shall
see, are in agreement with broad KnUn. Broad KnUn, as I will
show later on, combines existing philosophical insights. There-
fore, broad KnUn is not as controversial as it may seem. Rather,
it is in a sense the natural development of the latest work on
explanation and understanding. In the following sections, I will
show how some current positions already presuppose broad
KnUn and then propose an epistemology based on them.
4.4 is causal knowledge necessary?
The first tenet of narrow KnUn is that causal knowledge is nec-
essary for understanding. Even though it has been the de facto
position in philosophy of gscience for the past decades (Reut-
linger 2017b), it is also the more controversial of narrow KnUn’s
two tenets. Indeed, there is now a burgeoning literature on non-
causal explanation (e.g. A. Baker 2012; Baron et al. 2017; Batter-
man 2002; Batterman and Rice 2014; Lange 2013, 2017; Pincock
2015; Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018aSaatsi:2016aa) whose aim is to
show that there are cases of explanations which can’t count as
being properly causal. The literature thus already proposes many
counterexamples to narrow KnUn’s first tenet.
Even current prominent accounts of causal explanation are
now more liberal. For instance, despite the fact that their main
focus is on causal explanation, Woodward (2003, pp. 220-221)
and Strevens (2008, sec. 5.7) briefly indicate that the criteria they
propose for explanatory relevance could also be applied to non-
causal explanations.5 There is thus a prima facie strong case for
rejecting that causal knowledge is necessary for understanding.
5 Woodward’s insight, in particular, has recently received some attention (e.g.
Grimm 2010; Pincock 2015; Reutlinger 2016).
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In fact, the case for the “liberal consensus” (Reutlinger 2016) is so
strong that I will simply rehash important aspects of the debate
and consider some objections.
An important class of plausible non-causal explanations are
what Lange (2013) calls ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’,
i.e., explanations of physical phenomena that can properly be
seen as mathematical, but not because they employ mathematics.
Many causal explanations are formulated using mathematical
expressions, but distinctively mathematical explanations are ex-
planatory because of the mathematical facts they cite. These expla-
nations have received a lot of philosophical attention lately (e.g.
Baron 2016; Baron et al. 2017; Batterman 2010; Bueno and Coly-
van 2011; Lange 2013; Pincock 2015; Saatsi 2011). Even though
there are still debates over how exactly these explanations work,
there is clear support for the idea that science sometimes explain
physical phenomena with mathematical facts. And if this is the
case, then distinctively mathematical explanations are a direct
counterexample to the first tenet of narrow KnUn.
One simple but convincing example is the bridges of Königs-
berg case (Lange 2013; Pincock 2007; Reutlinger 2016). Leonhard
Euler (1741) provided an explanation of why it is impossible to
cross all seven bridges of Königsberg exactly once through a sin-
gle path. He proved that the mathematical structure instantiated
by the bridges, a graph, made it impossible because:
1. not all parts of Königsberg were connected to an even
number of bridges, and;
2. nor were exactly two parts connected to an odd number of
bridges.
In other words, there was no Eulerian path—a path that visits
every edge in a graph exactly once—one could follow to achieve
the desired result. It is a mathematical impossibility. In virtue
of the isomorphism between the actual layout of the bridges in
Königsberg and the mathematical structure, Euler’s proof showed
on what the (im)possibility of crossing the bridges only once
depended. The Königsberg example is a simple and intuitive case
where mathematical relations of dependence carry explanatory
work. Knowing the mathematical facts established by Euler plus
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the particulars of Königsberg afford understanding despite the
absence of causal knowledge.
Different interpretations of why this constitutes an explana-
tion can be given. Lange (2013) argues that it explains because it
shows, in a modally stronger sense than causal impossibility, why
the explanandum is the case. The specific causal structure instan-
tiated does not make a difference to the explanandum the way
the mathematical facts do. These facts necessitate the explanan-
dum in a stronger way than the causal factors. The mathematical
explanation goes beyond contingent causal facts about Königs-
berg. As for Reutlinger (2016), he argues that the generalization
used by Euler is mathematical and intuitively non-causal. That
generalization, conjoined with details about the arrangement,
entails the explanandum, i.e., the impossibility to cross all the
bridges once. The generalization, Reutlinger says, also supports
counterfactuals. Indeed, we know that if all parts of Königsberg
were connected to an even number of bridges, then there would
be an Eulerian path. Regardless of which interpretation is correct
between Lange and Reutlinger, there is agreement that there is a
class of explanations that does not appeal to causal knowledge
and which should be considered mathematical.
Proponents of narrow KnUn can respond to cases of distinc-
tively mathematical explanations in two ways. First, they can
deny that non-causal generalizations may afford understanding.
They can do so by, for example, challenging that these cases are
genuine explanations. Second, they may simply retort that what
appear to be non-causal generalizations are, in fact, causal. Both
avenues are implausible.
The first objection is the simplest to counter. First, there is very
few opposition that these cases represent genuine instances of ex-
planations (cf. Strevens 2018). Second, denying that they explain
and afford understanding may oppose practitioners’ judgments
of explanatoriness (Pincock 2015). Third, as I argue in more detail
in section 6.5.1, it is plausible that they indeed do explain. The
question is thus not so much if they explain, but in virtue of
what.
The second objection is the most serious. One could argue,
as Strevens (2018) does, that the mathematical proof within dis-
tinctively mathematical explanations only serves to grasp better
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the real causal difference-makers, namely the physical setup. For
him, the mathematics illuminates the reasons why the differences-
makers effectively make a difference. Euler’s proof, for example,
would help in grasping the explanation, but would not explain
itself. The explanation, according to Strevens, is causal, not math-
ematical.
There is certainly a sense in which the causal facts act as
difference-makers. Had all parts of Königsberg been connected
to an even number of bridges, an Eulerian path would have been
possible. One could then go on and build bridges so as to make
the walk possible. But if the mathematical proof is necessary
to grasp which physical details matter, why should the latter
receive all the explanatory credit? By citing the causal facts and
omitting the mathematical proof, we would not gain understand-
ing. Whereas causal facts are sufficient for understanding in
ordinary causal explanations, they are not in the case of distinc-
tively mathematical explanations. It is only because we grasp
the mathematical facts that we can understand why the physical
set up matters in the particular way that it does. Ultimately, it
is thus not the causal facts that afford understanding. If this is
the case, then there is really a class of explanations that do not
appeal to causal knowledge to afford understanding. Rather, the
information that conveys understanding is a sort of non-causal
dependence.
But even if we accept that Strevens is right—despite the evi-
dence to the contrary—concerning cases such as the Königsberg
bridges, we would still need an argument for why distinctively
mathematical explanations are in principle always causal. How-
ever, there is no such argument. At the very least, these examples
put the burden of the proof on the advocates of narrow KnUn to
argue why we can’t regard them as mathematical explanations.
In light of cases of distinctively mathematical explanations, we
have to conclude that the first tenet of narrow KnUn, namely
that causal knowledge is necessary for understanding, is unwar-
ranted.
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4.5 is explanation necessary?
If the first tenet of narrow KnUn is more controversial, the second,
namely that one needs to have an explanation to understand
why, is more widely accepted. Under this view, explanations are
the sole providers of knowledge that afford understanding. An
explanation is essentially just a set of propositions that connects
an explanans to an explanandum in the right way (Strevens 2013).
While it is uncontroversial that explanations provide the right
kind of propositions and structure, what reasons do we have
to believe that non-explanatory propositions conveying suitable
information cannot provide understanding?
The strategy I follow here is very similar to Lipton’s (2009).6
According to him, understanding should be identified with the
benefits that explanations provide rather than with the explana-
tions themselves. His strategy is thus to identify ways of getting
the same type of information that explanations typically provide
without passing through an explanation. In a similar fashion,
I would like to show that the kind of benefits that constitute
understanding—e.g., having causal knowledge—can be acquired
without having an explanation.
One important source of knowledge conducive to understand-
ing phenomena is referred to in the philosophy of science litera-
ture as HPEs (Bokulich 2014; Forber 2010; Grüne-Yanoff 2013b,a;
Rohwer and Rice 2013; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). A termi-
nological disclaimer is now essential. As their names suggest, it
may seem that HPEs and HAEs are simply different species of
the same genus ‘explanation’. If it is the case, then arguing that
having an explanation is not necessary because HPEs may af-
ford understanding would be misleading. Having an HPE would
amount to having an explanation and thus it would say nothing
about the necessity of explanation for understanding. So we first
need to find out whether HPEs are explanations or not.
Without entering too much in the details since chapter 5 dis-
cusses HPEs at length, HPEs are to be contrasted with HAEs.
HAEs give an account of how phenomena actually occurred.
6 Strevens (2013) explicitly disagrees with some of Lipton’s examples, but says
nothing about the general approach. See Khalifa (2013b) for an in-depth analysis
of Lipton’s strategy, its success, and limitations.
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HPEs have the form of HAEs, but do not provide the same sort of
actual accounts. In other words, HPEs satisfy internal conditions
of adequacy—the explanation’s structure—whereas HAEs satisfy
both internal and external—correspondence to the world—ones
(Strevens 2013).7 For instance, I could, using phlogiston theory,
provide an internally correct explanation of the phenomenon
of combustion. However, the theory does not actually explain
combustion because there is no such entity as phlogiston. The
explanation is false and does not meet the external conditions
of adequacy.8 To give another example, Ptolemaic astronomy
provided an internally correct explanation of the motion of the
planets using a geocentric cosmology and epicycles. But since the
theory is false because it depicts, among other things, the earth
at the centre of the solar system and planets as moving along
epicycles, it is not externally correct and thus not a HAE.
For the purpose of my argument, what is important to bear
in mind is that what narrow KnUn requires for understanding
is to have a HAE, not merely a HPE. The textual evidence of
the previous section makes this plain. Strevens explicitly denies
that potential explanations—or HPEs—afford understanding of
phenomena. He indicates that grasping a correct explanation
“requires grasping that the propositions expressing a relevant
model’s explanatory content are true, or in other words, under-
standing that the states of affairs represented by those propo-
sitions obtain” (2013, p. 512). This requirement is clearly not
satisfied by most cases of HPEs discussed in the literature since
they depict either false—or not known to be true—explanantia
or explananda. Their explanatory content is false and therefore
7 What I say here is in principle orthogonal to the scientific realism debate. As
Khalifa (2011) argues, to say that explanation is necessary for understanding
does not imply the factivity of the explanans. It only requires the explanation
to be correct according to some metric, e.g., empirical adequacy. A HPE thus
can simply be an explanation that is not correct or not known to be correct.
But, of course, many accounts require the (approximate) truth of the explanans
for understanding (e.g. Strevens 2013; Trout 2007; Woodward 2003).
8 There is also a distinction to be made between understanding with a theory
or model, also sometimes called objectual understanding (see Khalifa 2013a;
Kvanvig 2003), and understanding why. We are here only concerned with the
latter. It is thus possible to understand combustion with phlogiston theory
while not understanding why. To understand why some externals conditions of
adequacy need to be fulfilled.
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one can’t, according to narrow KnUn, reap understanding from
them. The issue therefore does not hinge on whether HPEs are
a species of explanation. The issue is rather whether a HAE is
necessary for understanding. According to proponents of the
second tenet of narrow KnUn, it is.
But if HPEs may afford understanding, as the literature sug-
gests, then it would imply that having a HAEs is not necessary,
notwithstanding narrow KnUn. That HAEs are not necessary
for understanding is precisely what contemporary discussions
of scientific modelling show. The philosophical challenge is to
make sense of a widespread practice—theoretical modelling—
across the sciences that seemingly afford understanding without
explaining in the HAE sense. Scholars took up the challenge and
developed accounts of modelling as HPEs in response.
An oft-discussed example in the literature is Schelling’s (1971,
1978) checkerboard model of residential segregation. According
to Sugden, an economist himself, the checkerboard model “tells
us something important and true about the real world” (2000,
p. 2). W. A. V. Clark and Fossett (2008, p. 4109), both social
scientists, consider the model “was critical in providing a the-
oretical basis for viewing residential preferences as relevant to
understanding the ethnic patterns observed in metropolitan ar-
eas”. Prior to the checkerboard model, social scientists believed
that only strong discriminatory preferences–i.e., racism–could
lead to residential segregation (Aydinonat 2007; W. A. V. Clark
and Fossett 2008; Grüne-Yanoff 2009; Sugden 2000). The model
showed that it was possible that preferences for not being in a
minority status could also produce the same pattern of segrega-
tion, a result that has proven to be very robust across changes of
assumptions (Muldoon et al. 2012).
The checkerboard model is often interpreted as having pro-
vided a HPE of residential segregation (e.g. Grüne-Yanoff 2013a;
Weisberg 2013; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). The model does
not make any specific claim about the actual mechanism produc-
ing instances of residential segregation. More precisely, it is not a
HAE of segregation since we do not know whether it explains
any actual instance of that phenomenon. Instead, it answers a
general how-possibly question, namely “how is it possible for
92 understanding does not depend on (causal) explanation
segregation to happen in a city without collective preferences for
segregation?” (Weisberg 2013, pp. 118-119).
Even though the model represents phenomena in a highly
stylized manner and even though the mechanism it depicts is not
known to be actual, it still appears to provide causal knowledge
about the phenomenon. Using the model, we know that if the
mechanism were true, under suitable conditions residential seg-
regation could be brought about. We know that it could actually
depend on those factors or, conversely, that it does not necessarily
depend on strong discriminatory preferences (Grüne-Yanoff 2009;
Reiss 2008; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014).
Knowing that some causal factors may bring about residential
segregation improves our understanding of the phenomenon
even though we do not know what actually causes it. It may
do it in various ways. It can expand our ‘menu’ of possible
explanations (Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). It can also license
w-inferences about phenomena (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015;
Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). Or it can contradict impossibility
theses people hold (Grüne-Yanoff 2009). All these accounts sug-
gest the checkerboard model, read as providing a HPE, can afford
understanding or can teach us about real world phenomena.
Another widely discussed example in this literature on HPEs
(e.g. Sugden 2011; Rohwer and Rice 2013; Rice 2016), this time
at the intersection of biology and economics, is the use of game
theory models of animal competition (e.g. Maynard Smith and
Price 1973; Maynard Smith and G. A. Parker 1976). These models
helped investigate the phenomenon of restraint in animal com-
bat. For instance, it may be expected that individual members
of the same species would develop weapons or strategies and
fight to death in order to gain selective advantages like mates or
resources. However, that is not what happens. Rather, individuals
typically display restraint and solve their conflicts conventionally,
viz. without significant cost to the participants. This appeared
to go against individual selection. Group selection was thus be-
lieved to be the adequate explanation. For if it may not be in
the interest of the individual to show restraint, it certainly is
beneficial for the species if its members are not regularly gravely
injured. Maynard Smith and Price were interested, using a com-
puter model, to examine “whether it is possible even in theory
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for individual selection to account for ‘limited war’ behaviour”
(Maynard Smith and Price 1973, p. 15). They concluded that their
analysis is “sufficient to show that individual selection can ex-
plain why potentially dangerous offensive weapons are rarely
used in intraspecific contests [. . . ]” (1973, p. 17). In other words,
the model shows that restraint in contest between individuals
of the same species benefit not only the species as a whole (the
group), but also the individuals. Contrary to what was expected,
a ‘limited war’ strategy can also benefit individuals’ fitness. To
explain that behaviour, it is not necessary to resort to group
selection. Individual selection is sufficient.
One interpretation of that model is that it “produces some
understanding of how individual selection could possibly lead
to restraint in situations of animal conflict” (Rohwer and Rice
2013, p. 341). As such it aims to answer a how-possibly question,
namely how individual selection could bring about restraint in
combat. Commenting on this type of modelling, Maynard Smith
(1978, p. 52) said that “[t]he role of optimization theorizing in
biology is not to demonstrate that organisms optimize. Rather,
they are an attempt to understand the diversity of life”. In a
similar vein, biologists Arnott and Elwood (2008, p. 529) note
that our “understanding of this variation [of forms of contests for
resources] was boosted by the application of game theory (May-
nard Smith and Price 1973; G. A. Parker 1974), which examined
how different strategies might be used by each contestant and
how the winner is determined”. Even though they do not satisfy
the typical empirical external conditions associated with HAEs,
both the judgement of practitioners and philosophical analyses of
specific cases of theoretical modelling lead to the conclusion that
HPEs can provide understanding. Proponents of the second tenet
of narrow KnUn could dispute this conclusion on two grounds.
They could contend that HPEs are, in fact, explanations in the
required sense of narrow KnUn. Or, they could deny that HPEs
can afford understanding. However, neither horn of the dilemma
is readily available to them.
Firstly, it is implausible to regard all HPEs as being HAEs.
Reydon (2012), for instance, argues that what Forber (2010) calls
global HPEs are actually genuine explanations of type-level phe-
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nomena.9 Since the point of narrow KnUn is precisely that only
HAEs can provide understanding, this would be a successful
way of defusing the claim that HPEs can afford understanding.
However, the fact that some HPEs should perhaps rather be
considered as HAEs does not exclude that others are genuine
HPEs. As I already pointed out, Strevens (2013) stresses that an
explanation must be externally correct, that is, it must contain a
true explanans, in order to afford understanding. Reutlinger’s
(2016) veridicality condition requires that both the explanandum
and the explanans must be true in order for the relationship to
be explanatory. HPEs, by definition, do not satisfy these criteria
because either the explanans or the explanandum is false or not
known to be true. Furthermore, there are clearly cases—e.g., the
ones discussed above—that do not satisfy them. Insofar as em-
pirical support is lacking for the explanans, models similar to the
checkerboard or the Hawk-Dove examples can’t qualify as HAEs.
So even though some HPEs could better be viewed as HAEs, not
all can. For this reason, narrow KnUn can’t account for them.
Secondly, if one rejects the claim that HPEs afford understand-
ing, this would imply that exemplary cases of theoretical mod-
elling are epistemically suspect. That many contemporary philo-
sophical accounts as well as practitioners’ hold that HPEs afford
understanding is strong evidence that they actually do so. Insofar
as practice is correctly described, the burden of proof should be
on those philosophical accounts that want to deny HPEs can
afford understanding, not on practitioners.
In a related but separate discussion, Fumagalli (2016) argues
that both the checkerboard and the Hawk-Dove models, inter-
preted as ‘minimal models’—that is, models that supposedly lack
any representational features—can’t justify a change of confi-
dence in necessity or impossibility theses (see Grüne-Yanoff 2009).
The checkerboard model, for instance, affects our confidence in
the thesis that only strong discriminatory preferences can bring
about residential segregation. Fumagalli may be right as far as
minimal models thus defined are concerned. But this does not
imply that HPEs need be minimal models. Actually, the mistake
seems to rest in regarding the checkerboard and the Hawk-Dove
9 Forber (2012) claims nothing really hinges on that distinction because for him
global HPEs are a kind of explanations.
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models as minimal. The checkerboard model may afford under-
standing precisely in virtue of some similarity or resemblance
between the world and the model (Sugden 2009; Ylikoski and
Aydinonat 2014). To maintain that the mechanism depicted by
the checkerboard model is causally possible indeed appears to
require at least a minimal assessment of its similarity with the
actual world. One could nevertheless argue, as Resnik (1991) and
Reydon (2012) do, that HPEs are in fact HAEs or merely serve
heuristic purposes. But what is at stake is not whether HPEs
are a species of explanations or not, but whether they afford
understanding. Reydon, however, does not specifically address
this issue. The fact that HPEs lack full empirical support does not
necessarily imply they can’t afford understanding. Furthermore,
HPEs may sometimes serve heuristic purposes, but other times
they may also afford understanding. The checkerboard model
seems to do both. It suggests a novel empirical hypothesis that
can orient future research, while also allowing to answer various
questions about residential segregation. The two functions are
not necessarily mutually exclusive.
It might be the case that scientists are sometimes too optimistic
about results from HPEs or that they mistake some HPEs for
HAEs. There might thus be cases of HPEs that do not improve
our understanding. However, such negative readings do not
imply that HPEs can’t, out of principle, afford understanding.
Descriptively, denying this capacity to HPEs is infelicitous as
actual practitioners consider they afford understanding. However,
the normative point may still hold, viz. that practitioners are in
fact mistaken. That said, proponents of narrow KnUn would
need to offer a plausible argument for why we should consider
they are indeed mistaken. Arguments of that kind are currently
lacking.
If HPEs may afford understanding, as it is plausible they some-
times do, then narrow KnUn faces a serious objection: it ap-
pears that having an explanation, in the sense of a HAE, is not
necessary for understanding. Whereas HAEs of course afford
understanding, HPEs may also.
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4.6 broad knun
In the two preceding sections I argued that the two tenets of
narrow KnUn are false. Broad KnUn, I contend, provides an alter-
native epistemology of understanding that fulfils the desiderata
set forth in section 4.3. In particular, accounting for scientific
practice should not come at the cost of blurring the difference be-
tween illusory and genuine understanding. It should also make
salient the relationship between explanation and understanding.
I would now like to provide a more positive characterization.
One fruitful way of advancing towards a more formal character-
ization of broad KnUn is to look at Reutlinger’s (2016) theory of
counterfactual explanation. This is because it already embraces
one element of broad KnUn, namely it welcomes non-causal
knowledge. Reutlinger’s theory aims at capturing the ‘common
element’ of causal and non-causal types of explanation with-
out necessarily being tied to an interventionist interpretation
of counterfactuals. Reutlinger’s strategy is to stay as close as
possible to the Woodwardian (2003) spirit of causal explanation,
while making room for non-causal generalizations to serve as
explanantia. An important motivation of his is precisely to accom-
modate mathematical explanations such as the widely discussed
Königsberg bridges case (see, e.g., Pincock 2007). According to
Reutlinger, a relation between an explanans and an explanan-
dum is explanatory iff it satisfies the following conditions (2016,
p. 737):
veridicality condition Generalizations G1, . . . , Gm, the auxil-
iary statements S1, . . . , Sn, and the explanandum statement
E must all be (approximately) true or be well confirmed.
implication condition G1, . . . , Gm and S1, . . . , Sn logically
entail E or a conditional probability P(E|S1, . . . , Sn).dependency condition G1, . . . , Gm support at least one coun-
terfactual between S1, . . . , Sn and E.
Since Reutlinger’s theory allows for non-causal generalizations,
it already incorporates the first tenet of broad KnUn. The con-
ditions he states are those that explanations (i.e., HAEs) must
satisfy. Accordingly, his theory leaves out the second tenet of
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broad KnUn, viz. that an explanation is not necessary for under-
standing.
The first step that will allow us to filter out understanding from
explanation is by identifying in virtue of what explanations pro-
vide understanding. To put it in Lipton’s (2009) terms, we have to
separate the benefit explanations provide—understanding—from
the explanations themselves. Reutlinger is not explicit about this,
but since his theory is an extension of Woodward’s (2003), we
can find indications there. For Woodward, explanations provide
understanding because they convey information that is relevant
to answering w-questions about a phenomenon of interest. One
understands when one obtains information about counterfac-
tual dependence that allows to answer these questions. We thus
see that what is key to understanding is the information some
propositions provide, information that is closely related to the
satisfaction of the dependency condition.
Broad KnUn expands on the idea that it is essentially informa-
tion about counterfactual dependence that contributes to under-
standing, regardless of whether it is causal or not, and, crucially,
regardless of whether it is obtained through an explanation or
not. Reutlinger’s theory already accommodates non-causal de-
pendence by modifying the dependency condition. Having an
explanation implies that certain relations of dependence actu-
ally obtain. This information that explanations provide allows to
answer w-questions. But is it possible to answer some ‘what-if-
things-had-been-different’ questions about a phenomenon even
if the relations of dependence are not actual? The challenge for
broad KnUn, therefore, is to show that having an explanation is
not necessary for satisfying the dependency condition. Put differ-
ently, how could the dependency condition, which appears to be
essential for understanding, be satisfied without the veridicality
condition?
Reutlinger proposes an account of explanation and explana-
tions are usually taken to be factive, i.e., they give true accounts
of the facts. The function of the veridicality condition is precisely
to ensure the factivity of explanation. False generalizations would
not explain an explanandum and true generalizations would not
explain an explanandum that is known to be false. For a set
of propositions to count as an explanation, both the explanans
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and the explanandum must be true. But what if the veridicality
condition is not satisfied? What if the generalizations are false or
not known to be true? What if the explanans or explanandum are
merely possible? Put differently, what if we have a HPE? Accord-
ing to Reutlinger’s account, this would imply the relationship
is not explanatory. However, if we accept the compelling evi-
dence that HPEs may provide understanding despite the fact that
they contain false explanantia or explananda, then this suggests
that the veridicality condition is not necessary for understand-
ing. Since we can obtain understanding from false explanantia
or explananda, the veridicality condition may be necessary for
explanation, but not for understanding.
This indicates that we can disentangle the condition for ac-
tual explanation in Reutlinger from the core constituents that
specifically concern understanding. We can achieve this result,
I submit, simply by amending the veridicality condition. Ac-
cordingly, we can modify the theory of explanation to achieve a
theory of understanding. I propose that the relationship between
an explanans and an explanandum affords understanding iff:
possibility condition The generalizations G1, . . . , Gm, the
auxiliary statements S1, . . . , Sn, or the explanandum state-
ment E are (im)possible according to the relevant modal
interpretation and epistemic goal.
implication condition Generalizations G1, . . . , Gm with the
auxiliary statements S1, . . . , Sn logically entail E or a con-
ditional probability P(E|S1, . . . , Sn).dependency condition G1, . . . , Gm support at least one coun-
terfactual between S1, . . . , Sn and E.
In other words, I propose to amend the veridicality condition
for what I call the possibility condition.10 Essentially, it relaxes the
explanatory requirement that the explanans and explanandum
be actual. What is actual is possible, but what is possible is not
necessarily actual. Explanations require that all its constituents
are actual, but not understanding.
10 Reutlinger and others (Reutlinger 2017a; Reutlinger, Hangleiter, et al. 2018)
themselves suggest that HPEs do not satisfy the veridicality condition. The
possibility condition I put forward is a novel proposal.
4.6 broad knun 99
This fits very well with accounts of HPEs that view them as
describing “how a set of parts and activities might be organized
such that they exhibit the explanandum phenomenon” (Craver
2006, 361, my emphasis). They show how an event could possibly
occur or how known processes can lead to different outcomes
(see also chapter 5). This, in turn, affords understanding of real
world phenomena. For instance, the checkerboard model exhibits
a possible causal mechanism—possible causal generalization—
that can bring about residential segregation, which is an actual
phenomenon. However, the model itself does not explain residen-
tial segregation because we do not know whether it is actually
that mechanism that produces segregation. Yet, the checkerboard
model affords understanding by virtue of showing how it could
be brought about. It supports counterfactuals of the form ‘If
individuals had not strong discriminatory preferences, then resi-
dential segregation could still occur’. More generally, it allows to
make various counterfactual inferences about the phenomenon
of residential segregation (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015; Ylikoski
and Aydinonat 2014). Despite the fact that it does not satisfy
the veridicality condition, it does satisfy the possibility and the
dependency conditions. If it were the case that preferences for
not living in a minority status cause the phenomenon, then we
would have an explanation. We would also of course understand.
But we can also understand even when we lack an explanation
insofar as the dependency condition is satisfied.
The “(im)possible according to the relevant modal interpreta-
tion and epistemic goal” clause within the possibility condition
makes explicit that 1) there are various ways we can deem a
proposition to be (im)possible (Lange 2009; Kment 2012) and 2)
that understanding is achieved on the background of a specific
epistemic goal. Many HPEs, for instance the checkerboard model,
display possible causal dependence. However, other cases may
appeal to different modalities (e.g., epistemic, nomic, metaphys-
ical, etc.). In mathematical explanations, the relevant modality
is mathematical or logical. The truth or falsehood of possibility
claims is reached on the background of the suitable facts, de-
pending both on the modality and on the epistemic goal. To say
that something is logically possible does not imply that it is also
causally possible. The same constraints do not apply. For the
100 understanding does not depend on (causal) explanation
purpose of scientific understanding, causal, epistemic, or nomic
possibility are perhaps the most relevant types. Broad KnUn,
however, does not rule out a priori the sorts of possibilities or
relations of dependence that may afford understanding.
To make this clearer, let us use an example discussed by
Strevens (2013), that of the young earth creationists. They pur-
portedly explain the formation of the Grand Canyon by citing
one massive flood occurring over a short period of time. The
flood would have laid down most of the different rock layers and
the flood would have dug the canyon itself. Strevens says that he
“cannot think of any conversational context in which it is correct
to say, without frantic hedging, that the young earth creationists
understand the formation of the Grand Canyon” (2013, p. 513).
That they do not understand follows from Strevens’s requirement
that one needs to grasp a correct explanation in order to under-
stand. The great flood explanation is false, i.e., its explanans is
not true in the sense that it is not actual. The Grand Canyon was
actually formed by other geological processes, namely by sedi-
ment accumulation, plate movement, and slow erosion. Recent
evidence suggests large parts of the canyon may be as old as 70
million years (Flowers and Farley 2012), a far cry from the young
creationists’ claim.11
But does relaxing the veridicality condition imply that compa-
rable cases may satisfy the possibility condition and thus afford
understanding? If so, it may imply that the possibility condition is
too liberal since utterly wrong-headed HPEs could afford under-
standing. Since one desideratum of an account of understanding
is to allow demarcation of illusory from genuine understanding,
this would be an unwelcome implication of broad KnUn. Again,
offering a descriptively adequate epistemology of understanding
should not make it too easy to obtain.
I agree with Strevens that the young earth creationists’ great
flood explanation does not afford understanding. Here, it is
important to take into consideration what is the relevant modal
interpretation for a given epistemic purpose. This allows to clarify
11 The age of the Grand Canyon is an on-going debate. Scientific advocates of
a ‘young’ canyon date its origin to about 5-6 million years. In any case, we
are still far from the young earth creationists who claim the earth was formed
between five and ten thousand years ago.
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how exactly a HPE contributes, or not, to understanding. If one
asks ‘How possibly could have the Grand Canyon been formed?’,
the question can most appropriately be interpreted as a request
for causal information about the Grand Canyon. One wants to
know how the Grand Canyon could have possibly been causally
formed. Hence, not only is the young earth creationists’ great
flood explanation actually false, but according to what we know
about geological processes, this could not have happened the
way the young earth creationists claim. In other words, the great
flood explanation does not qualify as being a HPE and is not an
appropriate answer to the how-possible question above.12
By that, I mean that the causal generalization linking the flood
to the canyon is not only inconsistent with what we know about
the causal history of this specific case, but also with other more
general causal facts. It conflicts with the fact that geological
processes forming canyons operate over long periods of time,
not during one year. And while floods may produce certain
geological formations (e.g., the Channeled Scablands in the US,
see V. R. Baker and Bunker (1985); Waitt (1980)), the floods are
local, not global. It also contradicts scientific facts about the age
of the earth and of the Grand Canyon. Or it can hardly account
for the presence of fossils in the different rock layers. What
makes the young earth creationists’ explanation an inadequate
answer to the how-possible question is not so much the fact that
floods can play a causal role, but the precise way they claimed
it happened and how inconsistent it is with everything else we
know about geological processes. In a nutshell, it just could
not have happened the way the young earth creationists claim.
The great flood explanation thus does not fulfil the possibility
condition since the how-possibly request calls for information
about causal possibility, which the young earth creationists do
not provide.
It also does not satisfy the dependency condition because the
generalization linking floods and the Grand Canyon does not
support the right kind of (true) counterfactuals. For instance, the
12 Of course, young earth creationists would most probably disagree with this
statement. The flood causing the formation of the Grand Canyon is consistent
with their other background beliefs. Here I am assuming that the geological
sciences provide reliable empirical information.
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young earth creationists’ explanation implies that the following
counterfactual is true: ‘Had there been a great flood, the Grand
Canyon would have been formed as a result’. However, that coun-
terfactual is false. Perhaps if other geological processes would
also have been sufficiently different the flood could have formed
the canyon, but this qualification is not part of the young earth
creationists’ story. Absent changes to these other processes, the
flood would not have brought about the Grand Canyon. It is at
best unclear what sort of w-questions the great flood explanation
may answer.
All that said, since the possibility condition allows for impossible
explanantia and explananda, does this mean the great flood gen-
eralization would, on reflection, afford understanding? It could,
but only in a specific set of circumstances. Let us suppose that
we did not know that a flood during a very short period of time
could have dug the canyon and laid down the rock layers, but
that we did know that the actual explanation involved erosion,
sediment accumulation, and plate movement. One question we
may ask ourselves is whether other causes, like the flood, could
have brought it about. We may thus build a model or simulation
in which we try to generate the Grand Canyon with an intense
flood as the main causal driving force. In order to achieve this
result, we would most probably need to assume very different
geological conditions and processes than the ones currently exist-
ing. In doing so, we would thus learn about the contingency, or
necessity, of the actual explanation. We would also learn to what
extent the actual world would need to be different for the flood
to have the capacity to form the canyon. As Weisberg argues in
discussing similar examples of impossible explananda, modelling
the impossible is a sound scientific practice which may afford
understanding.
Why should theorists who are primarily interested in
studying what is actual try to understand what isn’t
actual? The answer to this question cuts deep into
the heart of theoretical practice: Theorists ultimately
aim to partition the space of possibilities. They aim to
understand what is possible, what is impossible, and
why (Weisberg 2013, p. 128).
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What this shows is that whether a given HPE affords under-
standing or not depends on what is exactly achieved and on
the context of enquiry. Whereas the young earth creationists’
specific ‘explanation’ brings nothing to the table in terms of un-
derstanding, we can imagine slightly different scenarios where
investigating the conditions under which a flood could have
formed the Grand Canyon would yield understanding. We un-
derstand better the Grand Canyon if we establish, say, that it is
impossible to generate it with known initial conditions and a
great flood as a possible process. Or that it is possible that a flood
forms the Grand Canyon, but only if the world would have been
a very different place. These generalizations may for instance sup-
port the counterfactual that ‘Had there been a flood, the canyon
would not have been formed as a result’. The crucial difference
between this illustrative case and the young earth creationists’
one is that the latter does not identify relevant possible causal
generalizations and that these generalizations do not support
counterfactuals.
Another way of illustrating this point is to briefly consider
the cases of phlogiston theory or Ptolemaic astronomy. As I
said in section 4.5, both theories rely on false generalizations
and therefore do not explain. Looking at these cases with our
contemporary eyes, shall we say they afford understanding?13
Our account of understanding should view these cases as offering
at best a limited understanding of nature. As with the young
earth creationists’ case, much depends on what we take the
relevant w-questions to be. Both theories are famously unable
to answer some questions that concern the phenomena they are
supposed to explain. For instance, phlogiston theory has trouble
supporting counterfactuals concerning the combustion of metals
since some gain weight instead of losing it. Moreover, not only
are their generalizations false, they provide a wrong-headed
picture of the world.
So perhaps we might say that they depict impossible explanantia—
e.g., the earth at the centre of the universe—, but whether phlogis-
ton theory or Ptolemaic astronomy would satisfy the possibility
13 I want to set aside the question whether phlogiston theory, for instance, in-
creased understanding of its contemporaries. This is out of the scope of this
chapter.
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and dependency conditions again depends on the epistemic goal
and what sort of counterfactuals are under investigation. For
example, one might be interested in exploring what difference it
would make if the earth were at the centre of the universe. This
may help understand why the world is the way it is. However,
that is a different epistemic goal than what Ptolemaic astronomy
purported to do.
My proposed account of the conditions under which the re-
lationship between an explanans and an explanandum affords
understanding, therefore, has the resources to discriminate be-
tween genuine and specious cases of understanding. While broad
KnUn seeks to be as accommodating as possible in order to re-
flect actual scientific practice, it also imposes limits on what can
count as affording understanding. The possibility and depen-
dency conditions provide criteria according to which we can
assess whether or not a relationship affords understanding.
One final objection may be the following: does discarding the
veridicality condition imply that understanding is not factive?
Reutlinger’s (2016) veridicality condition originates from the
usual requirement that explanations are factive. We may not
need factive explanations for understanding, but we still want
understanding to be factive. How can we have factive understand-
ing without (factive) explanation? We can because the function of
the veridicality condition, as it is formulated, is simply to ensure
the relationship could be part of an actual explanation, not that it
would afford understanding. An explanation is constituted by an
actual explanandum and an actual explanans. A possible or false
explanans does not explain an actual explanandum. That being
said, a relationship that does not satisfy the veridicality condition
may afford understanding. Indeed, it should not obscure the fact
that generalizations can still support counterfactuals, and thus
satisfy the dependency condition, even if the explanans or the
explanandum are merely possible.
This is, in fact, the determining component of understanding.
As we have seen above, it is information that allows to answer
w-questions that is relevant for understanding (Grimm 2010;
Woodward 2003). Explanations provide that kind of information,
as HPEs can do. We can truthfully answer some w-questions
even when we lack the actual explanation. For example, the
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checkerboard model shows that residential segregation could, in
suitable conditions, be brought about if individuals had certain
preferences. Since we consider the mechanism to be causally
possible, we can use that information to answer ‘what-if’ ques-
tions. It therefore satisfies the dependency condition. To know
that an explanandum may depend on a possible explanans is
genuine knowledge of dependence and is, in that sense, factive.
Likewise, that a possible explanans supports at least one counter-
factual implies that we can evaluate its truth. Understanding is
therefore still factive because it relies on matters of facts about
possibility and counterfactuals. One would not understand with-
out knowledge of possibility or without truthful assessment of
counterfactuals. Knowing that something is possible responds to
facts about possibility. This makes understanding factive. Broad
KnUn therefore does not necessarily come at the cost of having
to reject the factivity of understanding.14
4.7 conclusion
Neither tenet of narrow KnUn is necessary. In other words, un-
derstanding does not depend on causal explanation. Amending
Reutlinger’s (2016) theory of counterfactual explanation as sug-
gested above yields a sound basis for an epistemology based
on broad KnUn. Upholding narrow KnUn comes at the price
of having an epistemology of understanding that can’t appraise
neither descriptively nor normatively some actual scientific prac-
tices. We do not have to pay that price. Broad KnUn avoids all
the problems that beset its narrow counterpart only at the cost
of pushing to their logical conclusions various positions one can
already find in the literature. Within broad KnUn we can easily
view HPEs as affording understanding even though they do not
actually explain. We can also see mathematical explanations as
having the capacity to afford understanding of the world. Broad
KnUn thus has a lot of normative appeal since it coheres with
the actual conduct of science.
14 Some (e.g. Elgin 2007; Kvanvig 2003) maintain that understanding is non-
factive. Whether it is or not has no direct implication for the account just
presented.
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Therefore, it fulfils an important desideratum of an account
of understanding, namely that it should not regard vast areas
of science as being mistaken about what they achieve. Broad
KnUn is simply the formal and explicit recognition of both cur-
rent scientific practice and of existing philosophical insights that
provides a sound, unifying, and much needed epistemology of
understanding.
5 HOW COULD MODELSPOSS IBLY PROV IDE HPES?
5.1 introduction
One proposal to solve the puzzle of model-based explanation is
to view these models as providing HPEs (e.g. Craver 2006; Forber
2010; Reydon 2012; Grüne-Yanoff 2013a; Bokulich 2014; Ylikoski
and Aydinonat 2014; Rice 2016). They usually contrast HPEs to
HAEs, which are accounts of how phenomena actually occurred.
This response, however, raises two sets of issues. First, although
the distinction between HPEs and HAEs is widely acknowledged,
what it precisely amounts to is ambiguous since existing views
attribute different features to HPEs. There are two important
families of accounts, which I call the Dray-type and the Hempel-
type. While the Dray-type (e.g. Dray 1968; Forber 2010) considers
HPEs and HAEs to be a different species of explanation, the
Hempel-type (e.g. Hempel 1965a; Brandon 1990; Bokulich 2014)
distinguishes them by their degree of empirical support. These
distinctions, I contend, do not appropriately capture the real
contrast between them. To consider models simply as HPEs
therefore does not straightforwardly solve the puzzle. Rather, it
raises an important question about the nature of HPEs, namely
what demarcates them from HAEs?
The second issue concerns the relationship between highly
idealized models and HPEs. Many models appear to not depict
possibilities, but rather impossibilities (van Riel 2015). If this is
the case, then how could models possibly provide HPEs if their
idealizations can’t possibly be true? Spelling out the epistemic
contribution of models in terms of HPEs does not constitute
genuine progress unless we have a clear idea of how models can
indeed provide them.
I aim to provide an account of HPEs that clarifies their nature
in the context of solving the puzzle of model-based explanation.
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In section 2 I introduce the two types of HPEs. Section 3 shows
why they are inadequate in the context of solving the puzzle
of model-based explanation. I develop the account of HPEs as
providing knowledge of possible explanations in section 4. In
section 5 I spell out in more details what is the relationship
between HPEs, models, and explanation. Section 6 concludes.
5.2 two types of hpes
The notion of ‘how-possibly explanation’ was introduced by
Dray (1957) in his discussion over the adequacy of the deductive-
nomological (D-N) model of explanation (Hempel and Oppen-
heim 1948) in history.1 Since Dray, the notion has been revisited
many times and the concept was recently used in some dis-
cussions over the epistemic contribution of scientific models.
Unfortunately, there is now a multitude of concepts on offer
and it is now harder than ever to cash out a precise distinction
between HAEs and HPEs. Table 5.1 gives a sense of the various
terminology used when the terms are classified into three broad
categories.
Table 5.1: Types of explanations
‘How actually’ ‘How-possibly’ Misc.
why-necessarily
(Dray 1957)
how-possibly
(Dray 1957)
would-be explanation
(Hindriks 2013)
true (Hempel
1965a)
potential
(Hempel 1965a)
pseudo-explanation
(Resnik 1991)
how-actually
(Dray 1968)
possible
explanations
how-possibly
(Dray 1968)
how-plausibly
(Machamer et al. 2000)
potential
how-actually
(Reydon 2012)
global
how-possibly
(Forber 2010)
genuine explanations in
need of explananda
(Reydon 2012)
1 Dray (1954) did not yet use the terminology of ‘how-possibly’.
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‘How actually’ ‘How-possibly’ Misc.
possible
explanation
why-necessarily
(Dray 1968)
local
how-possibly
(Forber 2010)
more or less strongly
confirmed (Hempel
1965a)
The literature thus far demonstrates that there is a relevant
distinction between HPEs and HAEs. However, what this distinc-
tion amounts to remains a source of contention (Bokulich 2014).
How are we to make sense of this?
One possibility is to use the distinction between what For-
ber (2010) calls, following Sober (2003), Hempel’s problem and
Peirce’s problem. The former is the problem of whether there are
different types of explanations and of what constitutes an ideally
complete explanation and the latter is the problem of comparing
evidential support and accordingly choosing the best explanation.
According to Forber, the dividing line between HAE and HPEs
concerns Hempel’s problem, not Peirce’s. He uses the distinction
to argue that since Brandon (1990) views the difference between
HPEs and HAEs as one evidential support—Peirce’s problem—,
then what Brandon sees as HPEs are not, in fact, genuine ones.
Rather, Forber says that Brandon’s HPEs should “count as incom-
pletely confirmed or tentative how-actually explanations [. . . ]”
(2010, p. 36). Reydon agrees and call them “potential how-actually
explanations” (2012, p. 307). These discussions indicate, as Rey-
don explicitly emphasizes, that HPEs and HAEs are sometimes
believed to have a different logical structure. According to this
view, HPEs and HAEs do not have the same form. A ‘potential
how-actually explanation’ differs from a HPE in terms of form
and also lacks the appropriate evidential support to be a genuine
or complete HAE.
I find this discussion of Hempel’s and Peirce’s problems illumi-
nating in that it suggests two dimensions along which to organize
the accounts of HPEs on offer. As Strevens (2013, pp. 512-513)
notes, all accounts of explanation place two types of conditions
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on explanatory correctness: internal and external conditions.2
Internal conditions state what form a set of propositions should
take to count as an explanation. It is about the internal structure
of the explanation. For instance, internal conditions for a D-N ex-
planation indicate that the explanation needs to have the form of
a deductive argument which takes a lawlike statement and initial
conditions as its premises and an explanandum as its conclusion.
The lawlike statement must be an essential part of the derivation.
External conditions concern the empirical match between the
explanation and what is to be explained. An externally correct
D-N explanation, for example, is one whose lawlike statement,
initial conditions, and explanandum are all true. It is important
to note that whether these conditions are satisfied is in princi-
ple independent. An explanation can have the form of a D-N
explanation, thus satisfying the internal conditions, yet be false.
An explanation can also identify an externally correct explanans
and explanandum, yet fail to connect them properly—e.g., the
explanandum does not deductively follow from the explanans—
and therefore does not satisfy the internal conditions.
Making this distinction allows us to see that there are in fact
two main classifications in the literature. One class of HPEs
states that the crucial difference between HPEs and HAEs is
that they differ in their internal conditions. In the tradition of
Dray (1957), these accounts suggest that HAEs and HPEs are, in
virtue of a different logical structure, different species of the same
genus explanation. Another class of HPEs instead states that the
essential difference is in whether and how the external conditions
are satisfied. Following Hempel (1965a), these accounts state that
HPEs are internally similar to HAEs, but they do not satisfy the
external conditions for explanatoriness. To make this clearer, let
us look at, respectively, what I call the Dray and Hempel types.
5.2.1 Dray-type: HPEs as a different species of explanation
Dray (1957) argued that there was a type of explanation that
did not obey the strict logic of the D-N model. D-N explana-
2 De Regt (2009) makes a similar distinction between the “logical” and “empirical”
requirements for scientific understanding as well as Hempel and Oppenheim
(1948) with the logical and empirical conditions of adequacy.
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tions reveal why an explanandum had to happen, hence why
Dray calls them ‘why-necessarily’. In explaining how-possibly,
however, “we rebut the presumption that it [the explanandum]
could not have happened, by showing that, in the light of certain
further facts, there is after all no good reason for supposing
that it could not have happened” (161, emphasis in original).
According to Dray, the need for a HPE arises in the specific cir-
cumstances where one does not believe the explanandum could
have happened. The HPE rebuts this belief by showing how it
could possibly have happened. If one believes it was impossible
for something to happen, a HPE makes clear to her that it was,
in fact, possible. But it does not imply that it had to happen. For
Dray, a HPE reveals one or a few necessary conditions for the
explanandum, though it does not show the sufficient conditions.
However, this does not mean that HPEs are incomplete D-N
explanations (cf. Brandon 1990). Rather, Dray says they fulfil a
different explanatory task, which is the refutation of the belief
that some state of affairs is impossible. In this sense, HPEs can be
complete. In D-N cases, if a belief is rebutted, it is the belief that
the explanandum need not have happened. Put differently, what
Dray calls why-necessarily explanations answer the question
‘Why it did so?’ whereas HPEs answer ‘How it could be?’ (Dray
1968). For him, then, what distinguishes HPEs from HAEs is their
different internal conditions: the “two kinds of explanation are
logically independent” (Dray 1957, p. 167).
In response to some critics, Dray (1968, p. 399) raises an inter-
esting distinction between ‘possible explanations how-possibly’
and ‘possible explanations why-necessarily’. This makes clear
that not all how-possibly explanations may count as true expla-
nations. HPEs can also be false. Thus, a ‘possible explanation
how-possibly’ is one that meets the internal conditions, but not
the external ones. Likewise, a HAE can also only satisfy the in-
ternal conditions. In his terms, it is a ‘possible explanation why-
necessarily’. ‘Possible explanations how-possibly’ and ‘possible
explanations why-necessarily’ differ in terms of their internal
conditions, but are similar insofar as they both do not meet the
external conditions. For Dray, a HPE has to offer a true necessary
condition. A HPE that would offer a false or irrelevant one would
only be a ‘possible explanation how-possibly’.
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Forber (2010), who is interested in explanations in evolution-
ary biology, follows Dray and frames the problem similarly by
identifying three different species of explanations: 1) global how-
possibly, 2) local how-possibly, and 3) how-actually explanations.
Like Dray, Forber argues that each sort of explanation answers a
different question:
The first type [global HPE] answers the question:
could some potential process produce evolutionary
changes in idealized populations? The second [local
HPE]: could some known process produce, in a way
consistent with the local information set for a real
population, an observed evolutionary outcome or pat-
tern? And the third [HAE]: why, exactly, did some
target evolutionary outcome or pattern occur (Forber
2010, p. 34)?
For Forber, these explanations all have different internal condi-
tions. Where Forber differs significantly from Dray, however, is
when he claims that “we can successfully explain how-possibly
without any empirical support [. . . ]; we need only show that
some outcome or pattern is consistent with a specific set of infor-
mation” (Forber 2010, 39, emphasis in original). Indeed, Dray’s
account requires that rebutting the impossibility presumption
identifies an actual necessary condition for the explanandum.
This of course demands some sort of empirical support. Relat-
edly, Reydon (2012), in a critique of Forber, also notes that his
global and local HPEs do not exactly have the same structure
as Dray’s HPEs. For Dray, HPEs serve to refute the belief that
a certain state of affairs is impossible. This is not necessarily
the case for Forber’s conception of HPEs. However, his project is
similar to Dray’s in that he maintains that there are different types
of explanations and that for him HPEs are not just incomplete or
partial HAEs.3
3 In a reply to Reydon (2012), Forber (2012) says this is the main feature which
makes his project similar to Dray’s.
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5.2.2 Hempel-type: HAEs lacking confirmation
Hempel denied HPEs were a different type of explanation. He
held that ‘how-possibly’ concerned the pragmatics of explanation
(Hempel 1965a, p. 428). The fact that an explanation may have
to be presented differently depending on one’s prior beliefs
and explanatory requests does not imply that there are two
different types of explanation. Accordingly, information may
have to be presented differently in order to make it intelligible to
different persons, but that does not imply that the explanations
are fundamentally different.
Hempel, in contrast with Dray and Forber, rather argued that
all explanations have to satisfy the same internal conditions,
namely those specified by the D-N model. Yet, Hempel differ-
entiated explanations according to whether they are ‘potential’,
‘more or less strongly supported or confirmed by evidence’, or
‘true’ explanations (Hempel 1965a, p. 338). A ‘potential’ explana-
tion is defined as “any argument that has the character of a D-N
explanation except that the sentences constituting its explanans
need not be true” (ibid.). That is to say, it is an explanation that
satisfies the internal conditions, but not the external ones—i.e.,
the explanans is false or not known to be true. A ‘true’ D-N
explanation is one that meets both the internal and external
conditions.
Hempel rejected the assertion that HPEs were a distinct species
of explanation and therefore did not believe it was necessary
to characterize them further. Even though some accounts (e.g.
Salmon 1989; Brandon 1990; Craver 2006; see also Bokulich 2014)
have equated Dray’s HPEs with Hempel’s potential explanations,
it is in a sense misleading since for Hempel ‘explaining how-
possibly’ belonged to the pragmatics of explanation and not to
its logic. As it stands, Hempel’s potential explanations can be
viewed as another way of spelling out the distinction between
HAEs and those ‘explanations’ that do not satisfy the conditions
of HAEs. For the sake of the present discussion, what I call a
Hempel-type HPE is thus a potential explanation.
Contrary to Dray, Hempel held that all explanations have the
same internal conditions. Therefore, he rejected that there were
different species of explanations. A potential explanation is not
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an explanation per se given that it does not actually explain.
For a set of propositions to explain, the external conditions also
need to be fulfilled. We can thus regard ‘potential’, ‘more or less
strongly supported by the evidence’, and ‘true’ explanations as
a continuum. Where they differ is in the degree to which they
each satisfy the external conditions. The less evidence we have
to warrant belief in the actual (true) explanation, the closer we
are to a potential explanation. Conversely, if the explanation is
for all practical purposes confirmed, then we are closer to the
actual (true) explanation. Were a Hempel-type HPE to be true—
or be empirically confirmed—, then it would satisfy the external
conditions and thus explain.
5.3 dray and hempel types in practice
Dray-type HPEs are thus distinct from Hempel-type potential
explanations. A Dray-type HPE has both different internal and
external conditions. Internally, it is a different species of explana-
tion, whereas Hempel-type potential explanations are not. Exter-
nally, the strict Dray-type also needs to identify true necessary
conditions for the explanandum. Potential explanations precisely
do not have these truth requirements. It is thus rather surprising—
and confusing—that some of the accounts in recent literature
have adopted Dray’s language, but Hempel’s concept.4 For in-
stance, Resnik says that “the difference between how-possibly
and how-actually explanations is quantitative–a difference of
degree–since empirical support comes in degrees” (1991, p. 143).
To give another example, Craver maintains that how-possibly
models “are purported to explain, but they are only loosely
constrained conjectures about the mechanism that produces the
explanandum phenomenon” (2006, p. 361). In these two cases,
the use of HPEs is closer to the Hempel-type than to Dray. HPEs
are not so much different types of explanation then ones not
meeting the external
4 Bokulich makes a similar point: “Subsequent discussions of how-possibly
explanations typically treat them instead as potential explanations” (2014, 322,
emphasis in original). See also Reydon (2012).
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But is it not only a language problem? What is really at stake
if scholars misidentify ‘potential’ explanations as ‘how-possibly’
explanations? The problem is that the confusion occurs not only
at the semantic level. In many debates on theoretical models, the
concept of HPE is mobilized to account for their epistemic contri-
bution (e.g. Brandon 1990; Cooper 1996; Craver 2006; Aydinonat
2007; Grüne-Yanoff 2013b,a; Rohwer and Rice 2013; Bokulich
2014; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014; Rice 2016). Unfortunately, the
lack of a clear and shared account of HPEs makes resorting to
them a shaky strategy. The following example illustrates the kind
of issues we often encounter.
For instance, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Rohwer
and Rice (2013) argue that the Hawk-Dove model (Maynard
Smith and Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1982) is “explanatory” and
provides “understanding”. It does so, according to them, even
though it is not an explanation. It is explanatory and provides un-
derstanding, they say, because “the model is still able to answer
certain key how-possibly questions (Resnik 1991; Forber 2010;
Reydon 2012)” (Rohwer and Rice 2013, p. 349). In all fairness,
Rohwer and Rice do not themselves develop extensively what
they mean by ‘how-possibly’. Yet, the three authors Rohwer and
Rice cite to support their claim all have substantially different
views over what HPEs are. For Resnik, the main purpose of HPEs
is heuristic. Fruitful HPEs can help to develop new and better
theories. However, Resnik is silent with respect to the relation be-
tween HPEs and understanding. Forber, on the contrary, precisely
argues against views such as Resnik by defending that HPEs,
local and global, are a distinct type of explanation.5 This also
contradicts Rohwer and Rice’s point that HPEs are not proper
explanations. In fact, that HPEs are explanations in their own
right is Forber’s main contention. Finally, Reydon argues, among
other things, that Forber’s global HPEs are explanations, but not
how-possibly. Without digressing into the details, as Rohwer and
Rice describe the Hawk-Dove model it would clearly be a global
HPE, not a local one. Thus, far from supporting Rohwer and Rice,
this goes against their claim that the Hawk-Dove model is not an
explanation and is only in the ‘how-possibly’ business.
5 He considers Resnik has a similar account as Brandon (1990), who he argues
directly against.
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As we can see, it is not possible to rely straightforwardly on the
notion of HPEs to make sense of scientific modelling. Depending
on one’s favourite account, HPEs can provide fruitful heuristics or
be viewed as complete and genuine explanations to specific types
of questions. This is of course making a significant difference
when the question is precisely to assess the explanatoriness of
models. If HPEs are to play a role in our appraisal of models, we
better agree on what we take the features of HPEs to be and what
is their epistemic purpose. Simply saying that models provide
HPEs is unsatisfactory in the absence of an appropriate account.
Of course, that there are competing views over the appropriate
notion of HPEs in the literature does not imply that all exist-
ing accounts of HPEs are mistaken. However, what I want to
show is that neither the Dray-type nor the Hempel-type are fully
adequate. To do so, it suffices briefly to consider the case of
Schelling’s (1971, 1978) checkerboard model of residential seg-
regation. The most popular interpretation of the model is that
it provides a sort of HPE (Aydinonat 2007; Grüne-Yanoff 2013a;
Weisberg 2013; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). Weisberg (2013,
pp. 118-119) summarizes as follows the question the model raises
and answers:
In other words, how is it possible for segregation to
happen in a city without collective preferences for
segregation? The answer is that this is possible when
every individual has a small preference for similar
neighbors and tries to satisfy this preference.
The model is not strictly speaking a Hempel-type potential
explanation because it goes beyond meeting the internal condi-
tions. The model does not only tell us how certain consequences
can be derived. When considering the model, “we see Schelling’s
checkerboard cities as possible cities” and see the similarity be-
tween the model and the world “by accepting that the model
world could be real - that it describes a state of affairs that is
credible [. . . ]” (Sugden 2000, 25, emphasis in original). The model
appears to tell us something more than just the fact that segrega-
tion can be obtained from given rules of behaviour.
However, it is also not clear whether the model actually ex-
plains the general phenomenon of residential segregation or
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specific instances of it. For this reason, Aydinonat (2007, p. 430)
considers we should view the checkerboard model as offering
a “partial potential (theoretical) explanation”. What the model
shows is that it is possible that preferences for not living in a mi-
nority status bring about segregation. But that it is possible does
not imply that it actually happens in this way. This is therefore
different from offering a merely internally correct explanation
and from providing a HAE. Furthermore, there is a prima facie
puzzle on the standard reading of the Hempel-type since it was
not developed to deal with the idealizations models typically
contain. Laws of nature can be true or false, but we can’t really
say the same of models (Reiss 2012b). It is therefore unclear how
the external conditions of the Hempel-type relate to models.
It is also not a Dray-type HPE for two different reasons. Firstly,
what the model refutes is not the belief that residential segre-
gation could not happen. The impossibility does not concern
the explanandum, but rather the explanans. It was considered
unlikely, if not impossible, that something other than strong
discriminatory preferences could bring about residential segre-
gation (W. A. V. Clark and Fossett 2008). As Grüne-Yanoff (2009)
argues, the checkerboard model contradicts this belief. But no
one had any reason to disbelieve that segregation exists or that it
could happen. Secondly, since the checkerboard model does not
identify actual necessary conditions for residential segregation,
it would constitute a ‘possible explanation how-possibly’ (see
Dray 1968), not a HPE. Since the causal factors identified in the
checkerboard model are at best sufficient for segregation—not
necessary—and are not known to be actual, then it would only
satisfy the internal conditions for a Dray-type HPE, but not the
external ones. There might be other instances of segregation
where these causal factors are not present.
5.4 the internal and external conditionsof hpes
What I take to be the distinguishing characteristic of HPEs is the
modal information they convey. This appears to be a feature that
both proponents of Dray-type and Hempel-type HPEs emphasize,
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albeit while not explicitly appealing to it. Consider the following
quotations from commentators on diverse sides of the debate
(emphases in original).
What we know seems to rule out the possibility of the
occurrence which is to be explained. The explanation
consists in showing that in spite of appearances to
the contrary, it is not an impossible one after all (Dray
1957, p. 161).
We use the notion of a potential explanation, for exam-
ple, when we ask whether a novel and as yet untested
law or theory would provide an explanation for some
empirical phenomenon [. . . ] (Hempel 1965a, p. 338).
What good is a speculative how-possibly explanation?
The short answer is: it shows how known evolution-
ary mechanisms could produce known phenomena
(Brandon 1990, p. 180).
They [how-possibly models] describe how a set of
parts and activities might be organized such that they
exhibit the explanandum phenomenon (Craver 2006,
p. 361).
In contrast, how-possibly explanations aim to explain
how some event could possibly occur (Forber 2010,
p. 33).
The Hawk–Dove game is intended to show how indi-
vidual selection could possibly produce this behavior
in a wide range of populations (Rice 2016, p. 92).
All the preceding quotes suggest that HPEs have something
to do with modality. The use of words like ‘might’, ‘could’, and
‘possibility’ are all modal terms. It is interesting to see that re-
gardless of one’s specific position in the debate over HPEs, a
common idea is that HPEs provide modal information. What I
take to be the defining feature of HPEs is therefore not the type
of question they answer nor their degree of empirical confirma-
tion, but rather that they contribute to our knowledge of the
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possibility of certain states of affairs. HAEs, on the contrary, con-
tribute to our knowledge of what is actually the case. Using this
demarcation criterion, we can spell out in more detail a general
characterization of the internal and external conditions of HPEs.
5.4.1 Internal conditions
The first question we may then ask is whether HPEs and HAEs
have the same internal conditions, viz., do they have the same
structure or form? In its general form, an explanation “is a set
of propositions with a certain structure” (Strevens 2013, p. 510).
The question is thus whether HPEs and HAEs have the same
propositions with the same structure. I propose that they do not.
Following a useful characterization by van Riel (2015), I first take
HAEs to express propositions of the following form:
hae p because q
Here, ‘because’ is simply a shorthand for one’s favourite rela-
tion of explanatory entailment. We might say that ‘p because q’
on causal grounds, i.e., that ‘q’ is a cause of ‘p’. But ‘p because
q’ could also be the case if a law of nature ‘q’ would be sub-
suming ‘p’. Nothing hinges on the specifics of what constitutes
the relation. Whether explanations should have the form of a
deductive argument or invariant counterfactual generalizations
is not a relevant issue here. This general form is therefore flexible
and can accommodate various substantial views over the nature
of explanation. A HAE is simply a set of propositions such that
they are amenable to a formulation ‘p because q’.
One thing that is important to mention is that ‘q’ can be divided
into several propositions, say the generalizations or laws of nature
‘q’ and the initial conditions ‘c’. A more precise characterization
may thus be ‘p because q and c’. This will prove important when
discussing specific accounts and can also make a difference when
assessing, for instance, the epistemic contribution of a model.
I will generally use the shorter version for the sake of brevity
and simplicity. This characterization of HAEs should be fairly
uncontroversial. The contentious issue is the following: How
do HPEs differ from HAE with respect to form? Still following
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van Riel (2015), I suggest we view HPEs as propositions of the
following form:
hpe ♦(p because q)
Propositions such as this mean “It is possible that ‘p because
q’ ”. This captures a key desideratum of HPEs that virtually all
accounts share, namely that HPEs express possibility claims.
Propositions ‘♦(p because q)’ and ‘p because q’ do not have the
same form and do not express the same content. Whereas know-
ing a HAE implies knowing what is actual, knowing a HPE entails
knowing what is possible. The possibility operator is placed on the
explanation proposition in order to allow maximum flexibility
in assessing specific cases. As the following discussion should
make clear, a general account of HPEs should accommodate
cases where either or both the explanans and explanandum are
possible.
In this formulation, how the modality of the possibility op-
erator should be interpreted is deliberately left open. This is
an essential feature of the characterization I propose. Modality
comes in various sorts, e.g., epistemic, metaphysical, causal, log-
ical, nomic, etc. (see Kment 2017). For instance, it is, according
to classical first-order logic, logically impossible that ‘p ∧ ¬p’; ‘p’
can’t be both true and false at the same time. Or, it is nomically
impossible for a solid uranium sphere to be more than a kilo-
metre in diameter because it could not ever reach that diameter
without triggering a chain reaction (see van Fraassen 1989). It is
not an accidental empirical generalization, but impossible accord-
ing to the laws of nature. By contrast, it is nomically possible for
a solid sphere of gold to have that diameter even though we may
never find one in the whole universe.
Quite often, the possibility of scientific interest is causal and
typical HPEs thus establish that ‘p because q’ is causally possible.
Logical possibility, on the other hand, is usually not very valuable
insofar as logic rules out very few empirical possibilities. To
know a logical possibility may not be informative with respect to
learning about the empirical world. That said, as the burgeoning
literature on mathematical explanation attests (e.g. Baron et al.
2017; Lange 2013, 2017; Pincock 2015), in some cases the relevant
modality may well be mathematical. My goal here is not to
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restrict what counts as acceptable modality in all contexts, but
rather to propose a general characterization. As I will show below,
many accounts of HPEs rely on an implicit or explicit notion of
modality, e.g., epistemic or causal possibility.
Leaving the interpretation of the possibility operator open has
two main advantages. Firstly, it provides a flexible and unifying
characterization. The same general schema can accommodate
various HPEs. Causal or mathematical HPEs may have the same
basic form, only different modal requirements. Secondly, it does
not a priori assert what may be the relevant types of modality. In
some contexts, scientists may be interested in nomic possibility.
In others it may be mathematical possibility. My account does
not preclude particular modalities.
How the possibility operator is interpreted has of course sig-
nificant consequences on the external—or truth—conditions of
a HPE. I will discuss it in more detail below, but here it is sim-
ply important to note that a thoroughly specified HPE states
the modality of the operator. What matters is that the relevant
modality ultimately needs to be selected in order to asses the
possibility claim.
At first sight, it may appear that my proposal is simply a
more formal characterization of Dray-type HPEs. Is this to say
that, at least with respect to form, the Dray-type is the correct
one? The Dray-type proponents are right to emphasize that the
propositional content of HAEs and HPEs is different. But it is
neither because HPEs answer a different type of question nor
because they identify only necessary conditions.
Firstly, for Dray (e.g. 1968), HPEs only reveal necessary condi-
tions and do not appeal to generalizations. Hence, the explana-
tory entailment relation—the ‘because’—is for him categorically
different between HPEs and HAEs. In Dray’s (1968) parlance,
if ‘p because q’ states sufficient conditions for ‘p’, then it is not
a HPE, but rather an ‘explanation why-necessarily’. Dray only
requires the identification of appropriate actual initial conditions
‘c’. A strict Dray-type could thus be formulated as follows: ‘♦p
because c’. The form is therefore quite different.
But to show that an explanandum is possible, it is not necessary
to identify necessary conditions. Suitable sufficient conditions
may do the trick. As Salmon (1989, p. 137) notes, “any potential
122 how could models possibly provide hpes?
explanation not ruled out by known facts is a suitable answer”.
At the very least, some how-possibly questions can be success-
fully answered without citing necessary conditions. Moreover,
as Reiner (1993) argues, finding necessary conditions is method-
ologically difficult, if not outright impossible. Indeed, the set of
necessary conditions is considerably smaller since some causes
may be individually sufficient for an explanandum. Establishing
necessary conditions puts very high demands on our knowledge.
Perhaps there are HPEs that identify necessary conditions, but it
seems we do not have good reasons to be monists about this. On
the contrary, my account leaves open what is the set of possible
interpretations of the explanatory ‘because’ relation.
Secondly, my account downplays the difference between HPEs
and HAEs. One critical claim of the Dray-type is that HPEs and
HAEs are different species of explanation. Both Dray (1957) and
Forber (2010) construe HPEs as answers to different types of
questions. For Dray, HPEs rebutted the belief in the impossibility
of the explanandum. Similarly, as I showed in section 2, Forber
frames his different type of HPEs as answers to different ques-
tions. However, as was previously objected (Pitt 1959; Hempel
1965a), quite often one can answer a how-possibly question with
a HAE. Put differently, a HAE implies its corresponding HPE. In
fact, a HAE may be the best answer to a how-possibly question
since one would not only know why something is possible, but
why it is actually the case. Dray and others may be right to point
out that a HAE is not necessary to answer a how-possible ques-
tion. But if a HAE can also in principle answer these questions,
it suggests there is not a one-to-one mapping between types
of questions and their corresponding explanations. Therefore,
whether how-possible questions require a different kind of expla-
nation is implausible. A HPE can be sufficient for answering a
how-possible question, but it is not necessary.
More concretely, why should we limit what questions can
be asked in what contexts? Grüne-Yanoff (2013a) shows that in
the course of constructing HPEs, scientists sometimes start with
different questions or background information. One example
he gives is Ainslie’s (2001) feedback model of self-control. The
model indicates that preferences displaying hyperbolic discount-
ing are compatible with the phenomenon of moderate impulsive-
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ness through a process of recursive self-prediction. Here Ainslie
shows from possible initial conditions how a possible process
could generate an actual idealized phenomenon. While Grüne-
Yanoff discusses Forber’s account, he does not describe this case
as one of Forber’s local or global HPE. Indeed, this example
does not seem to readily fit within the global vs local distinc-
tion. It is not an inquiry into the strictly formal constraints of
psychological possibility (global) nor does it postulate a known
process or concrete population. Yet, I think Grüne-Yanoff is right
to view this case as a HPE. At any rate, the problem is not so
much that the example could not fit within Forber’s categories,
but that as useful as they are in describing particular cases of
HPEs, they do not seem to naturally account for the variety of
epistemic contexts.6 The characterization I propose provides a
general characterization that situates differences in the varying
interpretations of the possibility operator and in the actuality or
possibility of the constituent propositions (e.g., explanandum or
initial conditions) of HPEs.
Forber’s discussion of Brandon (1990) gives rise to a similar
problem. Brandon views HAEs and HPEs as located on a same
continuum of evidential support, HPEs having less of it than
HAEs. As we have seen, Forber holds that Brandon’s HPEs are
not really HPEs, but tentative HAEs. Since Forber distinguishes
HPEs from HAEs by their aim, not their result, evidence that
supports a HAE can’t carry to HPEs. But I do not see why a
‘tentative HAE’ could never, out of principle, count as a HPE.7
If evidence for a HAE is incomplete and partial, why could it
not support a HPE? The evidence we have might be insufficient
for a HAE, yet be sufficient for a HPE. One’s evidence may be
lacking for establishing that an explanans actually caused an
explanandum, though it may license a corresponding HPE.
In sum, I do not see any principled reason to restrict some
questions and explanatory endeavours from qualifying as HPEs
from the outset. Dray-type proponents have rightfully pointed
6 Bokulich (2014) makes a similar claim using a case study on the ‘stripes’ of the
tiger bush. She claims that global and local constraints can be mixed depending
on the level of abstraction.
7 Grüne-Yanoff (2013a, p. 859) presents a similar case that he considers to be a
HPE. See also Resnik (1991) and Bokulich (2014).
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out some specific instances of how-possible questions, but con-
sideration of the diversity of practices and questions scientists
address militate against setting strict constraints. As we have
seen, sometimes what a model does is to establish the possibil-
ity of the process, not of the explanandum. More formally, one
would have prior good reasons to believe that ‘p’, but not that
‘q’. A model may exhibit that it is in fact possible that ‘♦q’ and
therefore could increase confidence in ‘♦(p because q)’. We could
also have cases where we have independent reasons to believe
that ‘p’ and ‘q’, but not that ‘♦(p because q)’. In this situation, a
model may connect the dots between ‘p’ and ‘q’ and establish
that ‘♦(p because q)’. The characterization of HPEs that I propose
encompasses all forms of how-possible questions since it does
not involve prior beliefs or explanatory aims. It also does not
exclude that a HAE can provide a satisfactory answer to these
question.
If there are substantial differences between the account I pro-
pose and the Dray-type, how is it different from the Hempel-type?
One straightforward possibility is simply to reconstruct it as a
false or unknown HAE: ‘p because q’, where ‘q’—and therefore ‘p
because q’—is either false or not known to be true. For Hempel,
what differentiated a potential explanation—the classic Hempel-
type HPE—from a true explanation—a HAE—is that the latter
fulfilled the external conditions whereas the former did not have
to. Put differently, HPEs had the same form as HAEs, except
for possibly being false or not known to be true. Understood as
a potential explanation, a Hempel-type HPE thus does not tell
whether or not ‘p because q’ is the case since it can be unknown.
What it tells is how ‘p’, ‘q’, and ‘p because q’ stand in logical
relation to one another. This characterization emphasizes that
what separates HPEs from HAEs is whether the former satisfy
the external conditions. Would they be met, i.e., were ‘p’ and
‘q’ be true, then ‘p because q’ would be true. This also accords
with more recent accounts of HPEs close to the Hempel-type.
For instance, according to Brandon (1990) the main difference
between HAEs and HPEs is one of evidential support, not of
form. In other words, HPEs and HAEs have the same internal
conditions. What demarcates them lies in the satisfaction of the
external conditions.
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The preceding analysis shows that there is a significant dif-
ference in terms of modal information between the account of
HPEs I propose and the Hempel-type. The Hempel-type shows
that a given set of propositions meets the internal conditions of
adequacy, e.g., that the explanandum logically follows from the
explanans. The main information it provides is one of logical
explanatory entailment. This information, albeit necessary and
valuable, is limited. Crucially, fulfilling the internal conditions
of adequacy does not provide any information beyond the mere
logical possibility of the explanation. It does not tell whether
the explanation or its constituents—i.e., ‘p’ and ‘q’—are possi-
ble according to the typically interesting sorts of modalities like
causal possibility. However, as testified by the quotes at the begin-
ning of this section, modal information that goes beyond logical
possibility appears essential to HPEs.
In fact, even accounts that have been traditionally classified in
the Hempel-type put stronger modal demands on what should
count as a HPE. For instance, both Salmon (1989, p. 137) and Bran-
don (1990, pp. 178-179) consider consistency with known facts to
be a hallmark of HPEs. On the Dray-type side, Forber (2010, p. 34)
appeals to a “causal principle of possibility”. Furthermore, HPEs
usually considered in the literature (e.g. Grüne-Yanoff 2013a) do
not simply show that there is logical entailment between the
explanans and the explanandum. This is too easy. Instead, they
also appear to provide information about what is empirically
possible in ways that go beyond mere logical possibility. For
instance, a HPE can show how a causally possible mechanism
may explain an actual phenomenon, like the checkerboard model
does (Schelling 1978; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014).
Hence, perhaps a second way of characterizing the form of
the Hempel-type HPE could be that it also has the form ‘♦(p
because q)’, but the possibility operator should only receive a
formal—e.g., logical—interpretation. This sort of possibility then
leaves open whether the explanation is, for instance, causally
possible. This characterization has the merit of highlighting the
main issue with the Hempel-type HPE: it is too lax. As a matter
of fact, a common worry in the HPEs literature (e.g. Brandon
1990) concerns so-called ‘just-so’ stories, a reference to Rudyard
Kipling’s ([1902] 1912) fabulous origin stories (e.g., How the Camel
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Got His Hump) for children. We want to be able to demarcate
between just-so stories that only have the form of explanations
and genuine HPEs that tell us something, perhaps limited, about
the world. More generally, we want to be able to demarcate
between true and false HPEs. There is a difference between
‘explaining’ the camel’s hump by citing its grumpiness expressed
through repeated ‘Humph!’ and a HPE of the hump based on
natural selection. While both may have the form of a HPE, only
the evolutionary HPE is acceptable.
One challenge for accounts of HPEs is thus to allow for a de-
marcation criterion between genuine HPEs and ‘just-so’ stories.
Just-so stories do not provide any substantial information about
the world whereas HPEs inform us about the modal status of the
explanation. This all suggests the need for stronger interpreta-
tions of the possibility operator. It may then be objected that my
account does little in terms of a positive proposal to respond to
worries raised by ‘just-so’ stories. While I indeed do not propose
any substantive criterion, characterizing HPEs as propositions of
the form ‘♦(p because q)’ is an important step. First, it allows to
accommodate various standards through the possibility operator.
What sort of possibility scientists are interested in depends on
the particular research setting. My goal here is not to a priori
specify what possibilities are important across all contexts.
Second, contrary to some strands of the Hempel-type, my
account in principle allows for standards that go beyond meeting
the internal conditions for explanation or beyond consistency
with facts. Perhaps we need a more neutral label than ‘just-so
stories’ for those set of propositions that only satisfy the internal
conditions of adequacy. My point is simply that a good account
of HPEs should also have the resources to go beyond these.
By allowing further modalities, especially causal, my account
broadens the scope of the Hempel-type. Moreover, as we will see
in the next section, it does so by making explicit that (true) HPEs
also need to satisfy some external conditions of adequacy.
5.4.2 External conditions
Typically, the external conditions for HAE require that ‘p’, ‘q’,
and ‘p because q’ are all true. More precisely, a realist account
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of explanation will require that ‘p’ and ‘q’ are true whereas an
antirealist may be content if only ‘p because q’ is true under
certain conditions. For an antirealist, the explanatory relationship
may be true in the absence of true explanantia and explananda
(see Khalifa 2011).
Of course, if ‘p because q’ is true, then ‘♦(p because q)’ is
trivially true. But the reverse is not true. A proposition ‘♦(p
because q)’ may be true while the corresponding HAE ‘p because
q’ is false. A HPE provides information about possibility whereas
a HAE provides information about actuality. HPEs thus have
more minimal empirical requirements. For ‘♦(p because q)’ to be
true, none of ‘p’, ‘q’, or ‘p because q’ need to actually be the case.
HPEs are propositions that express that a given explanation
is possible. HPEs may be true or false. Naturally, my goal is
not to develop a full-fledged account of modality.8 However, let
me state some relevant considerations. Here I assume, along
with the others in the literature on HPEs that take modality as
one key feature, that modal claims have a truth value and that
it can be established. As I said earlier, what is possible or not
depends on the interpretation of the possibility operator. What
is logically possible may not be nomically possible and thus the
‘same’ proposition may be true under one modality and false
under another.
For the realist, the position I will assume going forward, an
explanation can only be possible if all of its constituents are also
possible under the same modal interpretation. If either ‘p’ or ‘q’ are
not only false, but also impossible, then it can’t be possible that
‘p because q’. For if a given explanans ‘q’ is causally impossible,
then the corresponding causal HPE ‘♦(p because q)’ can’t be true.
To use an example from the previous chapter, since it is causally
impossible that the young earth creationists’ flood caused the
Grand Canyon, then the HPE is false. An impossible cause can’t
possibly provide a causal explanation of a given explanandum.9
8 For discussions on this topic, see, e.g., Gendler and Hawthorne (2002).
9 One may prefer to say that causal possibility, perhaps unlike other modalities
(e.g., metaphysical) is a property of the explanatory link ‘because’ rather
than of the explanans. Nothing substantial hinges on adopting that particular
interpretation, although I believe my formulation is more general. Ultimately,
this depends on how we want to decompose ‘because q’ in ‘p because q’. If
we follow Reutlinger (2016), as I did in the previous chapter, we might say
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It could be logically possible, but not causally, hence the requisite
to fix the interpretation of the possibility operator.
Conversely, for ‘♦(p because q)’ to be true, both ‘♦p’ and ‘♦q’
need to be true. Again, the possibility of a causal explanation
requires the causal possibility of its constituent explanans.10 This
also means that ‘♦(p because q)’ does not imply that ‘p’ and ‘q’
are not the case. The possibility operator may only specify the
‘because’ relation. In fact, it may be the case that in HPEs either ‘p’
or ‘q’ are true, or both. For instance, certain generalizations, initial
conditions, and explanandum may be actual, but the possibility
of the explanation may not have been assessed.
How does this view differ from existing accounts of HPEs?
The account I propose has different external conditions than the
Hempel and Dray-types. The contrast is starkest with the Hempel-
type where there are simply no requirements on the possibility
of either ‘p’ or ‘q’. But by not requiring them to be possible, as I
already indicated, a Hempel-type HPE can in principle contain
all sorts of quirky explanantia and explananda. In this sense, the
external conditions of the Hempel-type are looser than the ones
I propose. In fact, it is a HPE precisely because it does not satisfy
the external conditions. As long as it is not a HAE, but has the
same form, we have a Hempel-type HPE. Crucially, as we have
seen, a Hempel-type HPE may have the right form, yet this says
nothing about the possibility of either ‘q’ or of ‘p because q’. The
possibility of the statement ‘p because q’ is irrelevant. To know
that ‘♦(p because q)’, however, requires that one makes a sort of
modal assessment since ‘p’ or ‘q’ can’t simply be false, they must
be possible. To make the judgment over the HPE, one thus has to
bring in background knowledge.
Should we then just call HPEs, following Hempel, a ‘more
or less strongly supported by the evidence’ explanation? In a
sense, HPEs are more or less strongly supported by the evidence.
But for Hempel, what is more or less supported by the evidence
that ‘because’ more precisely corresponds to the implication condition (see
sec. 4.6) and that ‘q’ is a causal generalization. We could then reconstruct causal
explanations as propositions of the form ‘p because (q causes p)’, where ‘q
causes p’ is a causal generalization that explains—e.g., implies and supports
counterfactuals—the occurrence of the phenomenon p.
10 As I will discuss in the next section, idealizing models with putatively false
explanantia only prima facie pose a challenge to my account of HPEs.
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is the HAE, not the HPE. This is a crucial difference because
the evidence we have may support judgments of possibility, but
not of actuality. For instance, we may regard the checkerboard
model as providing a HPE of residential segregation in the sense
that it is, in fact, possible that the preferences for not living in a
minority status cause segregation. Yet, we can also consider that
we have no evidence that it is the HAE. In fact, we may even have
evidence that some other cause is the HAE. In short, we may
have zero evidence that the HPE is the actual explanation, yet still
consider that it is possible. A HPE is therefore fully supported by
the evidence for the specific claim it is making and this evidence
may be independent of the evidence for the HAE.
The difference in external conditions with the Dray-type is
more subtle as we can find various proposals for external condi-
tions. However, some Dray-type HPEs put actuality constraints
on either the explanandum or the explanans. On one side of the
spectrum, as we have seen, for Dray (1968, pp. 399-401) a HPE
identifies an actual necessary condition for the explanandum. To
show that a given phenomenon was not impossible, one could
not only appeal to a possible explanans. The necessary condition
identified had to be actually instantiated. This necessary condi-
tion then rebutted the presumption of impossibility. According
to Dray, if only a possible necessary condition was identified,
then it had to be called a ‘possible explanation how-possibly’. In
other words, it would have the form of a HPE, yet would not
satisfy the external conditions. Under my account, a HPE may
include actual elements, but does not require any.
On the other side of the spectrum, as stated earlier, Forber’s
global HPEs, in particular, have minimal external conditions. He
holds that mere consistency with formal constraints is sufficient
and that no additional empirical support is necessary. On the
contrary, his local HPEs have some actuality requirements. Only
the initial conditions ‘c’ may be speculative, the explanandum
and the generalizations being actual. He holds that local HPEs
“are just-so stories that speculate about the adaptive (or non-
adaptive) evolutionary history of a lineage” (Forber 2010, 36,
emphasis in original). For him, this is not per se a problem as
long as they are recognized as such.
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Contrary to some versions of the Hempel-type and Dray-type,
the external conditions I propose are either more or less demand-
ing. They can be more demanding insofar as the mere logical
form of an explanation is often not sufficient. A stronger modal
appraisal is called for. It compels to evaluate whether it is true
that the explanation is possible according to a relevant modality,
for instance causal possibility. One does so by looking at the
possibility of the explanans, the explanandum, or the explana-
tory link. Contrary to some versions of the Dray-type, they can
be less demanding as my account does not require any actual
proposition. HPEs can include claims of actuality, but actuality is
not required to establish claims of possibility.
5.4.3 Applying the conditions: a recap
I would like to end this discussion of the internal and external
conditions of HPEs by a brief synthesis of how it helps to organize
our thinking about the existing literature. Its principal virtue is
to show where the differences between versions of HPEs lie. One
conclusion I reach is that contemporary accounts (e.g. Brandon
1990; Forber 2010) are closer in terms of form than they seem to
be. Indeed, they all emphasize that the end product of a HPE is a
possibility claim. In this respect, I would say that Brandon’s and
Forber’s account are similar to mine in that they take HPEs to be
propositions of the form ‘♦(p because q)’.
Reydon’s (2012) analysis of Forber’s (2010) account supports
this claim. Indeed, Reydon argues that Forber’s global HPEs
should be seen as “genuine explanations in need of explananda”,
thus implying that they have the same form as HAEs. How-
ever, they do not meet the external conditions of HAEs.11 He
also makes the case that Forber’s local HPEs are in fact simi-
lar to Brandon (1990) and Resnik (1991), that they all have the
same “logical structure” (Reydon 2012, p. 309). Finally, Reydon
denies that local HPEs are a species of explanation—i.e., that
they actually explain—because of a lack of (complete) empirical
support.
11 This view has similarities to Sugden’s (2011) ‘explanations in search of obser-
vations’, which I discuss in section 5.
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External conditions
Account Internal cond. Possibility Actuality
Dray (1957) ♦p because c Epistemic (?) p Necessary c
Hempel (1965) p because q Logical —
Brandon (1990) ♦(p because q) Epistemic c, ‘because’ q
Forber (2010) ♦(p because q) Local causal c, ‘because’ p, q
Forber (2010) ♦(p because q) Global causal p, q, c —Table 5.2: An application of the conditions
We can find more variance in what external conditions the
different accounts put forward. Brandon (1990) appears to say
that HPEs should include actual generalizations ‘q’ and that they
should be epistemically possible. Forber’s (2010) global HPEs
should be causally possible—note the different modality–relative
to the global information set, but imposes no actuality require-
ment. His local HPEs use the same modality, but relative to the
local information set. And the explanandum and the generaliza-
tions should be actual.
Table 5.2 summarizes the preceding discussion, which sug-
gests two things. First, that the internal conditions intersect in
significant ways. The differences are less deep than we may think.
Second, that most of the disagreements are located within the
external conditions. What kind of modality matters and whether
there are requirements about actuality are two important sources
of contention.
5.5 hpes, models, and explanation
Since many accounts of scientific modelling rely on HPEs to
appraise models, we should have a good idea of whether they
are a genuine species of explanation, what sort of epistemic
benefits we may expect from them, and whether scientific models
can indeed provide HPEs. To answer these questions, let us first
look at the last issue, namely, the relationship between models
and explanations.
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Models are not explanations. Explanations are simply sets of
propositions satisfying the internal and external conditions stated
by one’s favourite theory (Strevens 2013). Whereas explanations
are linguistic entities, models are widely viewed as being non-
linguistic. This is clearly true of physical models such as the
MONIAC (aka Phillips Hydraulic Computer), but also of the
mathematical models usually discussed in the literature such
as the Lotka-Volterra model (Weisberg 2007b). So, when we say
that a model explains a given phenomenon, what this means is
that there is a given model proposition—propositions that are
true within the model—according to which ‘p because q’ and
that this proposition is epistemically related to the real-world
proposition ‘p because q’. When we say ‘Model M explains why p
with q’, we must be careful to not conclude that the model is the
explanation. Instead, what it means is that the model provides
sufficient reasons to believe that ‘p because q’ is true. It is in this
sense that models explain.12
Indeed, what many models do is to enable or justify the beliefs
scientists have towards claims of this sort. Claveau and Vergara
Fernández (2015) argue that models play an evidential role when
model propositions make a difference to one’s beliefs or justi-
fication for real-world propositions. When using a model, the
model propositions one knows enter her evidential network for
real-world propositions. Sometimes, these model propositions
make a difference by enabling belief in the real-world proposition
or by increasing justification. For instance, they show, as illus-
trated by the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model of the
labor market, that entertaining certain model propositions can
for instance increase the justification one has in the real-world
proposition that higher unemployment benefits lead to higher
unemployment. But besides this specific example, the fact that
modelling is such a widespread—and successful—epistemic ac-
tivity would be rather mysterious if model propositions would
not enter and make a difference to scientists’ evidential networks.
That models can and do provide evidence for propositions of the
12 Explanations are always given on the background of prior beliefs and compet-
ing explanations and this does not imply a pragmatic or psychological account
of explanation (see Woodward 2003, sec 5.12).
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form ‘♦(p because q)’ or ‘p because q’ should hardly be controver-
sial.
That said, one could ask in virtue of what exactly can models
provide such evidence. For my current purposes, I do not want
to take a particular stance on what constitutes these reasons to
believe. It might be by virtue of the model standing in some
suitable representation relationship with the world, e.g., of iso-
morphism (e.g. French and Ladyman 1999) or similarity (e.g.
Giere 2010). The model might be a fiction that licenses inferences
to the world (e.g. Suárez 2009). Solving the (difficult) problem
of how model propositions can correspond or license inferences
to world propositions is naturally out of the scope of this paper.
Nothing hinges on the specifics of how models provide these
reasons, we only need to grant that models do play this evidential
role.
Discussing one recent and influential account of models may
help to see the evidential role of models and its relationship to
possibility. Sugden (2000, 2009, 2011, 2013) argues, especially in
his more recent work, that posited similarities between models
and the world may license inductive inferences from the model to
the world. For instance, Sugden describes the inductive schema
of explanation where the facts that:
1. the explanandum ‘p’ is caused by the explanans ‘q’ in the
model world, and that;
2. both ‘p’ and ‘q’ occur in the world;
3. provide “reason to believe” that ‘p’ is caused by ‘q’ (Sugden
2000, 19, emphasis in original, 2013, p. 240).
Here the model propositions clearly enter into the modeller’s
evidential network. What happens in the model serves to justify
the inference to the world. While similarity is according to Sug-
den the key notion to license inductive inferences, he argues that
one important dimension along which to judge it is credibility.13
13 Sugden recently made this point explicit: “The fundamental explanatory con-
cept in my account of models is not credibility but similarity” (Sugden 2013,
p. 240). This puts into question to what extent his account is then different
from ‘isolationists’ accounts like Mäki (2009a) , but this is out of the scope of
the current chapter.
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In this context, credibility means that the confidence we have in
our inferences is “greater the extent to which we can understand
the relevant model as a description of how the world could be”
(Sugden 2000, 24, emphasis in original). Credibility in that sense
is not about considering that the model is real, but about judging
that it is compatible with one’s knowledge and beliefs about the
world (Sugden 2000, p. 25, 2009, p. 18, 2011, p. 718).
Using the account of HPEs developed here helps to clarify
Sugden’s views and the debate about them. In a discussion of
Schelling’s (1971, 1978) model of residential segregation, Sugden
(2011) argues that the 1971 model is an “explanation in search
of an observation” (2011, p. 722) whereas the 1978 model was
really trying to tell us something about the world. In other words,
the 1978 model is an explanation and the 1971 model is a poten-
tial explanation (e.g. Sugden 2011, p. 734).14 While Sugden does
not really define what he means by ‘potential explanation’, for
him the 1971 model is less credible than the 1978 one. It could
be real, but not in the same manner. Or consider how Sugden
argues against the ‘conceptual exploration’ (Hausman 1992b)
view according to which theoretical modelling is about explor-
ing the internal formal properties of models. Sugden believes
that the checkerboard model, especially the 1978 one, and Ak-
erlof’s (1970) ‘market for lemons’ go beyond mere conceptual
exploration. According to him:
they are sketches of processes which, according to
their creators, might explain phenomena we can ob-
serve in the real world. But the sense of ‘might explain’
here is not just the kind of logical possibility that could be
discovered by conceptual exploration (Sugden 2000, 11,
my emphasis; see also Sugden 2009, p. 23).
My account provides a ready-made clarification of what dis-
tinguishes the 1971 and 1978 models and of what demarcates
conceptual exploration from other more ambitious modelling
exercises. It locates the disagreement in the divergent interpreta-
tions of the possibility operator. In the terms I propose, Sugden
14 Sugden appears to use a pragmatic or instrumentalist account of explana-
tion (see Sugden 2013). Whether this is the right account and whether the
checkerboard provides a HAE or not is disputed (cf. Aydinonat 2007).
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argues that the checkerboard model goes beyond providing evi-
dence for claims of logical possibility. While he does not frame
the issue in terms of different modalities, it is clearly the under-
lying argument. As explained earlier, his notion of credibility
appears to be closer to a causal or epistemic interpretation of
modality. Likewise, we could interpret the difference between
the 1971 and 1978 models as one of modal appraisal. The 1971
model is not considered to be possible in the same sense as the
1978 one.
Furthermore, this may also help understand the source of the
debate between Sugden and rival accounts (e.g. Aydinonat 2007;
Grüne-Yanoff 2009; Mäki 2009a). Without clearly specifying what
sort of possibility commentators consider to be relevant for the
case at hand, they run the risk of talking past each other. My
account of HPEs is therefore not in disagreement with current
views of models. It rather provides a framework within which
we can think more clearly about the potential sources of disagree-
ments.
One potential major objection to my account comes from van
Riel (2015). He argues that models can’t provide HPEs since
many successful models do not describe possibilities, but rather
impossibilities. His argument is that since many of the entities
or processes postulated by models are conceptually impossible
(e.g., models of water as particles or as continuous medium
are inconsistent), then these models can’t be considered to be
HPEs. Indeed, many idealized entities and processes that models
contain could not, sensu stricto, possibly be the case. Sugden, for
instance, recognizes this state of affairs: “Economic models often
contain idealisations which, if interpreted literally, cannot be true”
(2009, 18, emphasis in original). But why is this not an obstacle?
The misunderstanding lies in taking model propositions at
their face value. Of course, if the possibility operator is applied
literally to them, then many, if not the vast majority, of models
will depict impossibilities.15 However, the objects of knowledge,
HAEs and HPEs, are not propositions about the model, but about
15 Van Riel (2015, p. 3845) is not concerned with logical possibility since it is
not the possibility typically relevant for scientific usage. His argument con-
cerns metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, and nomological interpretations of
modality.
136 how could models possibly provide hpes?
the world. A model does not provide a HPE in virtue of its model
propositions being literally true of reality. Instead, it provides
evidence for corresponding world propositions (Claveau and
Vergara Fernández 2015). Accordingly, we should not interpret
the possibility operator as directly bearing on the model proposi-
tions. Possibility judgments are rather on the appropriate world
propositions. For a given HPE of the form ‘♦(p because q)’ to
hold, it is thus not necessary that the model propositions of ‘p’ or
‘q’ are possible. It is simply required, as we have seen above, that
these model propositions be part of one’s evidential network for
the HPE.
In fact, as Van Riel’s (2015) own account of the content of
model-based information suggests, it is unclear to what extent he
would disagree with my proposal. Van Riel’s project is to provide
an account of the information supplied by models that deviate—
e.g., depict impossibilities—from reality. He suggests that using
a hyper-intensional operator of the form ‘according to model M
in context C, (p because q)’ allows propositions based on false
models to be factive and cancels ontological commitments. It is
hyper-intensional “in the sense that substitution of co-intensional
expressions may turn a truth into a falsehood” (van Riel 2015,
p. 3851). To use his own example, we can’t know that the differ-
ence between day and night is due to the sun circulating around
the earth since this is not actually the case. However, we can
know that according to the geocentric model, this proposition is true.
So it seems that van Riel and I partly have different projects.
He offers an account of model-based knowledge and holds that
models are not HPEs, i.e., that models do not literally provide
information about possibilities. On this we both agree. It seems
the potential confusion stems from not distinguishing properly
model propositions from real-world ones. But I see no reason
in his account and elsewhere to deny that model-based propo-
sitions may provide evidence for real-world claims of the form
‘♦(p because q)’. If anything, his account lays the ground for a
translation manual between model and real-world propositions—
which I here assume the feasibility—and thus concurs with my
views. I therefore do not believe that my account of HPEs is a
target for his arguments. Some false models may provide reasons
to believe that a given explanation is, or not, possible.
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That said, there might be a connection between the degree of
idealization of model propositions and their capacity to serve
as evidence for world propositions. That models misrepresent
and idealize is almost a platitude. Perhaps the ‘more impossible’
the model propositions, the less they can serve as evidence for
world propositions. However, to what extent certain idealizations
facilitate or hinder our capacity to learn about the world is an
important, but separate, question. There is no a priori reason to
doubt that some idealized models contribute to our knowledge.
Again, we here only need to grant that some idealized models
can indeed serve as evidence for world propositions. Bokulich
(2014), for instance, argues that some highly idealized models
may be closer to providing HAEs than others providing more
concrete causal details. Nonetheless, it might also be the case that
sometimes scientists do not restrict adequately their possibility
judgments. They may incorrectly consider some world proposi-
tions to be possible. One benefit of the proposed account of HPEs
is that it renders explicit the fact that possibility judgements are
made. This can allow to probe the interpretation of the modal
operator—e.g., causal possibility or epistemic possibility—as well
as the evidence provided for the judgements. If one considers
that a model provides evidence for a possibility claim, one needs
to justify why she thinks so. Knowing what sort of claim is put
forward is a first and significant step in its assessment.
Generalizing van Riel’s argument about impossibilities to cases
of modelling impossible targets (Weisberg 2013, sec. 7.2.2) may
however raise another challenge for my account. For instance,
Weisberg gives the example of a model of a perpetual motion
machine. Perpetual motion machines are nomically impossible.
For the machine to work, the physical laws would need to be dif-
ferent. These models can’t of course provide HAEs, but they also
can’t provide HPEs, or so it seems, since the target is nomically
impossible.
Yet, as I mentioned earlier in section 4.6, it appears that mod-
elling impossible targets is both a common practice and one that
is epistemically valuable. According to Weisberg (2013, pp. 128-
129), modelling impossibilities allows to learn about the con-
tingency of actual states of affairs by investigating alternative
possible histories. We can also learn their necessity by exploring
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what laws of nature would need to be different for a nomically
impossible fact to be merely contingent. Suppose one thinks that
a perpetual motion machine would be possible. Or simply sup-
pose that one does not know why perpetual motion machines are
impossible. By modelling one using actual physical laws, we can
learn why, in fact, it is not possible. The laws nomically prevent
the machine from working perpetually. We cannot have the laws
of nature we have and a perpetual machine.
Knowing impossibility claims of the form ‘¬♦(p because q)’ is
equally valuable as knowing claims of possibility. If the propo-
sition ‘q’ is nomically impossible, ‘♦(p because q)’ can’t be true
under a nomic interpretation. Some models thus give us true
propositions of the form ‘¬♦(p because q)’. Knowing possibilities
is especially important on the background of beliefs of impos-
sibility, whereas knowing impossibilities is significant on the
background of beliefs of possibility (cf. Grüne-Yanoff 2009). Both
should be regarded as HPEs.
When we say that a model provides a HPE, what it means
is that it provides reasons to believe that ‘♦(p because q)’. One
important question we may then ask is whether HPEs thus de-
fined constitute a genuine species of explanation, assuming that
propositions such as ‘p because q’ are explanations. More gener-
ally, in what relation do HPEs stand with respect to HAEs? Put
differently, HPEs do not explain actuality, but do they actually
explain? I think one major reason why we want to settle this
question is not so much for taxonomical reasons, but rather to
know whether HPEs are epistemically similar to HAEs. This is
especially important in the context of the puzzle of model-based
explanation.
One reason we may want to reserve the genus ‘explanation’ for
what we have so far called HAEs is because HPEs are unsatisfac-
tory answers to explanation-seeking why-questions. If I ask why
the financial crisis of 2007-8 occurred and one answers me in
return that it was possibly caused by the greed of bankers, I will
not be fully satisfied with the answer. I still will not know what
was actually responsible for the crisis, which was the information
my question asked for. Denying the explanation status to HPEs
thus sends the clear signal that HAEs are what we ultimately
care about. HPEs, all worthwhile they are and perhaps the best
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we can achieve in certain circumstances, do not actually explain
phenomena.
Van Riel (2015, p. 3846) makes a similar point when he argues
that since HPEs lack the actual ‘because’ explanatory entailment
usually associated with explanations, then they should not be
considered as such. Furthermore, it may also be philosophically
simpler since we do not have to provide an account of what
it is to ‘explain non-actuality’. Indeed, if HPEs are a genuine
species of explanation, additional analysis would be needed to
determine what is the explanans and explanandum of these
explanations. However, even if we accept that HPEs are not
HAEs—an uncontroversial point—, another crucial question that
arises is whether HPEs make epistemic contributions comparable
to HAEs. And if they do not, is it then appropriate to call these
both ‘explanations’?
A reason we may want to say that HPEs are genuine expla-
nations is because they may, like HAEs, afford understanding.
An important epistemic goal of science is understanding. Science
affords understanding of reality. One way it does so is by explain-
ing phenomena. As van Riel notes, a prime candidate argument
for the view that HPEs afford understanding is to consider they
are genuine explanations. For if they explain, then surely they
also afford understanding.
But, as I argued in chapter 4, it is also possible to make an
argument to the effect that HPEs, while not actually explaining,
afford understanding. Having a scientific explanation is a suffi-
cient condition for scientific understanding. But is it necessary?
And if propositions afford understanding, does this imply they
should be qualified as an explanation? Put differently, that propo-
sitions explain is a cue they afford understanding. However, if
propositions afford understanding, is it equally a cue that they
constitute an explanation? That HPEs may contribute to learning
(Grüne-Yanoff 2009, 2013a) or understanding (Rohwer and Rice
2013; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014; Rice 2016) has some support
in the literature. However, granting that HPEs afford understand-
ing does not imply they should necessarily be viewed as a species
of explanation. For one, Lipton (2009) argues that HPEs are a
prime case of understanding without having an explanation. If
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Lipton is right, then HPEs may afford understanding without
being explanations.
The previous analysis unfortunately does not provide a straight
answer about whether or not HPEs should be viewed as a gen-
uine species of explanation. What it does, however, is spell out
the commitments that come with using the notion of HPEs. On
the one hand, if HPEs are explanations, then it accounts for the
fact that they explain or are explanatory. This would provide a
straightforward answer to what sort of epistemic contribution
models providing HPEs make. However, we would need to moti-
vate further why they should share the genus ‘explanation’ with
HAEs whose contribution is in many respects superior. On the
other hand, if HPEs are not a species of explanation, this does
not necessarily imply they can’t afford, for instance, learning
or understanding. Nevertheless, more would need to be said
concerning the value of knowledge of possibility. In particular,
we need to understand better the conditions under which it can
inform us about the world.
5.6 conclusion
Although prima facie obvious, that what demarcates HPEs from
HAEs is the modal information they provide has been obscured
in previous discussions over HPEs. This single criterion is both
simple and clear while also acknowledging the idea that HPEs
make a genuine epistemic contribution in the form of knowledge
of possibility.
When all is said and done, both the Dray and Hempel-types
proponents were on the right track concerning many features of
HPEs. Supporters of the Dray-type were right to draw attention
to the fact that HPEs may make a genuine epistemic contribu-
tion. The crucial difference between HAEs and HPEs is the end
product, i.e., their particular propositional content, viz. claims
of possible or actual explanations. Hempel-type advocates were
right to downplay the difference between HPEs and HAEs inso-
far as HAEs also provide claims of possibility. In some cases, we
may lack the empirical support to establish a claim of actuality,
but may have enough for a possibility claim. In terms of form,
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they are not as radically different as the Dray-type would have
liked us to believe.
This characterization of HPEs makes plain what it is for a
model to provide a HPE: it provides evidence for propositions of
the form ‘♦(p because q)’. Knowing the general form of HPEs and
how models relate to them allows to assess with more precision
the contribution of particular models. Some models provide rea-
sons to believe the explanans is possible, others the explanandum,
or they may even provide evidence about their impossibility.
However, some questions remain open. Whether HPEs are a
genuine species of explanation is one of them. At any rate, if
we want the term ‘explanation’ to be reserved to HAEs—and
there might be good reasons for this—, then we should better
find a less confusing and more appropriate one for HPEs. While
it appears safe to claim that HPEs may afford epistemic benefits
in the form of learning or understanding, more work needs to be
done in order to clarify how exactly knowledge of possibility can
do it. But at least we now know better where to look and what
to look for.

6 NON-CAUSALUNDERSTAND ING WITHECONOMIC MODELS : THECASE OF GENERALEQU I L IBR IUM
6.1 introduction
In this chapter I am concerned with economic models in particu-
lar. Whether economic models explain economic phenomena and
thus provide understanding is a contentious debate (e.g. Haus-
man 1992b; Alexandrova 2008; Grüne-Yanoff 2009; Mäki 2009a;
Sugden 2009; Rice and Smart 2011; Reiss 2012b; Alexandrova and
Northcott 2013; Hindriks 2013; Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015;
Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). As we have seen in the previous
chapter, some proposals suggest that economic models afford
understanding by way of providing HPEs (e.g. Aydinonat 2007;
Grüne-Yanoff 2009, 2013b; Rohwer and Rice 2013; Ylikoski and
Aydinonat 2014).
One underlying idea behind these accounts is that HPEs, while
not actually explaining anything, still provide causal knowledge
that affords understanding. For instance, a model may show a
possible cause of a phenomenon. It appears such accounts are
successful in solving the puzzle of model-based understanding.
However, models that appear to neither provide actual nor possi-
ble causal knowledge have not been discussed. As the preceding
two chapters showed, there is a growing literature on non-causal
HAEs (e.g. A. Baker 2012; Baron et al. 2017; Batterman 2002; Bat-
terman and Rice 2014; Lange 2013, 2017; Pincock 2015; Reutlinger
and Saatsi 2018aSaatsi:2016aa) and on causal HPEs (e.g. Craver
2006; Forber 2010; Reydon 2012; Grüne-Yanoff 2013a; Bokulich
2014; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014; Rice 2016), but not on non-
causal HPEs.
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Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu’s (1954) seminal model
of general equilibrium therefore poses an interesting challenge
to philosophical and methodological accounts of models.1 Since
the model’s main contribution is a purely mathematical result,
viz. two existence theorems, it seems we should conclude that
the model can’t afford understanding of economic phenomena.
And yet, it does provide understanding according to economists,
despite not providing a causal account of the economy:
Not only have Debreu’s works contributed to mathe-
matical economics; they have contributed to the sci-
ence of economics as a whole. [. . . ] Even today, the
conceptual framework offered by general equilibrium
analysis is continuing to add to our understanding
of economic phenomena–and sometimes showing us
how little we really understand (Varian 1984, pp. 4-5).
Who can read them [Arrow-Debreu] without finding
their understanding of market power and the role of
markets deepened (Hahn 1985, p. 20)?
Therefore, whether you are a student, an economic
writer, a journalist, a policymaker, or an interested
citizen, if you want to understand modern macroeco-
nomics, you have to have passing familiarity with the
basic structure and properties of the ADM [Arrow-
Debreu-McKenzie model2] model [. . . ] (Athreya 2013,
p. 33).
But it was not until long afterward that this system
of equations [Walras’s] was scrutinized to ascertain
1 That Arrow and Debreu made a significant contribution to economics is rarely
disputed from within the discipline. The public recognition and the amount
of followers their work gathered are momentous. They are both laureates of
the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.
Arrow and Debreu (1954) is considered the “centerpiece” of the formalist
revolution of the 1950s in economics (Blaug 2003).
2 McKenzie (1954) also provided a proof of the existence of a general equilib-
rium. He too used Kakutani’s (1941) theorem, but his result was less general
because assumptions were made on demand functions instead of preferences
(Geanakoplos 2008).
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whether it had an economically meaningful solution,
i.e., whether this theoretical structure of vital impor-
tance for understanding the market system was logi-
cally consistent (Nobelprize.org 2014).
From the perspective of economics, that the Arrow and De-
breu (1954) model made a major contribution to understanding
has clear support. However, their work was also the target of
very harsh criticisms from economic methodologists, economists,
and philosophers alike. Commenting on the type of economic
research Arrow and Debreu contributed to establish, Blaug said
that “[t]he result of all this is that we now understand almost
less about how actual markets work, than did Adam Smith or
even Léon Walras” (2002, pp. 38-39).3 There is, to say the least, an
enormous discrepancy between considering the Arrow-Debreu
model worthy of receiving two Nobel prizes and considering
that we now understand less. The de facto significance of their
work is at odds with some of its critical appraisal. Following the
Arrow-Debreu model, do we understand less, or more?
I aim to answer this question. Relying on insights from the
previous chapters, especially chapters 2, 4, and 5, I offer an
example of theoretical modelling that yields knowledge of non-
causal dependence. More precisely, I argue that the Arrow-Debreu
model provides knowledge of mathematical dependence and
affords understanding. Basically, the model shows that, provided
certain assumptions are made concerning a competitive economy,
there exists a solution to the set of equations, thereby proving
the existence of a general equilibrium.
As I will argue, the model, while not exhibiting any actual
nor possible causal factors, nevertheless establishes mathematical
results that solved a long-standing puzzle of economic theory.
These results indicate how the solution mathematically depends
on the assumptions made. In short, the model provides a how-
possibly mathematical explanation of the general equilibrium.
This HPE, I argue, affords understanding not only of the model
itself, but also of the world. The account developed reveals how
mathematical knowledge can inform claims about the world,
3 Hands (2001, p. 294) also reports that for economic methodologists with Lako-
tosian leanings, general equilibrium theory perfectly exemplifies the problems
of contemporary economics.
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allow w-inferences, and thus improve our understanding. In what
follows, I trace the origins of the general problem Arrow-Debreu
addressed in section 2. In section 3 I briefly present the model.
Section 4 introduces an account of model-based understanding.
In sections 5 and 6, respectively, I discuss why we should consider
the Arrow-Debreu model to be a mathematical how-possibly
explanation and how it affords understanding of the world.
6.2 general equilibrium, from smith toarrow-debreu
The idea behind the concept of general equilibrium can be traced
back to Adam Smith’s ([1776] 1904) famous metaphor of the
invisible hand (Arrow and Hahn 1971; Arrow 1974; Debreu 1984,
2008; Geanakoplos 2008).4 Smith’s crucial insight was to see that
the unintended consequence of everyone’s pursuit of their self-
interest can coincide with the promotion of the collective good.
Individual participation in the economy, even though motivated
by self-interest, is “led by an invisible hand to promote an end
which was no part of his intention” (Smith [1776] 1904, p. IV.2.9).
Explaining social phenomena as being the unintended conse-
quences of individuals’ actions has since Smith been a central
theme of economics (Ullmann-Margalit 1978; Aydinonat 2008).
As a contemporary economics textbook introduces its subject to
its readers, “[o]ne of our goals in this book is to understand how
this invisible hand works its magic” (Mankiw 2012, p. 11).
At the time of The Wealth of Nations, Smith’s insight was more of
a conjecture than anything else (Stiglitz 1991). Indeed, he did not
provide any kind of mathematical argument for why we should
believe a mechanism or process such as the invisible hand would
work in the first place. His argument was very informal and not
rigorous by modern standards (Backhouse 1998). As Arrow and
Hahn (1971) note, common sense suggests it is impossible to
derive social benefit from purely self-interested motives. Yet, the
4 The origins of Smith’s idea can be found in earlier works, most famously
Mandeville’s ([1724] 1988) Fable of the Bees. Smith’s formulation has been the
most influential.
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invisible-hand hypothesis was sufficiently convincing as to foster
further investigations.5
The invisible-hand hypothesis can be understood as stating
that the interaction of individuals in a market economy will
result in a situation that is beneficial for all. The modern in-
terpretation of Smith’s invisible hand is the first fundamental
theorem of welfare economics (see Arrow 1951; Debreu 1959),
which says that “any competitive equilibrium is necessarily Pareto
optimal” (Mas-Collell et al. 1995, 308, emphasis in original).6 The
market for a commodity is in equilibrium when its supply equals
its demand. A partial equilibrium is one in which the supply
equals the demand in one market. But since prices in one market
ultimately depend on prices in other markets, that raises the
question whether there is an equilibrium in all markets. The
theorem says that a competitive equilibrium, a certain interpreta-
tion of a competitive economy where there is an equilibrium in
all markets, would lead to a Smith-like situation where private
interests mutually coincide. Crucially, the theorem says that if
there is such a thing as a competitive equilibrium, then it will be
Pareto optimal.
However, whether such an equilibrium can actually exist is a
deeply related but separate question. For if the equilibrium could
not exist, then it would be a significant blow to the invisible
hand hypothesis. If the economy can’t reach equilibrium, it is
more difficult to maintain that exchange in a market economy can
come to a point where both producers and consumers are content.
A major issue stemming from Smith’s idea therefore concerns
the existence of equilibrium insofar as the first fundamental
5 The oldest usage I could find of the ‘invisible-hand hypothesis’ label is due to
West (1970). It is now a more common way of talking of Smith’s invisible hand
(e.g. Reiss 2013b).
6 Some (e.g. Blaug 1996, 60, chap. 1, sec. 31; Backhouse 1997, pp. 128-130, 1998,
p. 1853; Reiss 2013b, chap. 12) have pointed out—rightly so—that the precise
formulation of the problem that preoccupied Smith underwent a significant
transformation under and since Arrow-Debreu. However, the fact of the matter
remains that practitioners view the general equilibrium model as a significant
contribution to the research agenda that Smith set. Smith was much more
concerned with the process that leads to market outcomes than with the
outcomes themselves. In contrast, as Hahn puts it, “GE [general equilibrium
theory] is strong on equilibrium and very weak on how it comes about” (1984,
p. 140). See also Blaug (1992, p. 163).
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theorem of welfare economics suggests that there is indeed such
an equilibrium.
An important first step into making the equilibrium argument
more rigorous was made by Léon Walras (1954) in his Elements
of Pure Economics.7 Whereas Smith’s argument was essentially
informal, Walras constructed a mathematical model. According
to Debreu (2008), only a mathematical model such as Walras’s
could fully account for the interdependence of all the variables a
general equilibrium presupposes. As Debreu explains, Walras’s
model still did not answer a fundamental question concerning
the general equilibrium, i.e., whether such an equilibrium existed
or not. The model rather assumed that there was a set of prices
and quantities where supply would equal demand. The main
argument supporting that belief was to count the equations and
the unknowns in the model and to observe that they were in equal
number (Debreu 2008).8 But as Debreu noted, that argument was
in no way definitive. In other words, it was not a proof. Yet, it
was common belief that the equilibrium—the set of prices and
quantities where markets clear—could exist despite the absence
of a definitive proof.
Arrow and Hahn (1971) explicitly linked investigations of gen-
eral equilibrium to the need to analyze logically the idea that
uncoordinated economic action can result in an equilibrium.
From Smith onwards there was a widespread belief that some-
thing akin to a general equilibrium could in principle exist, but
that belief was not fully warranted. The question of the existence
of the equilibrium was therefore by and large unanswered. The
Arrow-Debreu model was a seminal contribution to answering
this question. The existence problem only found a definitive
solution with Arrow-Debreu’s proof. Arrow and Debreu (1954)
“appeared to bring closure to an argument that was at least two
centuries old” (Weintraub and Gayer 2001, p. 421).
7 The book was originally published in French in 1874.
8 Blaug (1996, chap. 13) notes that Walras also tried to show by which mechanism
the equilibrium could actually be achieved—the tâtonnement process—which
in a sense can also be an argument in favour of the existence of general
equilibrium.
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6.3 the arrow-debreu model
Arrow and Debreu (1954) is a paradigmatic example of a math-
ematical model in economics. It is highly mathematical and its
connection to real-world phenomena appears to be at best in-
direct. Its main results “are two theorems stating very general
conditions under which a competitive equilibrium will exist”
(Arrow and Debreu 1954, p. 266). To establish these results, Ar-
row and Debreu used the axiomatic method. Essentially, the
axiomatic method consists in building a mathematical system
from basic propositions or postulates, namely the axioms. The
axioms are taken as the building blocks of the system and they
are then used to deductively derive the theorems, i.e., proposi-
tions that are not as basic as the axioms but are logically entailed
by them. The system thus built has a “mathematical form that is
completely separated from its economic content” (Debreu 1986,
p. 1265).9 The logical consistency of the mathematical structure
is independent of its economic interpretation.
Using the axioms, some additional assumptions, and mathe-
matical techniques—e.g. rules of inference—they made deduc-
tions about the logical properties of the system, deductions that
are, let me repeat it, in principle independent of any empirical
content. Arrow-Debreu defined a competitive equilibrium by
four conditions:
1. y∗j maximizes p
∗ · yj over the set Yj, for each j (Arrow and
Debreu 1954, p. 268)
2. x∗i maximizes ui(xi) over the set {xi | xi e Xi, p∗ · xi 5 p∗ ·
ζi +∑nj=1 αij p
∗ · y∗j } (p. 271)
3. p∗ e P = {p | p e Rl , p = 0, ∑lh=1 ph = 1} (ibid.)
4. z∗ 5 0, p∗ · z∗ = 0 (ibid.)
where Rl is the set of all vectors with l components, yj denotes
a production plan for the production unit j in the set Yj of
production plans, xi the consumption x of a consumption unit
9 Debreu (1984, p. 405), in his Nobel lecture, similarly explains what is axiom-
atization and how it was linked to the coordination problem Adam Smith
apprehended.
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i in the set Xi of consumption vectors, ui(xi) the utility derived
for unit i from consuming x, z is a vector whose components
are the excess demand over supply for the commodities, and the
asterisks (∗) equilibrium values, e.g., p∗ is an equilibrium price
vector.10
To establish the existence of the equilibrium, Arrow-Debreu
first needed to provide precise assumptions about a competitive
economy. Conditions 1 and 2 basically express the idea that pro-
ducers (1) and consumers (2) maximize their profits and utility,
respectively. Condition 3 says that prices are non negative and
not all zero and condition 4 normalizes prices. Conditions 1 and
2 are the ones most clearly connected to the Smithian idea of
individuals pursuing their self-interest. The competitive model
formalizes this pursuit since one important motivation behind
the model is to see whether it is compatible with a general equi-
librium. They then made the following assumptions about the
production possibilities and consumers’ preferences. Assuming
Y = ∑nj=1 Yj, then Y represents all the possible production plans
Y and (−Y) contains the additive inverse components of Y. Ω is
the non-negative orthant of Rl (Weintraub 1983, p. 35), i.e., a set
for which all components are part of Rl and are greater or equal
than 0. ui indicates the utility of the ith consumption unit. ζi
denotes the vector of initial endowment of various commodities
held by the ith consumption unit and αij is a contractual claim to
each production unit j’s share of profit.
i .a. Yj is a closed convex subset of Rl containing 0 (j = 1, . . . , n).
(Arrow and Debreu 1954, p. 267)
i .b. Y ∩Ω = 0 (ibid.)
i .c. Y ∩ (−Y) = 0 (ibid.)
ii . The set of consumption vectors Xi available to individual
i (= 1, . . . , m) is a closed convex subset of R1 which is
10 For a more exhaustive description or reconstruction, readers are invited to
consult the Arrow and Debreu (1954) paper itself, Weintraub (1983) or Geanako-
plos (2008). I am here first and foremost concerned with their methodology
and the main results they achieved. The exposition of the model will thus be
minimal.
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bounded from below; i.e., there is a vector ξi such that
ξi 5 xi f or all xi e Xi. (p. 268)iii .a. ui(xi) is a continuous function on Xi. (p. 269)iii .b. For any xi e Xi, there is an x′i e Xi such that ui(x′i) > ui(xi).
(ibid.)
iii .c. If ui(xi) > ui(x′i) and 0 < t < 1, then ui[ txi + (1− t)x′i ] >
ui(x′i). (ibid.)iv.a. ζi e Rl ; for some xi e Xi, xi < ζi; (p. 270)iv.b. for all i, j, αij = 0; for all j,∑mi=1 αij = 1. (ibid.)
To establish whether there could be a general equilibrium,
additional assumptions on the production possibilities and con-
sumers preferences needed to be done. Assumptions I.a–c define
the production plans and its constraints, namely that (I.a) produc-
tion plans are convex, which rules out increasing returns to scale,
i.e., productivity gains of adding inputs, that (I.b) it is impossible
to get an aggregate production plan without using any input, and
that (I.c) two production possibility vectors can’t exactly cancel
each other, i.e., one’s outputs can’t equal another’s inputs since
labour is also necessary and can’t be produced. Assumptions II–
III.c concern consumption behaviour. Assumption II defines the
consumption plans from which agents can choose. Assumptions
III.a–c posit how agents choose over the consumptions plans:
III.a continuity, III.b non-satiation, and III.c convexity of agents’
preferences. A continuous preference function ensures that there
are no big jumps in demand from small changes in prices. Con-
vexity means that agents prefer an average of commodities rather
than an extreme of one or the other. Non-satiation indicates that
there is no consumption bundle an agent would prefer to all
others, another bundle could be preferred. Assumptions IV.a and
IV.b concern the initial endowments. Based on the preceding
conditions of a competitive equilibrium and assumptions, they
then propose a first theorem, the proposition they need to prove.
theorem i. For any economic system satisfying Assumptions
I-IV, there is a competitive equilibrium (Arrow and Debreu
1954, p. 272).
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What the theorem says is that if an (economic) system satisfies
assumptions I–IV, then there exists an equilibrium such that it
satisfies conditions 1–4 of how they define a competitive equi-
librium. Having submitted the theorem, they next proceed to
prove it. The proof is purely mathematical. They first show that if
there is an equilibrium, then it necessarily satisfies the conditions
for a competitive equilibrium. They then demonstrate that the
plans the agents choose from satisfy assumptions I-IV and that
an equilibrium could be inferred from it, which necessarily is a
competitive one. The proof thus demonstrates that assumptions
I–IV are sufficient conditions for the existence, as defined, of a
competitive equilibrium.
In the fourth part of the article, Arrow-Debreu proposed to
establish the existence of the equilibrium, but by relaxing the
assumption (IV.a) that every agent has a positive amount of every
good for trading. They considered this assumption too strong—
i.e., unrealistic—and thus want to see if they can derive the same
result—the equilibrium—without it. Relaxing the assumption,
however, comes “at the cost of making certain additional assump-
tions in different directions and complicating the proof” (Arrow
and Debreu 1954, p. 280). Basically, they modified assumption
IV.a so that IV.a’ and IV.b are incorporated in IV’ and formulated
other ones (V, VI, and VII) to make the relaxation of IV.a possible.
I will not enter into the details of these new assumptions be-
cause what is ultimately important to note is not the assumptions
themselves, but the fact that Arrow-Debreu tested the robustness
of the existence of the equilibrium under changes of assumptions.
Suffice it to say that in effect they only supposed that agents can
supply at least one type of productive labour instead of owning
a positive amount of everything.
theorem ii For an economic system satisfying Assumptions I-
III, IV’, and V-VII, there is a competitive equilibrium (Arrow
and Debreu 1954, p. 281).
Theorem II is thus essentially the same as Theorem I (the equi-
librium exists), but derived from slightly different assumptions.
This shows that assumption IV.a is not necessary for the exis-
tence of the equilibrium, at least as it was initially formulated in
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the proof of the first theorem. In the fifth part they proved that
Theorem II is true.
I started this section by saying the model was highly mathe-
matical. However, it is not mathematical in the sense that it is
idealized and represents causal patterns using an abstract math-
ematical formalism. It is mathematical, I contend, in the sense
that the relevant facts and claims it establishes are mathemati-
cal, not causal. Yet, the model also appears to be populated by
producers and consumers who act on commodities, production
plans, prices, etc. Are not the relationships between these fun-
damentally causal? As Hahn emphasizes, “[t]he first important
point to understand about this construction [Arrow-Debreu equi-
librium] is that it makes no formal or explicit causal claims at
all” (Hahn 1984, p. 47). It does not claim that actual economies
will end up in an equilibrium nor does it describe mechanisms
or processes that could generate it. However, it is motivated by
what Hahn calls a “weak causal proposition” (ibid.), namely that
if a sequence of economic states reach an end state, then it will
necessarily be an equilibrium. This is because of the assumed
economizing action of agents who will engage in exchanges until
no one would prefer a different economic state. Conditions 1 and
2 above convey this weak causal proposition. This simply implies
that the axioms and assumptions are not arbitrarily chosen, they
are not “plucked out of thin air” (Hahn 1985, p. 12). That said, as
we will see in more details in section 6, it does not imply that the
main contribution of the model is causal. The motivation for the
model may have been partly causal, but the axioms and results
are not.
6.4 a mathematical hpe
Chapter 5, in particular, made the case that knowledge of rela-
tions of dependence obtained through HPEs may afford under-
standing. Does the Arrow-Debreu model make a similar contribu-
tion to our understanding of the world? Inasmuch as typical cases
of HPEs—e.g., the checkerboard model—afford understanding
via a HPE that provides causal information about phenomena
of interest—e.g., residential segregation—, I submit the Arrow-
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Debreu model affords understanding via a HPE that provides
knowledge of mathematical dependence about the general equi-
librium.
6.4.1 Mathematical explanations
To say that the Arrow-Debreu model is a mathematical HPE
raises an immediate issue: What is it to explain empirical phe-
nomena mathematically? In section 4.4 , I argued that there are
good reasons to believe causal knowledge is not necessary for
explanation and discussed one specific example, the Königsberg
bridges cases (Lange 2013; Pincock 2007; Reutlinger 2016). While
there are still many unresolved questions concerning the ex-
act role of mathematics in scientific explanations, there is wide
support to the idea that some scientific explanations explain in
virtue of the mathematical facts they cite (Lange 2017; Reutlinger
2017b).11
At first sight, it may appear that Sober’s (1983) account of
equilibrium explanation would readily fit the general equilibrium
case. However, whether so-called equilibrium explanations are
in fact causal is contentious (see e.g. Woodward 2003, pp. 6-7;
Kuorikoski 2007; Strevens 2008, 267ff.). Since what I ultimately
want to stress is that the HPE involved is essentially non-causal, I
prefer to remain agnostic towards the exact status of equilibrium
explanations. What is important for the point I am making is that
non-causal facts, mathematical ones I hold, are responsible for
affording understanding of the world.
To clarify how we could apply this idea of mathematical ex-
planation to the Arrow-Debreu case, let us discuss a simple and
intuitive example recounted by Lange (2013, p. 488):
That Mother has three children and twenty-three
strawberries, and that twenty-three cannot be divided
evenly by three, explains why Mother failed when
she tried a moment ago to distribute her strawberries
evenly among her children without cutting any.
In this case, it is ultimately not the physical facts about the
mother or the strawberries that explain why the mother failed
11 One dissenting view is Strevens (2018).
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to distribute them evenly. Out of mathematical necessity, she
possibly can’t divide evenly twenty-three units of anything by
three. One would not explain this impossibility by citing physical
facts about strawberries, the children, or what she exactly did
when she attempted to divide them. Of course, if the mother had
had twenty-four strawberries, then she would have been able to
divide them evenly between her three children. In a sense, an
explanation of the mother’s failure has to cite these facts.
Mathematical facts can only provide an actual explanation of
phenomena if there is a mapping or correspondence between the
mathematical facts and the physical ones (Pincock 2007; Bueno
and Colyvan 2011; Bueno and French 2012). But this only shows
that mathematical structures and properties can map on physical
facts, not that the latter are essentially responsible for the fail-
ure. In this example, the relevant facts are rather mathematical,
namely that there is no integer that multiplied by three equals
twenty-three. The mother failed this time as she and others would
also fail every single other time because of this mathematical
impossibility. This simple example illustrates quite clearly that
mathematical facts can explain empirical phenomena.
One feature of mathematical explanations is thus that they es-
tablish necessary conditions for their explanandum (Lange 2013;
Pincock 2015). According to Lange, mathematical explanations
show why a given explanandum is more than causally necessary.
They appeal to facts that are modally stronger than causal infor-
mation and constrain the causal space of possibility. They do not
explain by virtue of “describing the world’s network of causal
relations in particular, but rather by describing the framework in-
habited by any possible causal relation” (Lange 2013, p. 509). This
makes plain why the mathematical facts explain the mother’s
failure above. Even though her failure depends in a sense on
the specific physical facts of the situation, it depends more on
the mathematical impossibility. This sort of necessitation encom-
passes the physical facts that could obtain. This does not imply
that a given phenomenon can’t also have a causal explanation,
but simply that the mathematical facts necessitate it in a way that
causal ones can’t.
A notable difference between causal and mathematical expla-
nations is that the latter, instead of exhibiting causal dependence
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between explanans and explanandum, exhibit mathematical de-
pendence. There is nothing mysterious about this latter sort of
dependence. Claims of causal dependence can be established by
evaluating the truth of counterfactual conditionals of the form
‘Had antecedent A been, consequent C would have been’ on the
background of a set of relevant causal facts.
Similarly, to say that C mathematically depends on A simply
means that the truth of this counterfactual is evaluated on the
background of the relevant mathematical facts.12 It is in this
sense that the mother’s failure depends on the mathematical
impossibility of dividing equally twenty-three by three. Had the
mother had twenty-four strawberries, then she would have been
able to divide them equally by three.
It is also in this sense that the existence of the general equilib-
rium depends on the assumptions of the model. Had the aggre-
gate production set not been convex, thus implying increasing
returns to scale (assumption I.a in sec. 3), then the equilibrium
would not exist.13
We can see how this is connected to the account of under-
standing presented in the previous section. Knowing on what
the failure or the equilibrium depend, we understand why it is
so. Knowing the mathematical dependence allows to make w-
inferences about it. We are able to answer a range of w-questions
on the circumstances under which the mother would fail, or be
able, to divide the strawberries, or about the existence of the
equilibrium. In other words, we understand.
However, if the mathematical dependence in the strawberries
case explains the failure, the same is not true for the Arrow-
Debreu model. Indeed, it does not appear to provide an actual
mathematical explanation of general equilibrium. It fails to do so
for two reasons. Firstly, it seems it not to identify mathematical
facts on which the equilibrium would necessarily depend. When
mathematical conditions are only sufficient, we can’t know only
by appealing to them whether a phenomenon depends on them
12 Some accounts go further and reduce all modal notions of necessity and
possibility to the epistemology of counterfactual conditionals (Stalnaker 1968;
Lange 2005; Williamson 2007a; Kroedel 2012).
13 “Convexity really does perform a crucial role in the proof of existence; it is also
a very restrictive assumption and empirically very vulnerable” (Feiwel 1987,
p. 52). See also Debreu (2008).
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or not. This is because it may depend on another set of suffi-
cient conditions. Knowing that some conditions are sufficient for
bringing about a general equilibrium may therefore not be very
illuminating for there may be a number of other such conditions.
Secondly, it does not identify actual mathematical structures
or properties that map onto the world. An actual mathematical
explanation of general equilibrium would require identifying
that there is a mapping between the mathematical structure and
the phenomenon (Bueno and Colyvan 2011; Pincock 2007, 2012)
and showing how the phenomenon depends on some necessary
mathematical properties. In the case of the Arrow-Debreu model,
it is rather dubious whether there is such a phenomenon as the
general equilibrium in the first place and to what extent the
conditions for a competitive economy are satisfied.
6.4.2 A mathematical HPE
While the Arrow-Debreu model fails to be an actual explana-
tion of general equilibrium, we should view its contribution as
being a mathematical HPE. Causal HPEs, such as the checker-
board model, establish claims of causal possibility. Mathematical
HPEs establish claims of mathematical possibility. These claims, I
contend, may afford understanding of the world.
To make sense of the Arrow-Debreu model’s contribution to
understanding, it is first important to keep in mind the nature of
the problem that they were trying to solve (see sec. 6.2). As Rosen-
berg (1992, p. 202) observes, it was far from obvious that prices
and quantities in all markets could be determined simultaneously.
Yet, the invisible-hand hypothesis was nevertheless sufficiently
compelling for economists to believe it. We can interpret the
Walrasian tradition, Rosenberg says, as solving a ‘how-possible’
problem about the existence of the equilibrium. As Arrow and
Hahn put it, “[t]he proposition [the invisible-hand hypothesis]
having been put forward and very seriously entertained, it is
important to know not only whether it is true, but also whether
it could be true” (1971, vii, emphasis in original). Prior to Arrow-
Debreu, economists not only did not know whether it was true,
but also did not know if it could be true. There was no satisfac-
tory answer to this how-possible question. The very possibility
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of the equilibrium was not demonstrated. Thus, what the Arrow-
Debreu model did was not to establish that there is a general
equilibrium in actual economies. What it did was establishing its
mathematical possibility. It could, under the conditions specified
in the model, be true. It is in this sense that the Arrow-Debreu
model is a HPE.
However, even if we grant that the Arrow-Debreu model is a
HPE, we could say that the relevant modality is not mathematical.
The model would indicate how it could causally be true, not math-
ematically. For instance, one could say that the model showed
how interdependent processes of economizing action by con-
sumers and producers could lead to a general equilibrium. While
I agree that the Arrow-Debreu model can ultimately bear on
causal claims of this sort, it misinterprets the actual problem they
were trying to solve and their contribution. The ‘how-possible’
problem—i.e., the existence of a general equilibrium—was inher-
ently mathematical. Economists simply did not know whether
the equilibrium characterization of the economy was formally
consistent and admitted of a solution. Economists had already a
causal interpretation. They were lacking the mathematical form.
The novelty of the Arrow-Debreu model was not to describe
unthought-of causal factors or how they interact, but to prove
that within a given mathematical framework the equilibrium
necessarily exists. The ‘how-possible’ problem they were aiming
to solve was essentially a consistency check: Is there a set of
consistent assumptions for which an equilibrium exists? Answer-
ing this question was just a very difficult mathematical problem
which did not require describing and assessing causal factors.
Koopmans makes this point very explicitly:14
The test of mathematical existence of an object of anal-
ysis postulated in a model is in the first instance a
14 This is also consistent with how Arrow-Debreu motivate the empirical implica-
tion of the model: “The investigation of the existence of solutions is of interest
both for descriptive and for normative economics. Descriptively, the view that
the competitive model is a reasonably accurate description of reality, at least
for certain purposes, presupposes that the equations describing the model are
consistent with each other. Hence, one check on the empirical usefulness of
the model is the prescription of the conditions under which the equations of
competitive equilibrium have a solution” (Arrow and Debreu 1954, p. 265).
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check on the absence of contradictions among the as-
sumptions made. If we assume that not all members
of a body of contradictory statements can have empir-
ical relevance, this logical test has to be passed before
any question about the relation of a model to some
aspect of reality can seriously be raised (Koopmans
1957, p. 55).
The problem of existence is a mathematical problem, not a
causal one. Crucially, the existence theorems, and thus the equi-
librium, do not depend on a particular specification or inter-
pretation of causal facts, but on mathematical ones. As Debreu
emphasized, there is a “divorce of form and content” (Debreu
1986, p. 1265) (see also sec. 6.3) between the mathematical struc-
ture and its economic interpretation.
Following Ylikoski and Aydınonat’s (2014) terminology, we
can characterize Arrow-Debreu as providing a ‘mathematical
scheme’. Like the checkerboard model , which does not have a
specific target and can be applied to the general phenomenon of
segregation, the Arrow-Debreu model lays out a mathematical
framework, or template, which can be used to structure and
model relationships between variables. It is not about a particu-
lar phenomenon, e.g., general equilibrium in Canada, but about
general equilibrium in general. It is meant as a template that
can be applied to study the properties of equilibrium, or the ab-
sence thereof. The various axioms, definitions, assumptions, and
theorems of an axiomatic theory help us to represent economic
phenomena by providing “an empty schema of ‘possible realities’”
(Ingrao and Israel 1990, 285, emphasis in original). That schema
provides a mathematical framework in principle divorced from
its empirical economic interpretation, but a schema that also con-
strains the economic (causal) space of possibility. For instance, the
framework is incompatible with increasing returns to scale on the
production side or with the possibility of a Pareto improvement
while at equilibrium (Hahn 1984, p. 6). So while the existence of
the equilibrium does not depend on a specific economic interpre-
tation, the mathematical framework also constrains the possible
interpretations.
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6.5 arrow-debreu and understanding theworld
6.5.1 Understanding the model vs the world
If we accept that the Arrow-Debreu model is indeed a math-
ematical HPE, one could still object that it does not provide
understanding of the world, but merely of the model. A common
distinction made when assessing the epistemic contribution of
models is between understanding the model and understanding
the world. One understands the model when one gets a better
grasp of the model’s implications, how some results are derived,
whether some assumptions are robust, etc. Put differently, one
understands the model when one knows how its results depend
on its assumptions. I take it to be uncontroversial that the Arrow-
Debreu model provides such understanding of the model.15 But
if it is only about the model, then the precedence of the existence
question, as expressed by Koopmans (1957, p. 55) in the previous
section, would be rather puzzling. It is indeed a question about
the model, but whose answer can change the justification we
have for certain beliefs about the world. Therefore, it is also, at
least indirectly, a question about the world.
The contentious issue is thus how the model also provides
understanding of the world. As we have seen earlier in chap-
ter 2, one understands the world when one can make correct
w-inferences about it. Making correct w-inferences requires to
have knowledge of relations of dependence. To actually explain
a phenomenon implies showing on what it actually depends.
The analogy with causal HPEs is once again enlightening. The
checkerboard model, for example, does not establish on what
residential segregation actually depends. Yet, it is widely claimed
that the checkerboard model improved our understanding of the
world. Before the checkerboard model, we did not have reasons
15 In fact, one can find views along these lines from practitioners themselves,
for instance: “The question of the existence of a competitive equilibrium is of
course a question not about the world but about the model” (Koopmans and
Bausch 1959, p. 120). In a sense, this is obviously correct. When economists
prove the existence of a mathematical object within a set of equations, they are
at least answering a question about the model.
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to believe residential segregation could causally depend on the
preferences for not being in a minority status. The model showed
it was possible. It is a HPE.
Likewise, the Arrow-Debreu model does not show on what the
equilibrium actually depends, but rather that it can possibly exist
given certain conditions are met. In both cases—the checkerboard
and Arrow-Debreu models—knowledge of dependence plays a
crucial role in warranting beliefs about the world. Asked in an
interview about the relevance of the existence problem, Arrow
answered the following: “Therefore, I would like at least to be
sure that it is a coherent theory [general equilibrium theory].
That does not prove that the real world is like that, but at least
it gives me a chance” (1987, p. 197). The thought is that if it is
not possible to provide a consistent mathematical formalization
of the general equilibrium, then it is unlikely that it is an actual
empirical phenomenon.
This is because, as we have seen, claims of mathematical pos-
sibility are modally stronger than those about causal possibility.
Of course, mathematical possibility does not entail causal possi-
bility. The set of possible mathematical relations of dependence
is greater than the set of possible causal relations of depen-
dence. For the same reason, causal impossibility does not entail
mathematical impossibility. Some relationships may be causally
impossible, yet can be mathematically represented. However, if
a phenomenon is causally possible, should it not also be mathe-
matically possible? And if it is mathematically impossible, does
it imply that it is also causally impossible? As the various prac-
titioners quoted above pointed out in slightly different terms,
if one wants to know whether the invisible-hand hypothesis is
true, an important question one may ask is whether it could be
true. They considered that establishing a claim of mathematical
possibility would inform them about the world. Thus, Arrow and
Debreu (1954) provided a model that improves our understand-
ing of the real world conditions under which we can expect, or
not, a general equilibrium.
Backhouse (1997, p. 133) is right to say that our inability to
rigorously prove something does not imply it is not true. As
Arrow acknowledged above, economists’ inability to prove the
existence of the general equilibrium up until the first existence
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proofs (e.g. Wald [1936] 1951) did not imply that existence was
impossible. The existence proof relied on mathematical tools that
were developed in the decades before by, among others, Von
Neumann (1945) and Kakutani (1941). The theorem by Kakutani
was then used by Nash (1950) in order to establish the existence
of an equilibrium in a finite game (Debreu 2008). Basically, Arrow
and Debreu (1954) used the same mathematical machinery to
extend that result to a nth-agent game, the ‘economy’.
However, economists’ inability to prove existence can, and was
considered to be, evidence against it. As we have seen in section
5.5, models serve that evidential role when model propositions
make a difference to the justification we have about world propo-
sitions (Claveau and Vergara Fernández 2015). They do so by
strengthening the evidential network one has about these propo-
sitions.16 For instance, Theorem I in Arrow and Debreu (1954)
can contribute to justifying the belief that a general equilibrium
is causally possible, a belief many economists had, but which
was in need of further justification. Conversely, the absence of
a proof, or worse, an impossibility proof, could also serve as
evidence against its causal possibility. To those who perhaps be-
lieved it was impossible for the general equilibrium to exist on the
ground of mathematical impossibility, Arrow-Debreu showed it
was possible.17 They had to revise their beliefs. And to those who
already believed that it was possible, Arrow-Debreu strength-
ened their existing beliefs. The immediate goal of the model is
not to actually explain why there is a general equilibrium in
the world, but rather to investigate the conditions under which
it could exist. The model establishes mathematical dependence
16 There is a difference between the checkerboard model as accounted by Grüne-
Yanoff (2009) and the Arrow-Debreu model. For Grüne-Yanoff, a change of
confidence can only happen when a model 1) presents a credible model that
2) contradicts an impossibility thesis. The Arrow-Debreu model is usually not
considered to be credible and it does not contradict an impossibility thesis
since many economists already believed that it was possible.
17 Of course, the mathematical impossibility of an object depends on which
assumptions are used. Arrow’s (1963) famous impossibility theorem is a good
example of such an impossibility result. It is true that no rank-order voting
system can aggregate individual preferences and also can satisfy some set of
minimal conditions, but that does not mean that preferences can’t be aggregated
in general. Likewise, one could hold that the general equilibrium is impossible
on the ground of assumptions that are considered to be plausible.
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between a mathematical object, the competitive equilibrium, and
some assumptions one can make—or has to make—to derive
the object. While not actually explaining anything, its particular
contribution is the determination of various mathematical condi-
tions, sufficient and/or necessary, for the existence of a general
equilibrium. Arrow-Debreu provided decisive evidence against
the claim that it is mathematically impossible for the equilibrium
to exist under a relevant set of assumptions.
6.5.2 Arrow-Debreu and w-questions
However, even if we accept that the Arrow-Debreu model is a
mathematical HPE, one could say it remains unclear what w-
questions about the world it contributes to answer. Since it is
a central feature of the account of model-based understanding
presented earlier, this could put pressure on the claim that the
Arrow-Debreu model affords understanding of the world. The
model established a set of mathematical conditions on which the
equilibrium depends. These conditions constrain the space of
possibility within which the general equilibrium may receive an
empirical interpretation.
To give a more concrete example, in Arrow and Debreu (1954)
the assumptions are only jointly sufficient for equilibrium, not
necessary. However, they are not all equally dispensable. We have
already seen the critical role the assumption of convexity has.
To give another example, in proving Theorem II, Arrow-Debreu
illustrate what kind of w-questions their model can allow to
answer. Basically, they want to see what assumptions are needed
to derive the existence of the equilibrium. They do it by relaxing
assumption IV.a, which states that every individual has a positive
amount of each commodity. They consider this assumption as
“clearly unrealistic” (Arrow and Debreu 1954, p. 270). The proof of
Theorem II, which relies on slightly different assumptions needed
to relax IV.a, is an exercise the goal of which is to exhibit how the
results may change under modifications of the assumptions. It
shows that IV.a, at least in its initial form, is not necessary for the
existence of the equilibrium. However, whereas having a positive
amount of each commodity is not necessary, they assert that “to
have equilibrium, it is necessary that each individual possess
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some asset or be capable of supplying some labor service which
commands a positive price at equilibrium” (Arrow and Debreu
1954, p. 270). Changing the assumptions of the proof reveals how
the theorem depends on them and allows one to answer a range
of w-questions.
There is therefore a mathematical dependence relation between
the assumptions and the truth of the theorem. But this depen-
dence has implications for empirical interpretations. It allows, for
instance, to answer the following w-question: ‘What if agents had
no assets and no possibility to sell their labour at a positive equi-
librium price?’ One w-inference we can make is that there would
be no general equilibrium. This is because we know that such
an economic interpretation does not instantiate mathematical
properties considered necessary for the equilibrium. Answering
this w-question is only possible because we have knowledge of
mathematical dependence. This allows one to answer various
w-questions about the world. For instance, we would know that if
the world did not instantiate some conditions deemed necessary,
then a general equilibrium would not, out of necessity, ensue.
Conversely, we would know what features of the world would be
sufficient to obtain an equilibrium. Uncovering sufficient and nec-
essary conditions for equilibrium thus has the potential to allow
us to answer a range of w-questions about why the equilibrium
exists or not.
Looking at the cluster of models (Rodrik 2015; Ylikoski and
Aydinonat 2014) using similar assumptions can also provide a
much richer account of what relations of dependence are at play
and of which assumptions may be necessary. The checkerboard
model, for instance, has been subject to various robustness analy-
ses (see Aydinonat 2008; Muldoon et al. 2012) to establish under
what conditions segregation patterns can be expected.
In similar fashion, the Arrow-Debreu model has now been
subject for decades to similar robustness tests (e.g. Arrow and
Hahn 1971; Arrow and Intriligator 1982). In particular, under
what conditions the equilibrium is unique (are there multiple
sets of prices and quantities?) or stable (will an economy out of
equilibrium come back to the equilibrium value?) have been top-
ics of intense scrutiny. It was, for instance, a central motivation of
Arrow and Hahn to study those abstract mathematical relations
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of dependence and see “how robust this result [the existence of
general equilibrium] is” (1971, p. vii).
One goal of their book was to analyse the various conditions
under which general equilibrium would still hold. Later on the
same page they justify this practice the following way: “In at-
tempting to answer the question ‘Could it be true?’, we learn a
good deal about why it might not be true” (Arrow and Hahn 1971,
p. vii). Hands (2016) claims that seeing these attempts as deriva-
tional robustness analysis (see Woodward 2006; Kuorikoski, Lehti-
nen, and Marchionni 2010) is an accurate description of the prac-
tice. Derivational robustness analysis involves testing the sensitiv-
ity of a model’s derivations—e.g. existence of the equilibrium—to
changes of its assumptions. It can allow one to see what role
different assumptions play in driving the model’s results. Cru-
cially, derivational robustness analysis amounts to asking vari-
ous w-questions about changes of assumptions (Ylikoski 2014;
Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015). Hands also argues that prelim-
inary successes in robustness analysis increased the credibility
of the general equilibrium model. But, Hands notes, failures of
robustness in some respects, especially concerning stability, have
also reduced confidence in the model as the best characterization
of a competitive economy.
One could then object that since the project failed to uncover
robust conditions, then the Arrow-Debreu model can’t afford
understanding. However, as Arrow and Hahn noted above, we
can also understand “why it might not be true”. As it happens,
for economists, the model still has some important benefits in
that it “provides us with a clear benchmark against which to
measure the dysfunction of the real world [. . . ]” (Athreya 2013,
p. 33).18 That the model can serve as a benchmark19 supposes that
economists are fairly confident that the conditions they have for
equilibrium are relevant for studying the actual world, perhaps
that they are quasi-necessary or sufficiently good approximations
of what would be required in the world.20 It supposes that the
18 See also Hahn (1973) for a similar justification.
19 A role that Debreu (1986, p. 1268) recognized.
20 One way of understanding the notion of ‘quasi-necessity’ is in terms of necessity
relative to a particular context or modality. Some conditions may be necessary
in a context, but not in another. Or some ‘necessary’ conditions may themselves
be necessitated by modally stronger modal facts (see Lange 2009).
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knowledge they have concerning the conditions under which
the equilibrium exists can be used, as a matter of fact, to answer
w-questions. For instance, it gives a framework in which actual
deviations like informational asymmetry can be studied (e.g.
Akerlof 1970). Instead of affording understanding why there is a
general equilibrium, the model may afford understanding why
there is not.
Stiglitz assesses in similar terms Arrow-Debreu’s contribution.
According to him, their achievement was not to prove that the
equilibrium generally exists, but instead it “was to find those
special and limiting conditions under which the Invisible Hand
theorems hold” (Stiglitz 1991, p. 18). Since we know that the
world does not instantiate certain conditions specified by the
model (e.g., some markets have increasing returns to scale), we
may understand why there is no equilibrium. What may make
the (broadly construed) Arrow-Debreu model suitable as a bench-
mark is thus not its causal similarity to the actual world, but
that it states conditions that economists consider quasi-necessary
for the equilibrium. The mathematical relations of dependence
constrain sufficiently the economic space of possibility. Despite
the lack of similarity to the actual world, the model may there-
fore allow to make w-inferences about real world phenomena.
As Hahn aptly puts it, the aim of the model “is not realism but
aid to understanding” (1985, pp. 20-21).
Finally, one might—rightfully—worry that any mathematical
model could afford understanding of the world. This would
indeed be an undesirable consequence. A good account of model-
based understanding should be able to discriminate between
mathematical models that afford understanding and those that
do not. I addressed similar worries in section 4.6 and in chapter 5.
According to my account of HPEs, they have the following form
‘♦(p because q)’. Hence, it first crucial to specify the modality of
the possibility operator. Then, we need to assess the truth—i.e.,
possibility—of the HPE. Moreover, to provide understanding a
model has to allow one to answer w-questions about the world,
as the checkerboard model does, for instance.
However, not all models can allow to answer such questions.
For instance, a mathematical relation of dependence that could
not receive any relevant empirical interpretation could not be
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used to answer w-questions about the world. Moreover, mathe-
matical relations of dependence that would not constrain at all
the space of empirical possibility would simply not exhibit on
what a phenomenon depends. Even though the account is in
principle liberal regarding what can afford understanding, not
anything goes.
One compelling reason why the Arrow-Debreu model passes
this test—that of offering a true HPE—is that economists by and
large regard it as establishing a (true) claim of mathematical
possibility. Not all models pass it though. For instance, Walras’s
(1954) model came close, but ultimately fell short of offering the
mathematical HPE economists sought. One might object that
practitioners can be wrong. This can indeed be the case, but as I
argued in section 1.1.2, it is also to some extent undesirable for a
philosophical account to conflict with practitioners’ judgements.
That the Arrow-Debreu model actually affords understanding of
the world is a good explanation of why practitioners consider
it does. In turn, that the model provides a mathematical HPE
is, I contend, a good explanation of why the model affords said
understanding.
6.6 conclusion
There is now a vast literature on non-causal HAEs as well as
on causal HPEs. My goal with this chapter was to fill a gap in
the literature by discussing a case of what I take to be a non-
causal HPE, namely the Arrow-Debreu (1954) model of general
equilibrium.
The model, in the eye of economists, affords understanding. I
argued that it affords understanding understanding in virtue of
being a mathematical HPE. Being so, the model provides knowl-
edge of mathematical dependence that can be used to answer var-
ious questions about the real world. Viewing the Arrow-Debreu
model as providing knowledge of mathematical dependence
allows to interpret it as making a genuine contribution to our
understanding despite the fact that it does not provide us with
knowledge of causal dependence.
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This interpretation contributes to elucidate partly the discrep-
ancy between the different appraisals of the model’s contribution
to understanding. The model does not provide causal knowl-
edge, yet its contribution to our knowledge, mathematical in this
case, is difficult to dispute. That knowledge, in turn, also affords
understanding of the world we live in.
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So, to respond to one of my supervisor’s worry, did I give eco-
nomics a free pass to absolution? I have tried to provide an epis-
temological framework that clarifies how we should think and
reason about the epistemic contribution of theoretical modelling.
As far as I am concerned, the absolution—or condemnation—is
still up for debate.
As much as I endeavoured to come up with definitive answers
about the ‘explanation paradox’, it might also give the impression
that I raised more questions than I have answered. As long as we
can think more clearly about what are the truly significant ques-
tions to answer, I will consider that an important desideratum
has been fulfilled.
There are fours main areas where I think further research
would be particularly important and helpful.
7.1 measuring understanding
One first area in need of additional investigation concerns the
evaluation, or we could say measurement, of understanding. In
chapter 2, I raised various doubts about InfBUn viewed as a sub-
stantive account of understanding. I argued that the evaluative
interpretation was preferable.
However, although that second interpretation does not face
the same crucial objections, it is still wanting in two main re-
spects. First, one feature of knowledge or understanding that the
epistemological literature emphasizes is that they are a cognitive
achievement because of ability. However, that relation ‘because
of’ relation has proven to be very elusive. Shall we construe it in
causal-explanatory terms (e.g. Greco 2010) or in strictly disposi-
tional ones (e.g. Sosa 2007)? And what are the relevant abilities
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we should deem responsible for understanding? What are the
cognitive processes that underlie these abilities?
Furthermore, it seems this is not only a philosophical question,
but also an empirical one. For instance, many suggest that the
notion of ‘grasping’ captures an important feature of genuine
understanding (e.g. Grimm 2014; Strevens 2013). But, as Trout
notes, “[i]f we had a psychologically informed and empirically
rigorous account of ‘grasping’, that would go a long way toward
characterizing understanding. But we don’t” (2018, p. 238). Em-
pirical work could definitely inform our philosophical theories of
understanding. In the meantime, it is not clear how philosophy
can contribute to clarify the ‘because of’ relation without more
empirical input.1
Second, we simply lack explicit, accepted, and exhaustive met-
rics of evaluation. Actually performing w-inferences may be very
good evidence for understanding across scientific contexts. But
it can’t be the whole story. Shall we only look at behaviour?
Probably not. And is making inferences the only behaviour that
matters? Here, the existing work on explanatory power may be a
fruitful avenue of inquiry (e.g. Cohen 2016; Lipton 2004; Schup-
bach and Sprenger 2011; Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010). Since
explanation and understanding are intimately linked, we may
expect measures of explanatory goodness and of understanding
to be related. However, if understanding and explanation also
come apart, as I hold they do, then we should also expect the
metrics to not be fully similar.
This also raises the question as to who should decide what
makes a good explanation or understanding. Philosophers have
traditionally monopolized that discussion using good old concep-
tual analysis. But there is also experimental work that studies folk
attributions of understanding and explanation (e.g. Wilkenfeld,
Plunkett, et al. 2016; Wilkenfeld and Lombrozo 2018; Wilken-
feld, Plunkett, et al. 2018). What is the relevance of these results
for our philosophical theories of understanding? Shall we trust
philosophers’ intuitions about how best to evaluate understand-
ing? Growing work in experimental philosophy suggests we
should not (see Machery 2017). In any case, there is room for a
thorough investigation of these questions.
1 Trout (2018), for one, is sceptical.
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7.2 broad knun, hpes, and modality
Broad KnUn, the epistemology of understanding I argued for
in chapter 4, relies on the notion of ‘possibility’. The account of
HPEs I presented in chapter 5 also uses the modal notions of
possibility and actuality to demarcate HPEs from HAEs. Accord-
ing to that account, HPEs are simply propositions of the form
‘♦(p because q)’. These propositions can also be true of false. This
supposes that:
1. We can specify the relevant interpretation of the modality
operator.
2. We can indeed evaluate the truth of possibility claims.
As I acknowledged throughout the thesis, my proposal delib-
erately left open these issues. My goal was to convince the reader
that a key distinction we needed to make when assessing the
epistemic contribution of models lay in the distinction between
actuality and possibility.
However, a truly complete and general account of broad KnUn
and of HPEs would need to answer these questions. Accordingly,
I believe that one fruitful avenue of inquiry would consist in
unpacking the various interpretations and truth conditions of the
possibility operator. For instance, are some modal interpretations
prior or stronger than others (Kment 2014; Lange 2009)? What
are the most frequent or adequate interpretations of modality in
the sciences? Can all kinds of modality afford understanding, or
only a subset of them (e.g. causal possibility)?
Provided we can map out the different sorts of modality, we
still need to know how to assess their truth. Whether or under
what conditions we have epistemic access to modal truths is
contentious (Machery 2017; Williamson 2007b). Williamson pro-
vides one potential line of defence. For him, modal judgments
are just of the same type as ordinary instances of counterfactual
judgments. Since we have good reasons to think we can evaluate
the truths of some counterfactuals, then that we can assess the
truth of some HPEs is not that far-fetched. However, we are nev-
ertheless still far from having a comprehensive account of that
works across all modalities. For example, what sort of evidence
do we need to judge that something is causally possible?
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Answering all these questions would have required delving
into the epistemology of modality and other deep metaphilo-
sophical issues. While this was beyond the scope of this thesis, it
would certainly be important to address them.
7.3 models as evidence
Another area concerns the evidential role of models (see Claveau
and Vergara Fernández 2015; Grüne-Yanoff 2009). Although I
found the evidential view a very fruitful way of approaching the
epistemic contribution of models, I was surprised by the resis-
tance I faced when discussing with fellow colleagues. Indeed,
there is this widespread conception that the models themselves
somehow are similar to their target or that they are the explana-
tion.2
As I explained, I rather consider that HAEs or HPEs are world
propositions and that building and manipulating models—and
their model propositions—change the justification we have in
the world propositions. This moves the focus away from talk-
ing about, for instance, idealizations or scientific representation.
While we may still need, for instance, to talk about idealizations
to assess the evidence, it nonetheless changes the focus.
All that said, we do not currently have a fully-fledged account,
pace Claveau and Vergara Fernández (2015), of how models can
serve that evidential role. Under what conditions models may
serve as evidence for world propositions like explanations? How
should we assess contextual features? A piece of evidence is
always evidence on a given background.
Also, models usually do not come alone, but in families or
clusters: what is thus the proper unit of analysis (Aydinonat 2018;
Vergara Fernández 2018; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014)? Likewise,
how is the evidence socially conceived and processed? Science is
a social institution and thus it seems social epistemology could
inform our account of models as evidence.
2 This position is different than the so-called ontic conception of explanation (see
Wright 2015). The confusion lies in taking model propositions at face value and
thus carrying the explanatory work.
7.4 non-causal generalizations 173
Many of my arguments relied on the descriptive accuracy of
the premise that models actually do serve an evidential role.
While I think this was a reasonable and modest claim, there is
still work to be done on the descriptive and normative fronts.
7.4 non-causal generalizations
A final area where I believe we could, no, need to make significant
progress concerns the distinction between causal and non-causal
explanation. As I showed in chapter 4, inquiries about non-causal
forms of explanation are thriving (e.g. Lange 2017; Reutlinger and
Saatsi 2018a). I also argued in chapter 6 that the Arrow-Debreu
(1954) model of general equilibrium provided a mathematical
HPE. I made that argument on the basis of current accounts of
non-causal explanation.
However, we lack a thorough understanding of what demar-
cates non-causal generalizations (or facts) from causal ones (Reut-
linger 2016). Causal explanations explain and afford understand-
ing in virtue of the causal generalizations they use. In the same
way, non-causal explanations explain and afford understanding
on the basis of non-causal generalizations. Then, what are their
respective features? Do we need an account that distinguishes
between different layers and strengths of necessities (Lange 2017),
or shall we instead refine the counterfactual framework to accom-
modate mathematics (Baron et al. 2017)?
In any case, that understanding is crucial if we want to ade-
quately delineate the different types of explanation. Moreover,
this can only enrich our grasp of what role mathematics play in
our understanding of phenomena.
We may not have all the answers about understanding with
models. At least, I hope we now know better what next questions
to ask.

SAMENVATT ING (SUMMARY )
Het gebruik van theoretische modellen brengt veel epistemolo-
gische uitdagingen met zich mee. Modellen lijken economische
fenomenen te verklaren, maar er lijken ook cruciale kenmerken
aan te ontbreken die theorieën over wetenschappelijke verklar-
ing gewoonlijk vereisen. Ze lijken bijvoorbeeld geen getrouwe
weergave te geven van de relevante causale factoren.
Mijn proefschrift beoogt een antwoord te geven op de volgende
centrale en algemene vraag: wat kunnen we leren van theoretis-
che modellen? Het doet dit door aan te tonen dat modellen
epistemische voordelen kunnen bieden in de vorm van begrip,
zelfs wanneer ze niet echt verklaren of wanneer ze geen causale
kennis opleveren.
Het tweede hoofdstuk van mijn proefschrift kijkt naar de
inferentialistisch-behavioralistische theorie van begrip en stelt
deze theorie geen onderscheid kan maken tussen het gevoel van
begrip en echt begrip. Ik stel dat we deze theorie kunnen zien als
een evaluatieve theorie van begrip in plaats van een inhoudelijke.
Het derde hoofdstuk analyseert een mogelijke oplossing voor
het probleem van de representatie, namelijk een oplossing die
gevonden kan worden in de feitelijke versie van inferentialisme.
Ik beargumenteer echter dat deze theorie geen onderscheid kan
maken tussen verklarende representatie en slechts fenomenolo-
gische representatie. Ik concludeer dat het inferentialisme dus
voor een dilemma staat. Het vierde hoofdstuk schetst wat ik de
‘smalle kennistheorie van begrip’ noem en toont vervolgens aan
dat de twee centrale claims die deze maakt, namelijk dat men
alleen iets begrijpt als 1) men kennis heeft van oorzaken en 2) dat
deze kennis gevormd wordt door een verklaring, onhoudbaar
zijn. In het vijfde hoofdstuk wordt een nieuwe theorie van ‘how-
possibly’ verklaringen ontwikkeld, waarin wordt beweerd dat
wat deze verklaringen onderscheidt van ‘how-actually’ verklarin-
gen is dat de eerste kennis van de mogelijkheid verschaft, terwijl
de laatste kennis van de actualiteit verschaft. Het zesde en laatste
hoofdstuk is een gedetailleerde case study van de algemene even-
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wichtstheorie in de economie. Ik beargumenteer dat het model
een niet-causaal begrip biedt via een wiskundige how-possibly
verklaring.
SUMMARY
Theoretical modelling raises many epistemological challenges.
Models appear to explain economic phenomena, yet they also
seem to lack crucial features theories of scientific explanation
usually require, for instance faithfully representing causal factors
of interest.
My doctoral thesis aims at answering the following central
and general question: what, if anything, can we learn from theo-
retical models? It does so by showing that models may provide
epistemic benefits in the form of understanding even when they
do not actually explain or when they do not provide causal
knowledge.
The second chapter of my thesis examines the inferentialist-
behavioural account of understanding and argues that it does
not allow to distinguish between the sense of understanding
and genuine understanding. I submit that we can view it as
offering an evaluative account of understanding instead than a
substantive one. The third chapter analyses one purported solu-
tion to the problem of representation, namely the factive brand
of inferentialism. I argue the account can’t distinguish merely
phenomenological from explanatory representation and conclude
by presenting a dilemma inferentialism faces. The fourth chap-
ter characterizes what I call the narrow knowledge account of
understanding and then shows that its two tenets, i.e., that one
understands only if 1) one has knowledge of causes and 2) that
knowledge is provided by an explanation, are untenable. The
fifth chapter develops a novel account of how-possibly explana-
tions which claims that what demarcates these explanations from
how-actually explanations is that the former provide knowledge
of possibility whereas the latter provide knowledge of actual-
ity. The sixth and final chapter is a detailed case study of the
general equilibrium case in economics. I argue that the model of-
fers non-causal understanding via a how-possibly mathematical
explanation.
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